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PART VII.

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## THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND.

THE success or failure of the Catholic University of Ireland is a matter in which not Ireland alone is interested. While, in the event of a success at all commensurate with the hopes of its projectors, the sister island would reap the principal share both of the glory and of the profit, it is certain that English and colonial Catholics—nay, the whole English-speaking Catholic population of the world—would all be more or less benefited; and similarly, the collapse and failure—*Dii avertant omen*—of so great an enterprise, while it redounded principally to the disgrace of Ireland and the detriment of all Catholic interests in that country, would entail some share in the loss, some participation in the shame, on those Catholics in other parts of the empire who joined in laying the foundations, but have perhaps been too neglectful of the progress of the superstructure. Justifying the proceeding, therefore, on the plea of community of interest, we shall take this opportunity of briefly reviewing the present state of the Catholic University, and consider what measures may be necessary or expedient to secure for it a brilliant and useful future.

We have not been able to procure any calendar, or other authoritative document, showing the actual state of the Catholic University during the present session; but from the most reliable information which has reached us, it would appear that the number of its students does not exceed that of last year, and is rather on the decrease than otherwise. We are confident that we do not understate the number of *bonâ fide* matriculated students, when we estimate it as under fifty. It is true that there is a flourishing medical school in connection with the University; but the fact affords no criterion

of the general success of the institution. The medical school in Cecilia Street existed before the University came into being, and would continue to exist if the University were to be closed to-morrow. The condition of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, or Arts, is the true test of the progress of any university. Tried by this test, the Catholic University offers no reassuring ground of confidence to its well-wishers.

With regard to the government of the University, it would appear that it has been carried on for the last few months in conformity with the decisions announced in the pastoral of the Irish Episcopate dated in November last. No rector has been appointed; but the episcopal board to which the affairs of the institution have been intrusted have had occasional meetings, at which some important decisions have been arrived at. By one of these, the examination for entrance has been remodelled; by another, the fees charged to extern students have been reduced by two-thirds of their amount. This latter change has been made so recently, that its effects have not yet had time to manifest themselves.

The inauguration of this University board was undoubtedly a very wise and desirable measure, both with a view to increase public confidence in the institution, and also as furnishing a convenient and readily accessible channel through which the future rector could learn the predominant sentiments of the Episcopate and the whole clergy, and in turn communicate to them his own views, upon all the more important academical questions. It supplied a missing link in the chain which should bind the University in closest union with the religious and national life of Ireland. But in this chain, it must not be forgotten, an efficient rector is a link yet more indispensable. Without such an officer, the University has neither a will nor a hand; its mechanism may be perfect, but the *power* has been left out.

To complete this brief sketch of the present state of affairs, it must be mentioned that the University is still without a charter from the crown, and therefore cannot legally confer degrees upon its students. With regard to the medical school, the disqualification is of little consequence; since the licenses or diplomas of medical men are not with us, as in most foreign countries, issued solely, or even chiefly, by universities, and the existing licensing bodies have all, or nearly all, recognised the school in Cecilia Street as a fit and qualified place of medical education. But upon students in all the other faculties the impossibility of obtaining a degree cannot but operate as a serious hardship.

It may be useful, after returning from a survey in which we have found so little to cheer us, to cast our eyes across the water, and examine the actual condition of a sister institution, which the founders of the Catholic University of Ireland were expressly desired by the Holy Father to look to as their model. We refer to the University of Louvain. We really do not know of one eminent advantage, nor of one serious drawback, which the University of Louvain does not share with her less prosperous sister. Belgium has a large Catholic population; so has Ireland. The Catholic University of Belgium was founded and favoured by one Roman Pontiff; so was that of Ireland by another. The universities in Ireland supported by the state are Protestant or secular; those in Belgium which receive the same support are secular or infidel. How is it, then, that the inquirer into the fortunes of Louvain beholds a scene of unchequered activity, animation, and success, existing under conditions so similar to those with which the Irish University appears at present unable to cope?

The prosperity of our neighbours is, or should be, a pleasing subject of contemplation at all times; but when in that prosperity we find matter of warning, humiliation, or encouragement for ourselves, it becomes doubly interesting to trace the steps by which it was attained, and to examine the conditions of its permanence. Of such an instructive career of success we find a record in the *Annuaire de l'Université Catholique de Louvain* for the year 1860. This institution, as we said before, furnished the model upon which the Catholic University of Ireland was framed; and if the fortunes of the two have been widely different,—if the one has nothing but success to point to, the other, at best, a chequered and fitful career, divided between good and ill,—the supporters of the younger institution may perhaps find an explanation of the causes of much in its history that has saddened and disappointed them in a careful review of the circumstances and modes of action which at Louvain have issued in an unexampled prosperity.

In the first place, those too liberal Catholics who maintain that a Catholic university is not wanted, and that the materials do not exist in Ireland out of which it can be formed, may be surprised to hear that in a country with a Catholic population considerably smaller than that of Ireland, and in the face of the rivalry of the non-Catholic Universities of Ghent, Liège, and Brussels (which hold a corresponding position to the Queen's University in Ireland, and, like it, are supported and patronised by the government), the number of

students at Louvain has regularly and steadily increased, until, from 86, the number registered in 1835, the opening year of the University, it has swelled in 1859 to 754.

In the next place, those too ardent well-wishers of the Catholic University of Ireland who would literally kill it with kindness, and while claiming for it privileges too exalted to be realised, neglect the practicable and attainable advantages which lie at their feet, must be informed that the successful and triumphant institution of which we speak does not pretend, in the case of the vast majority of its students who seek degrees, to confer those degrees of its own authority, but sends them before a mixed "jury," or board of examiners, appointed by the state, who stand in precisely the same relation to Louvain as to the non-Catholic Universities of Ghent and Brussels. In the year 1829, three hundred and twenty-five academical degrees of all kinds were conferred on students of Louvain by the mixed juries, while only twenty-three degrees, of which fifteen were in theology and canon-law, were conferred by the University itself.

The question now arises, whence this extraordinary difference in the respective careers of two institutions founded under the same auspices and upon the same principles? How comes it that Louvain, in the fifth year of its existence, had 490 students on its roll, against 86 students in the first year; while the Irish University, in the sixth year of its existence, has notoriously not increased its numbers above what it could boast of at the very opening of its schools?

To this question it seems to us that a simple and intelligible answer can be given. First and foremost,—for Louvain the right man has been found. Monsigneur de Ram, the rector, has administered the affairs of the University with unflagging zeal and incomparable ability during twenty-five years. To the Irish institution a man of genius was only lent for a time, and then snatched away:

"Ostendent terris hunc tantum fata, neque ultra  
Esse sinent."

Secondly, at Louvain a rational and practical arrangement was adopted from the first, under which its students were enabled to obtain, on equal terms with those of any other Belgian university, *available* certificates of intellectual attainment, in the shape of state degrees. People are too apt to fancy that the knowledge gained is every thing, and the formal acknowledgment of it little or nothing; but the notion may easily be carried too far. It is good to have a lump of gold; but it is far better to have that gold coined into sovereigns, and stamped with a known authentic stamp, be-

cause then your gold will be *available*, it will pass current in the world. So it is with degrees: to have the knowledge is a good thing; but to have it recognised by competent and public authority is far better. It is to be noted also, that the hope of obtaining such recognition, in other words, of taking a degree, animates many to labour for the attainment of knowledge to whom the love of it for its own sake would not have been a sufficient spur, and acts as an additional stimulus to all.

Let us turn now to the Catholic University of Ireland. There is no present provision by which a student matriculated in it can take a degree, either in arts, law, or medicine, which the state and general society will recognise. The late government was applied to for a charter empowering the University to confer degrees, and Mr. Disraeli appeared to lend a gracious ear to the proposal. Those who were simple enough to believe in the possibility of a genuine alliance between Irish Catholics and English Tories predicted with eager confidence the speedy realisation of these hopes. But the delusion was soon dispelled. A well-timed question from Lord Shaftesbury, put on the eve of a critical division, when to coquet with a dozen Irish Catholics might have imperilled the support of a hundred English Protestants, drew from Lord Derby the declaration, that "the government had no intention of advising her Majesty to grant a charter to the Catholic University." From the present government there is, of course, not the slightest chance of obtaining such a charter as was asked for from Mr. Disraeli; they having taken every opportunity since they came into power of declaring their intention to support the system of mixed education.

This, therefore, is the state of things at present,—the Catholic University has no rector, and any student who enters it must, so far as appears, renounce the hope of taking a degree which will be of any use to him. Let us consider these two disabilities separately.

It is surely unnecessary to use many words in order to demonstrate that a young and struggling institution cannot possibly flourish—can, in fact, only decline and deteriorate,—so long as it has not one active and responsible ruler. As well expect the solar system to go on and prosper without the sun, or a ship to be well navigated without a captain, as that a school, college, or university can flourish while carried on by subordinate officers, undirected by one supreme head. Doubtless an institution which has been once set on foot by an able ruler, and has commenced to work, may continue to exist and perform its functions in a dull mechanical way for

some time after the ruler has been removed. But the force by which it does so is, after all, only the *vis inertiae*,—the power by which motion, once communicated to a body, tends to perpetuate itself,—and must inevitably be overpowered before long by the friction of the counteracting obstacles. Even at Oxford, with its history of a thousand years, the want of a Vice-Chancellor (who is, for all practical purposes, the supreme head of the University) would soon create incalculable confusion. Who does not remember the repeated complaints which have been made of the non-residence, or insufficient residence, of the presidents of the Queen's Colleges of Cork and Galway? Yet in each case the supreme ruler existed; he was *in rerum naturâ*; nay, he was in Ireland, and could be appealed to at any moment to settle any difficulty that might arise. But at the Catholic University no such officer exists.

That we do not exaggerate the importance of this question of a rector, let the following extract from the little book already cited bear witness. At the festival held at Louvain in November last, in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the University,—a festival joyous and glorious for all who partook in it,—after the Belgian and the foreign students had in turn presented addresses to the rector, in which he is spoken of as the “glorious and living symbol of the University,” the professorial body came before him to present an honorary medal for his acceptance. In their address on this occasion they say: “When we remember the origin and the progress of the great scientific institution which has grown up under the constant impulses of your generous and fostering zeal, we unite ourselves to all the Catholics of Belgium in order to pay a tribute of admiration to the eminent man whom a protecting Providence pointed out to the choice of our venerable Bishops. . . . . When we think upon all the proofs of devotion and talent which you have so lavishly given in the course of your long career, upon all the services which you have rendered to religion, to science, and to your country, we congratulate you, with all the energy of our souls, on the success which you have obtained, on the good which you have realised, and on the recompense which awaits you in the bosom of God and in the grateful remembrance of posterity.”

But we are wasting words; for in theory at least no one is likely to dispute the paramount importance of an able rector to a young institution. The difficulty is probably a practical one,—that it is not easy to find a person both willing and qualified to fill the office. To such a plea it might

be replied, that if the University is to go on, a rector must absolutely be found. If among the clergy of Ireland there exists at the present moment an individual both competent and willing (or even *compellable*) to undertake the post, surely a diligent and determined search would soon bring him to light, and place him at the head of affairs. But if such a search should result in disappointment, then, since a rector is *indispensable*, it would surely be better to close the University until happier times, than to spend more money and waste more human effort in an enterprise which must inevitably fail. To treat the question in this way appears to us tantamount to a *reductio ad absurdum*. The Irish clergy number amongst them—it cannot be doubted for an instant—many devoted, able, and learned men, to any one of whom this trust might be committed. Our object is merely to press, in the most forcible language that we can command, the absolute necessity of making this appointment without further delay.

The second obstacle with which the University has to contend is, the inability of its students to procure degrees. To clear up this subject, let us enumerate the degree-conferring bodies which at present exist, both in England and Ireland:

1. The Catholic University has itself the right, granted to it by the Holy See at its foundation, of conferring degrees;
2. The Queen's University has the power of conferring degrees, in arts, law, and medicine, upon students of the three Queen's Colleges;
3. The University of Dublin confers degrees on the students of Trinity College; and
4. The University of London confers degrees upon students belonging to certain institutions connected with it, or even upon persons privately educated, who can pass the requisite examinations. (We omit all the other English Universities, because they require actual local residence as a condition of obtaining their degrees.)

Let us now consider these four cases *seriatim*.

Had the inherent right of conferring degrees which the University possesses been boldly yet cautiously exercised in the second or third year of Dr. Newman's rectorship, when the tide in its affairs was flowing, when hopes were high and sympathy universal, it is not improbable that the attempt would have succeeded. But under actual circumstances, mistrust having in too many quarters supplanted confidence, it would evidently be undesirable to exercise the right in question, except in the very last resort. For it must always be remembered that in this matter the interest of the student

is the main consideration. It would be easy for any school or college to subject a young man to a difficult examination, and then to dub him B.A. or B.D. of the said school or college; but what would be the use of such a distinction to the young man? Being unrecognised by general society, and not conferred by competent authority, it would simply be scouted and despised. Now the Catholic University possesses, it is true, the competent authority; but the other element in the value of a degree, the recognition of society, would, under present circumstances, be wanting.

With regard to the second case, no student of the Catholic University could in the present state of the law receive a degree from the Queen's University. Nothing could enable him to do so but an act of parliament constituting the Catholic University a Queen's College. But this is totally out of the question, since the present legal constitution of the Queen's Colleges has been pronounced by the Holy See and by the Irish Episcopate to involve dangers to the faith and morals of Catholics attending them.

Thirdly, were there no other obstacle to the students of the Catholic University obtaining degrees from the University of Dublin, the expense would effectually prevent it. In order to take the degree of B.A., a candidate must have paid during three years the high tuition-fee of Trinity College; if to this were added the annual fees of the Catholic University, the expense of a degree to a student of the latter would become ridiculously great.

Lastly, the B.A. degree of the University of London, under existing regulations, could be obtained without any great difficulty or expense. The degree itself is, indeed, as yet not equally valuable with those of older universities; like the Scottish "pound," it passes current in society at a rate far below its Oxford or Cambridge namesake; still it is recognised, and is yearly becoming more valuable. Its being an *English* degree constitutes, in the present case, a serious objection. Still, were the question put to any student (actual or prospective) of the Catholic University, "Which would you prefer,—a London degree, or none at all?" the student would probably select the former alternative.

It appears, then, that out of the four possible academical degrees enumerated, one (that of the Queen's University) is beyond the reach of the students in Stephen's Green, as the law at present stands; another (that of Trinity) is unavailable, if for no other, for economical reasons; a third (that of the London University), though accessible, is open to grave objection; while the fourth it would upon various accounts

be most impolitic to attempt to confer at present. Is there now any preferable fifth alternative, which the promoters of the cause of Catholic education might hope, by a reasonable exercise of prudence and energy, to obtain?

It seems to us that there is; and it is this. Why should not an arrangement be aimed at for the Catholic University of Ireland analogous to that which works so admirably at Louvain? Let there be a mixed board of examiners for academical degrees, one half Catholics and the other half Protestants, appointed by the Lord Lieutenant (subject, as to the Catholic members, to the approval of the Bishops), and empowered to grant degrees in arts, law, medicine, and science, to students who had matriculated in any of the Universities of England or Ireland, and followed there a prescribed course of instruction. This might be effected by an act of parliament, which, if introduced, as it ought to be, by an Irish member, and one of their own supporters, the present Liberal government could only by the extremest illiberality oppose. Such an act would, in fact, furnish Ireland, but in a better way, with a machinery which, under its new regulations, the London University supplies for England. A valuable *Irish* degree, recognised by the state, by the law, and by society, would thus be accessible to the students of the Catholic University (for it need hardly be said, that in the schedule attached to the act, enumerating the Universities contemplated under its provisions, the Catholic University would of course be included), while no humiliating condition would be imposed, no sacred principle tampered with. Into the details of such a plan it is unnecessary to enter; they could be easily arranged, if the principle were adopted and acted upon.

A plan so simple and so equitable, if zealously promoted by Catholic educationists (especially if organised in some society such as the "Catholic Education Society" proposed in the late number of the *Dublin Review*), would probably, even if opposed at first, ultimately win its way to general acceptance. Indeed, it may be presumed that the venerated prelates who watch over the interests of the University will certainly never rest contented with a settlement *less* advantageous than this. Whether, as a temporary expedient to meet the case of the present students, and of those who may enter the University before a final settlement has been obtained, it might not be advisable to make arrangements with the London University with the view of bringing, under their recent regulations, their B.A. degree within the reach of the students in Stephen's Green, is perhaps a question deserving

of consideration. Doubtless the whole subject will be duly weighed in the proper quarter.

To recapitulate what has been said,—the whole future of the Catholic University seems to be bound up with these two main requirements, the appointment of a rector, and the adjustment of some plan whereby the students can obtain degrees. If the foregoing observations shall be found to throw any light on these questions, and on the best mode of dealing with them, our object will have been fully attained.

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### REFORM.

THE contemptuous apathy with which the Reform Bill has been received is not encouraging to those who would write about it; but the bill itself involves such momentous consequences, that those who have something to say upon them, and the opportunity of saying it, can scarcely allow the occasion to slip by unused. It would be an everlasting reproach to the present generation, if, through their imbecile sloth or lordly carelessness, they were to allow the constitution of their country to be changed without having first satisfied themselves, with the utmost circumspection and care, that the alteration is requisite for the national safety, and that it still leaves safeguards enough to guarantee the continuance of the constitution for generations to come.

We cannot say that the apathy of the House of Commons has been compensated by the activity of the press. The question has been discussed as a matter of propriety, but not as a subject of interest. If critics have entered into the judgment-hall, it was only *ut viderent finem*—to get it over and have done with it. Even the organs of parties and classes which consider the bill to be fatal to their interests have written as if they thought it fated. There has been no organic attempt to defeat it, or even to counteract the injuries it threatens. It was enough to grumble at the bill, and sneer at the intrigues of its author. There has been no contrition expressed by the Tories for their follies; and yet they have led us into our present dilemma: first, by their refusal of the small reforms demanded in 1827; next, by their revengeful desertion of Wellington and Peel after the passing of Catholic emancipation; then by their “damnable iteration” of the same gross blunder after the repeal of the corn-laws in 1845; and lastly, by their tricky appropriation of a

principle which they were born to oppose in their bill of last year. There has been no exhortation to the nation to gird up its loins for a struggle. The middle classes have been told to accept with resignation the inevitable stroke that must disinherit them; and have been only taught to revenge themselves with epigrams and jokes, like the nobleman "beggared by fools" of whom Dryden writes :

"He had his jest, and they had his estate."

If the classes that have hitherto governed the country have really become so sapless and effete as to put up with this exchange; if they have been crammed with comic grammars and comic histories, comic preaching and prayer-books adapted to the stage, till they have become like the mockers to whom Mahomet addressed the Koran text, "The heavens and the earth, and all that they contain, think ye that we have made them in jest?" if they really have become only politicians in play, only capable of looking at the Reform Bill as a pleasantry, or an unpleasant practical joke,—then certainly it is time to admit some streams of fresh blood into our governing classes.

Our statesmen and our representatives seem to feel their burden to be too heavy for their shoulders; not that they stand apart, like the gods of Epicurus, and lazily watch the everlasting machine roll on: they are willing enough to put their shoulders to the wheel; late sittings and committees all day they will attend with most praiseworthy assiduity. But the one thing that they are required to do, that they shrink from undertaking. They find it easier to do than to determine, to act than to think; therefore they wish to let matters settle themselves. No one will seize the rudder—none will give orders for shifting the sails; but every one will lay hold of the rope nearest him, and haul away with hearty good will. They have judged themselves to be more capable of labour than of the direction of labour; and thus they have almost confessed their incapacity for government. Under the double burden of a sense of incapacity and a desire to fulfil their responsibilities, men will generally seek to lessen their labours by a process of simplification. As popular Protestant theology is reduced to a shallow fiction, which "he who runs may read," and which, indeed, can only be read running,—for a moment's pause to meditate would reveal its nakedness,—so popular politics are simplified down to the merest rudiments. Under the manipulation of our present politicians, our constitution would be deprived of its high human organisation, and would be simplified into a homogeneous mass of similar cells.

All advance in organisation implies differentiation of parts; all real reform implies that encouragement of the growing members, and that discouragement of the decaying parts, that tends to the greatest development of the one, and the necessary lopping away of the other. In this process there is no necessary simplification: the growing members may be as different as possible; the decaying ones may be all alike; the tendency may be to wider and wider differentiation, and to increased speciality in each part, and not to generalisation and homogeneousness.

And here, as it appears to us, was the great error of the first Reform Bill. Up to that time, both the practice of the constitution and the theory of the greatest political writers recognised the principle of representing all conflicting interests in the deliberative assembly of the nation. "Conflicting interests," says Burke, "interpose a salutary check to all precipitate resolutions: they render deliberation not a matter of choice, but of necessity; they make all change a subject of compromise, which naturally begets moderation; they produce temperaments, preventing the sore evil of harsh, crude, unqualified reformations, and rendering all the headlong exertions of arbitrary power, in the few or in the many, for ever impracticable." Various boroughs had various constituencies; their laws varied from well-nigh universal suffrage to selection by a close corporation. And before the reform agitation of 1832, the best Whig authorities considered this variety of constituencies to be one of the great safeguards of the constitution, and deprecated uniformity of suffrage as a degradation towards either oligarchy or democracy. "A uniform qualification must be so high as to exclude true popular election, or so low as to be liable to most of the objections which lie against universal suffrage." Thus wrote Sir James Mackintosh, in 1818, in his admirable essay on "The Right of Parliamentary Suffrage."\* "Variety," he continues, "by giving a very great weight to property in some elections, enables us safely to allow an almost unbounded scope to popular feeling in others. While some have fallen under the influence of a few great proprietors, others border on universal suffrage. All the intermediate varieties and all their possible combinations find their place." Even Lord John Russell, in 1821, expressed the same opinion. "All parts of the country and all classes of the people ought to have a share in elections. . . . In proportion to the general freedom of the community will be the discontent excited in the deprived class by the sentence of nullity and inactivity pronounced upon them.

\* *Edinburgh Review*, vol. xxxi., and *Works*, vol. iii. p. 205.

Every system of uniform suffrage, except universal, contains this dark blot; and universal suffrage, in pretending to avoid it, gives the whole power to the highest and lowest, to money and to multitude, and thus disfranchises the middle classes." And he concludes, that though every class ought to have an influence in elections, it is not necessary to give every member of every class a vote; that is to say, different classes might be made to preponderate in different places by a varying qualification.

The revolutionary character of the Reform Bill of 1832 consisted solely (as we think) in going so far towards abolishing this variety,—in giving us a uniform qualification instead of the different ones which we had. We suppose that the desire for simplicity was at the foundation of this error. Simplicity, no doubt, is a very necessary quality of the machinery of elections. But the simplicity of this machinery does not depend upon its being every where the same. It is doubtless best that steam-engines should be simple; but a steam-engine at Manchester does not spoil the working of another engine at Liverpool because it happens to be made after a different model. In like manner, it is not necessary for the simplicity of an election at York that it should be conducted precisely in the same manner as an election in Surrey, and by voters with the same qualification. Simplicity of machinery was not the real object sought in 1832. Simplification of the work of parliament was the real reason for the levelling process that was adopted; and this process was rendered necessary by the principles of reform that were then held. During many previous years, piecemeal reforms had been proposed; and the rejection of these had led to the agitation which necessitated the wholesale measure; and the wholesale measure necessitated the adoption of political principles which were and are quite contrary to the whole tenor of the constitution. A wholesale measure must be uniform, universal, and must do all it has to do at once. It is opposed to the principle of variety; and "a variety of rights of suffrage," says Mackintosh, "is the principle of English representation;"—it must be universal, extending to all constituencies; and it must alter them all at once, as if the constitution had become as jointless and decrepit as Wordsworth's old Cumberland beggar, who must "move altogether if he move at all." But as a very few of these wholesale alterations would soon bring us to the furthest possible limit,—to manhood-suffrage,—it is always necessary to proclaim the finality of the present measure,—to declare that it is enough for years or generations to come, if not for ever. Lord John Russell

made himself quite notorious for his promise that the Reform Bill of 1832 went as far as reform could ever go. It was to be final, and was thus to destroy the old constitutional principle of a standing law for the continual adjustment of the representation to the variations of constituencies. The simplicity which was considered necessary for the bill caused the changes made to be uniform, universal, contemporaneous, and (it was said) final; thereby obscuring the variety of the old constituencies, rendering needlessly difficult the partial changes which from time to time may become necessary, and doing away with that standing vital force of continual self-adjustment which ought to be a characteristic of the constitutions of all states; for "a state," says Burke, "without the means of some change, is without the means of its conservation."

It appears, therefore, to us, that the true mission of the reformers of 1860 is, to restore the principles which were obscured by those of 1832 against their better judgment, as expressed in times of less excitement. "We ought not," said Mackintosh, in 1821, "to exchange our diversified elections for any general qualification." We require, then, that the fact should be recognised, that the simplicity which is wanted is not a simplicity in the statute, which necessarily implies uniformity in all the elections, but a simplicity of election in each place, which is compatible with the greatest variety in different places, and consequently with the greatest intricacy of the statute-book. We do not want to lighten the labours of our representatives, but merely to provide that in each constituency the electors should be selected on the simplest possible rules. We want variety of constituencies instead of their present uniformity, and therefore we want a reform diametrically opposed to that of the government bill. Secondly, we want the principle of finality explicitly renounced, as it is implicitly by the introduction of the bill, and the old constitutional principle expressly recognised, that there should be a standing law of continual self-adjustment in the state. We cannot conceive a state in which reform is not a normal condition of progress, that is, of existence; of a progress which need not be change, but simply growth. "The course of true wisdom," says Mackintosh, "would have been [to enact] a law which, acting quietly, calmly, but constantly, would have removed or prevented all gross inequality in the representation." Thirdly, we want the fact to be recognised, that variety in qualifications is necessary for the representation of classes; and that these various qualifications must be local: if this was once recognised, we should have no difficulty in finding places where each class might with all certainty

elect its own representatives. There might be places where the shipping interest is all-powerful, others where the manufacturing interests, others where the Stock Exchange commands the poll, others where the working-man is certain of securing the return of his delegates. But to secure this variety, it is necessary that we should give up the hallucination that all reforms must equally affect all constituencies at once. The time is gone by for us to fear a revolutionary reform agitation; in 1832 it was necessary to patch up the rent at once with cloth of any colour. The measure was not only a reformation, but a conciliation also; the occasion was too urgent for delay and circumspection. Then the argument that it was necessary to shut up the agitation as soon as possible was the master-key of the controversy; it was needful to finish the business out of hand, and have done with it; it was too hot to hold. But it has cooled now; we may take it in our hands, and examine it as curiously as we please, without fear of burning our fingers; there is no hurry. Still the business must be begun, and begun *bonâ fide*, or we may soon have an agitation. There was a lull before the bill of 1832; in 1827, Lord Althorp, the leader of the Whigs in the House of Commons, told Sir R. Peel that the people had become so indifferent to reform, that he never intended to bring forward the question again. Since 1823, only fourteen petitions in its favour had been presented; and Mr. Roebuck admits,\* that the agitation of 1831, instead of being the spontaneous result of popular feeling, "was, in fact, brought about by the incessant labours of a few industrious and shrewd partisans, forming a secret, but very active and efficient, committee in London." Though there are no such abuses extant now as served for a foundation for the agitation at that time, yet no one can tell how soon a similar movement may be propagated; and if it is just that each class should have its representatives in the House, it is clear that the sooner the working classes have their due amount of representation, the better it will be for the rest of us.

But though the measure must be begun at once, there is no reason why it should be finished at once. In 1830, the reform question was a running sore; it would have been as mischievous to keep it open as to prevent an ulcer on the human body from healing. But now it has lost all morbid symptoms, and reform can be nothing worse than a health-preserving issue. Provided that it retains this healthy character, there can be no more harm in an annual or biennial reform bill than in the annual debates on the Budget, or than in

\* *Hist. of Whig Ministry*, vol ii. p. 309.

Mr. Spooner's motions, which amuse him, and do not hurt us. We wish, then, to get rid of the feeling, which is founded on the timidity of one party and on the swagger of the other, that it is necessary to frame at once a comprehensive measure, and to have done with it, so as to set the question at rest for a season, and to give us some years' breathing-time before we have a further inroad of the inevitable democracy.

If it is true that no constitution is perfect which does not contain in itself a power of responding to changes of condition, and of gradually reforming itself so as to satisfy the requirements of a progressive population, it follows, *ex vi termini*, that reforms should be gradual, put together piece by piece as they are wanted, and applied where they are wanted, not forced on a reluctant portion of the commonwealth because they are required for another part of the kingdom. Instead of dealing with all the kingdom at once, each place should be dealt with separately: this was all that was asked in 1827; and if it had not been for the ill-advised opposition of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel to the enfranchisement of Birmingham, we should now have in operation the principle of gradual enfranchisement of boroughs, and of classes in particular boroughs, instead of our having still to hope to see the principle established.

After we have once recognised that reform is a continuously acting law, not visiting us, like earthquakes or revolutions, by intervals and catastrophes, but continually readjusting our practice to our principles, we shall lose all love for a comprehensive bill, and all fear even of so extravagant a project as a standing committee of the House to watch over the births and deaths of constituencies, to determine when this borough is moribund, and when that town is worthy to be erected into a borough; and further, to consider to what class the influence of the place belongs, and to recommend parliament so to rule the qualification of its constituents as to secure the predominance of that class in its elections. We will consider the objections to this plan further on; here we have to enumerate two important benefits that would follow at once from its adoption.

The first of these benefits is, the multiplication of the steps which lead us down the incline which ends in the level of democracy. If we descend by strides as wide as those which Lord John Russell's giant legs can take with such facility, we shall find ourselves citizens of a democratic republic like America, or of a revolutionary empire like France, within two generations. Between the qualification of the Reform Bill of 1832 and pure democracy there are only ten degrees

for the boroughs, and fifty for the counties ; Lord John Russell at one stride carries us down four of the ten steps, and forty out of the fifty. One more such a tumble, and we are at zero. That with a serene sky above us, and warm air around us, our political barometer should make such a fearful fall, indicates rather a breakage in the instrument, or incompetence in the managers of it, than any real tempest brewing in the elements. If we adhered to the system of universal uniformity of suffrage, it would be difficult to moderate this headlong descent. An eight or nine pound qualification would be considered as too small a concession, and might produce the very agitation which we so much dread ; moreover it would not do that which the present Reform Bill is required to do, namely, give the working classes a fair representation in parliament. But if we returned to the variety we formerly possessed, then the downward steps might be multiplied almost indefinitely. For each reform would only apply to the place for which it was intended, and it might require a hundred sessions to legislate for a hundred boroughs.

The second benefit is, the field that is at once open to us for trying the many plausible plans which statesmen and eminent political thinkers have devised for guaranteeing the stability of our class-representation. With universal uniformity, only one of these experiments can be tried, and when it is once determined upon, it will be irrevocable, whatever its ill effects or its unexpected consequences. With the restoration of variety, every one of the plans may find its fitting place. If three members are given to the West Riding, an attempt may be made to give the minority a voice, by giving only two votes to each elector. If three are given to Manchester, the experiment of the cumulative vote may be tried there. Elsewhere, the electors may vote by voting-papers, as they vote for guardians, and the provisions of Sturges Bourne's act may be applied to the election of members of parliament. In another place, Hume's proposal of primary and secondary electors may be put to the test of practice. In other places, the "fancy" franchises may be set up. Even the forlorn ballot might find a place for the sole of its foot. There is no end to the possibilities of experiment, as soon as the principle of variety of franchise is acknowledged to be essential to the stability of class-representation.

To all this it may be objected, what is the House of Commons, that it should thus sport with the rights of the people ? Either the parliament derives its powers from the people it represents, or it does not. If it derives its powers from the

people, it does not appertain to its functions to determine what sections of the people it will represent; the people as a whole has a right to be represented, and the qualification must go upon general laws, so as to be the same every where, not to be jobbed and manipulated, here rounded and there squared, at the fancy of the leaders of parliament, in order to preserve the balance of parties pretty much as it exists at present. The principle of variety of qualification in various places would at once open the gates to a whole deluge of jobs, and jobs would beget discontents, whose consequences in the long run would be much more dangerous than the effects of a general lowering of the franchise in all places at once. On the other hand, if the parliament does not derive its powers from the people it represents, the representative system is a mere hoax, and the question of reform a sham.

It would be endless to discuss the question of the rights of the people. If the franchise is among these rights, we ought, consistently, to admit that an article of property is a legitimate article of sale. If the supremacy in the country is to be given to voters who are saleable, it will perhaps go some way to restore the balance in favour of property, if we make provision that they should be actually sold. But to argue seriously. Among the rights of every freeman we must reckon his liberty, and his security of person and property. All persons may have equal rights, though not to equal things. The person who buys a shilling's-worth of bread has as much right to what he buys as the person who buys a hundred pounds'-worth. The person who pays twenty pounds in taxation has not twenty times more right to supervise the disbursement of taxes than he who pays one pound; but he has an equal right to twenty times more weight in the disposition of it. He is oppressed if those who pay less than he have more influence than he in spending the funds which he contributes. All have a right to equal securities for freedom, for justice, for the means of procuring temporal prosperity; all have a right to have their local interests attended to. Each man, whether he has the franchise or not, ought to know and feel that he is free, but not free dangerously to himself or others: he ought to be assured, that if he acts as he is bound to act, no power on earth can touch his life, his liberty, or his property; he ought to possess that inward and dignified consciousness of his own security and independence which alone constitutes the proud and comforting sentiment of freedom; he ought also to know and rejoice in his safe mediocrity; he should be glad to think, that though he had the talents of a Napoleon, he cannot, by favour of prince

or people, elevate himself above a given line, so as to endanger his own or his country's ruin ; he should love the order which keeps things fast in their places ; he should consider it made to him, and he to it ; he should as soon think of asking for another body and another mind, as another order in which to live.

This is very good morality, but unfortunately it does not carry conviction with it. For the ruling classes to hold such language to the unenfranchised, appears like a full belly preaching patience to the lank hungry one that barks for food. It will not do to forget that the love of power is as natural and as much a fact as the love of freedom. Free people not only desire to be well ruled, but to rule, and to express their own opinion. The unenfranchised part of the population in 1832 had no particular oppression to complain of ; they were as well off as their enfranchised neighbours. But they wanted power as well as freedom. They wished not merely that the nation should be well governed, but that they should govern it. Many of them succeeded in attaining their desires, and it was lucky that they did ; no amount of the very best government would have induced them to forego their wish for another thirty years. Whether the change was for better or worse, some change was unavoidable ; if some useful principles were sacrificed in the hurry, we have only to thank those whose stubborn opposition to partial reforms goaded the people to refuse to be satisfied with any but a comprehensive measure.

The right of the people to the franchise, then, is dependent upon these two other rights : the right to be well governed, and the right to have a hand in the government. As the unenfranchised classes have been, and may still be, well governed, the first clause does not help our argument much. The second divides itself into two heads, according to the twofold function of the House of Commons. The House arose as the imposer and the guardian of taxes ; and it has advanced to be the supreme council of the empire in all matters of government. As far as it is a taxing body, every man has a right to representation therein, in proportion to the amount of the taxes that he pays. As far as it is the organ of the imperial government, every man may claim a representative influence therein, proportionate to his political capacity ; and here the principle holds good, that "every person has a right to so much political power as he can exercise without impeding any other person who would more fitly exercise that power." The two functions of our parliamentary representatives require two different qualifications in their constituents. The taxing function requires a property qualification ; the political

function, a political qualification. Rich tax-payers would be highly injured if their taxes were levied and spent only by needy politicians; and needy politicians might be equally aggrieved by the timidity and want of energy of a government of rich tax-payers. They would suffer like the poor in unions where none but tenant-farmers are guardians. In spite of the doctrine of theorists, that property qualification is the best test of political capacity, it is the possible, the supposed, or the apparent discrepancy between the rights of property and the rights of political capacity that gives rise to all the difficulties of reform.

We are convinced that this discrepancy will never be reduced by any general equalising measure. On the contrary, every further reduction of qualification gives more power to the needy classes, and takes it away from those who have property. In order to satisfy the claims of wealth as well as the claims of capacity (or supposed capacity), a most complicated system, similar to that of Sturges Bourne's act, would probably be requisite; and this complexity, being found, not in the statute-book, but in the registration-office and in the polling-booth, would be a much more fatal error against simplicity than any possible variety of franchises in various places. Besides, it would not answer its political object. It would not satisfy those classes whose supposed discontent is the motive for the measure: they would, as Mr. Bright says, consider any such classification as a degradation; and the measure being universal, if it gave the working men power any where, it would give it them every where, and so fail in its object of preventing the reduction of the kingdom to a democracy; or, if it gave them power nowhere, it would only dissatisfy them the more on account of the imposition which they would consider had been practised upon them.

If no universal homogeneous measure can reconcile the discrepancy between the rights of property and those of political capacity, partial measures, with varieties of qualifications, evidently can do so. In a nation of 30,000,000 of inhabitants, men must be content to be lumped together in classes, and must learn to identify the interests of their class with their own. "To be attached to the subdivision," says Burke, "to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle, the germ of public affections." Men must be content if their class is adequately represented, though they may not be represented as individuals. The gentlemen and rich tradesmen of Marylebone must acquiesce in being swamped by the ten-pound voters, provided that their classes are sure of returning their representatives elsewhere.

We must understand, then, that if the class to which a man belongs is properly represented in parliament, he himself must be considered to be sufficiently represented, though in his own borough his individual vote is hopelessly smothered beneath those of a great opposing majority. This rule applies as much to the labouring classes as to any other. Numerically they are every where in a majority. To enfranchise them universally would be to place all power in their hands, and to disfranchise every other class. To lower the franchise universally, but only so as to enfranchise a few of the upper strata of the working classes, would not be sufficient to give them a representation. If they were left in a minority, their candidates would still be beaten; if they were to constitute a majority, we should wake and find ourselves a republic. The only remaining plan is to enfranchise the class, but not all the members of the class; to enfranchise it in some great towns, where it is most powerful and its opinions are most marked, and to take care that its influence does not spread so as to swallow up that of all the rest. The working classes are more homogeneous than any other. If the Duke of Wellington feared the first Reform Bill because the lower strata of the middle classes represented by the 10*l.* householders were the most apt of all to form combinations and unions apart, what would he have said to the strata which Lord John Russell would now enfranchise, who have proved their powers of combination, not to mention their advanced socialistic opinions by the late strike? The unity of the working classes is the most terrible warning against the present Reform Bill. Mackintosh has some remarks upon this point that are worthy of all consideration: "The labouring classes are in every country a perpetual majority. . . . Notwithstanding local differences, persons in this situation have a general resemblance of character and sameness of interest. Their interest, or what they think their interest, may be at variance with the real or supposed interests of the higher orders. If they are considered as forming, in this respect, one class of society, a share in the representation may be allotted to them, sufficient to protect their interest compatibly with the equal protection of the interests of all other classes, and regulated by a due regard to all the qualities which are required in a well-composed legislative assembly. But if representation be proportioned to numbers alone, every other interest in society is placed at the disposal of the multitude. No other class can be effectually represented; no other class can have a political security for justice; no other can have any weight in the deliberations of the legislature.

No talents, no attainments, but such as recommend men to the favour of the multitude can have any admission into it. A representation so constituted would produce the same practical effects as if every man whose income was above a certain amount were excluded from the right of voting. It is of little moment to the proprietors whether they be disfranchised, or doomed, in every election, to form a hopeless minority." When the interests and sympathies of the working class are the same in all places, it is clear that representatives elected by one body of them are necessarily the exponents of the wishes of the remainder.

The unity and individuality of the working class, though it is an invincible argument against putting all power into its hands, is also a very strong reason why it should be fairly represented, both as an order of tax-payers, and as a class with a certain political capacity. As a mere numerical majority, it has no claim to the greatest share in the representation. The old practice was, to represent adequately the separate interests of classes and districts; but there are no traces of a representation founded on mere numbers. The ancient measure of right to representation was liability to taxation: on this ground an act was passed in the time of Henry VIII., enabling Durham to return members. "The inhabitants," says the act, "are liable to all payments, rates, and subsidies, equally with the inhabitants of other counties and boroughs, and are therefore concerned equally with them to have knights and burgesses in parliament." Still not all the taxable inhabitants were enfranchised, but only the freeholders and freemen. The members chosen by the part of the people were considered virtually to represent the whole. All districts and communities, all classes and interests, were considered to have a claim to representation, but not all individual men.

Burke is especially severe upon the principle of the representation of mere numbers: "'A million should prevail over a thousand.' True, if the constitution of a kingdom be a problem of arithmetic." But, he asks, "is every landmark of the country to be done away in favour of a geometrical and arithmetical constitution?" Numbers count for little; "nothing is a due and adequate representation of a state that does not represent its ability and its property." Of the consequences of a numerical representation, he says, "Those who attempt to level, never equalise: in all societies consisting of various descriptions of citizens, some description must be uppermost;" and where all men have equal power, the working classes, which are most united and least differentiated, must rule. But, says Burke, "servile artisans ought not to

suffer oppression from the state ; but the state suffers oppression, if such as they, either individually or collectively, are permitted to rule." We will finish our quotations with one that is singularly apposite to that foolish flattery of the working classes which has been so much in vogue of late years, but of which the strike went far to cure us: "Woe to the country that would condemn to obscurity that which should shed lustre on it; and that considers a low education, a mean contracted view of things, and a sordid mercenary occupation as a title to command." "In public councils," says Ben Jonson, "nothing is so unequal as the equality where votes are numbered, not weighed." It has been well said of uneducated constituents, that "those who cannot give good reasons for their votes, will probably vote for reasons which they are ashamed to give," just as a Hottentot is ashamed to tell a civilised man the secrets of his religion.

In answer, then, to the objection, that the House of Commons has no right to sport with the people, and to fix the various franchises at its fancy, we reply, that the House, as an integral portion of the supreme government of the empire, not only has the right, but is bound to distribute the franchise according to the principles of the constitution, and according to the capacity of the constituents. Endless, we know, is the jesting with which the St. Simonian formula, "to each according to his capacity," was received. "What business," asks Proudhon, "has the Père Enfantin to judge of my capacity? If I had the honour to belong to this Infantine Church, my first idea would be to box my pontiff's ears." But the House of Commons is neither a self-erected prophet like the Père Enfantin, nor does it pretend to judge of the capacities of individuals, but of classes. A great part of its judgment turns on the very patent capacities of the various classes to be taxed. And for the internal qualifications an external test is always demanded, such as a degree at the university, or the having come to years of discretion. "The wisdom of the people," says Pascal, "is shown in their distinguishing men by external marks, as nobility, riches, and dress. They are cannibals whom Montaigne makes so surprised at seeing bearded men do homage to an infant king. Would you elect the wisest or most virtuous? But each man is wisest and most virtuous. Therefore, choose the eldest male heir, and all is clear, without room for disputes. Peace, the greatest of goods, becomes easy." All classes, though the quality which gives them their place in the classification be intangible, may yet also be distinguished by some accidental external quality, of which account might be taken for the franchise, provided

that the classes are taken locally, and that no attempt be made to make a general division of the whole population into a few marked strata. The partitions of society should be, as it were, vertical, not horizontal. And these vertical divisions might be easily distinguished by some marked external characteristic.

In fixing on this characteristic, it must never be forgotten that fitness to govern is not an absolute quality, but a comparative one. A French private soldier might be commander-in-chief in Timbuctoo, without deserving to be a marshal of France. And because a Potter rules in the trades-union or a Stubbs in the village pot-house, it is no reason why the chair of the quarter-sessions should be offered to him. Where we can have better, the worse must be contented with inferior positions. No class, then, should be so enfranchised as in effect to disfranchise the rest; least of all should the class which pays least in taxes, which has least leisure, and consequently least political capacity, be made so predominant as to overshadow the richer and more educated classes. But it will not be enough to make mere accumulated wealth the sole test of qualification. Accumulated wealth gives no criterion of distinction between the growing and the stationary classes of the community. Now it is in the growing classes that the common life is most vigorous, and where consequently political capacity may be expected to be more largely developed. Every care, therefore, should be taken not to thwart the legitimate ambition of the prosperous and growing parts of the country, or these parts are forced into revolutionary ideas. All the Indian nabobs of Burke's day were Jacobins. The ambition of the newly-enriched man when checked is sure to run in this groove; it becomes discontented and evil-eyed, and loves to see things go backward. But rising ambition is rather busy than dangerous, and becomes a useful and healthy force when it is allowed a proper sphere of development. The Duke of Wellington said, in a debate on municipal reform, "As the people of England, since the original establishment of close corporations, have advanced in riches, in knowledge, and in their whole condition, it is natural that they should wish to participate in the administration of their own affairs." The growing portions of the community have a right to the opportunity for the exercise of their political talents. The stationary parts of the empire may retain what they can of their controlling power, but they should leave the progressive parts free to act, and, above all, free to express themselves in the great council of the nation.

We know that in advocating these principles of reform we

are going against what may be called the sectarian interests of the Catholics of the United Kingdom. We know that with universal suffrage, or even with a largely lowered franchise, the Catholics would form large bodies in many of the great towns of England, where their union and combination would soon render them as powerful a party as they are in the United States. We know also that the lower classes who would take the benefit of a lowering of the franchise, are generally much more favourable, or rather much less hostile, to Catholicity than the ten-pound householders usually are, among whom is chiefly to be found the traditional Puritanism which has survived from the Reformation to the present day. The strata beneath this are usually indifferent to all religion, and in many places even more favourably disposed to the Church than to any other form of Christianity. Among them, in the country parts, survive such sayings as, "We do know it was the old religion;" or, "It was the first, and it shall be the last;" while in several thickly populated districts, the priest is the only religious functionary who is always received with respect, and who can dare with security to penetrate into dens and alleys where the police are afraid to go. A comprehensive measure of reform would also inflict a due penalty on the classes to which we owe our three centuries of oppression, by crushing the Established Church. But, in spite of all these reasons, we would rather preserve the institutions of the empire in their integrity, than destroy them for a merely temporary selfish advantage. Besides, the fate of the Church, even in Catholic countries where universal suffrage is in vogue, is a sufficient warning against trusting too much to such mobs as those who extemporise the services of St. George's-in-the-East. At the present day, the power of secret combination has largely developed among the radical and so-called liberal sections of the people. Those who are attached to old institutions are so many units, who can only be got to act together at intervals, and by fits and starts. A largely lowered right of suffrage would put all power into the hands of agitators and demagogues. Now in the long run these people are not the most advantageous assistants that the Church can have, even if she could secure their allegiance. The clergy in Belgium have already begun to repent of 1830, and to regret the rule of the King of Holland. It is superfluous to speak of the present feelings of the clergy of France towards their elect of the 2d of December. The Church may always depend upon the people, but not on the people organised on the principles of a revolutionary democracy.

Our confidence in the bill before the House is not increased by seeing to whose hands it is confided. We do not forget the former performances of the great letter-writer of the present century. We do not forget that on the defeat of the second Reform Bill in the Lords, Oct. 8th, 1831, how popular violence was provoked by Lord John Russell's letter to the chairman of the Birmingham political union, in which he assured them, "that it was impossible for the whisper of a faction to prevail against the voice of the nation." Though he was afterwards forced to deny that the "faction" he meant was the House of Lords, and though within a month the ministry was obliged to proclaim the union to be an illegal body, yet for the moment the letter did its work; it made the mob believe that their excesses would not be unacceptable to their rulers. The riots of London, Derby, Nottingham, and Bristol followed. We pass over his letter on the repeal of the corn-laws to the electors of London, in 1845, in which he attempted to forestall the popularity of Peel, of whose measures he had obtained an inkling, and his celebrated Durham epistle of 1850, in which he treated the Catholics to an act of charity, similar in all respects to that which he had bestowed on the opponents of reform in 1831. These things have little to do with the merits of reform, but have much to do with the merits of the man, who has always shown himself so ready to raise and make use of a revolutionary excitement for the purpose of passing measures in which he takes a personal interest or has in any way engaged his reputation, that it would be the starkest madness in the classes which at present govern the country to trust their fate in his hands.

We have confined our arguments to the question of the restoration of variety of qualifications in various constituencies; the principle, though obscured by the reform act of 1832, is still living in the different qualifications for borough and county, and in the whole class of borough freemen. It may easily be restored and revived. Without it, we are confident, no general plan will succeed, neither representation of minorities, nor consolidated votes, nor fancy franchises, nor any other of the numerous proposals, all ingenious, all worthy to be tried on a small scale, but all inapplicable in a comprehensive universal measure.

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## THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE POPES.—No. II.

IN our former article\* we intentionally omitted all mention of the States of the Church, because they not only formed no part of the European system of states which the Popes wished to found, but, as the patrimony of St. Peter, stood quite apart from the other states, like a stranger, whose mission it seemed to be to present a contrast to the uniformity of the rest, and to be a centre of peace and quietness, while the others made war and rapine their business. While all other states naturally result from the migrations of nations, the patrimony of St. Peter rests on essentially different bases. Rome is its nucleus; and though the city was sometimes overwhelmed with the overflow of the barbarians, and though portions of its territory were more than once absorbed by them, the migratory races never maintained a permanent settlement there. This kernel of the Papal power was not, as the superficial historians of France would have it, the gift of Pipin and Charlemagne; with whom the modern Emperors of the French have about as much in common as the wolf and the fox with the lion. They only extended the already existing ecclesiastical dominion to territories rescued from Lombard usurpation, or from the Church-enslaving chicanery of the Byzantine empire. The history of the States of the Church is quite independent of that of the Papal system of Europe, but runs parallel with that of the growth of the German empire, which found Rome the great obstacle to the attainment of a universal sovereignty. Before the German kings could receive the imperial crown, they were obliged to acknowledge the independence of the States of the Church; and when "the new Pilate," as Dante calls Philip the Fair, prevailed upon Clement V. to exchange Rome for Avignon, not only Rome, but the whole Church, fell into trouble and confusion, through the preponderance of France; for after the removal of the Roman chair, the French Cardinals plunged the Christian world into a schism that lasted nearly forty years, during which the States of the Church fell into a state of decomposition, from which it required the unremitting exertions of the Popes during the fifteenth century to rescue them.

These endless fluctuations induced the Popes to adopt the policy of endeavouring to exclude foreign influence from Italy, and of checking the preponderance of one power by the opposition of another. Protestant England is now

\* See p. 154 of our second volume.

charmed with the Italian policy of self-deliverance and self-emancipation, though introduced under the suspicious patronage of the despot of France. But the great Popes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had no other intentions than to make Italy a free country. If they failed, they had to thank Charles VIII. of France, who invaded Italy, overthrew the national governments of Milan, Florence, and the rest, and in union with Spain founded a hierarchy of powers which has not been improved by the expulsion of the Austrians. It was not German interference that produced the misfortunes of Italy. The Germans, for the most part, prevented the petty and destructive wars, and smothered the violent antipathies which always were smouldering between the different territories and towns. They pacified Italy. Her misfortunes for centuries have been due to the interference of the French, who were continually blowing the embers of discord, and, though incapable of rearing any lasting political edifice, or of maintaining themselves in the possession of the country, were always on the watch for opportunities of fomenting divisions among the unfortunate people. Over and over again they marched their armies across the Alps when Italy had risen to a flourishing and prosperous condition, only to leave it an impoverished and desolate ruin. But we will not anticipate.

The Crusades added new motives to those which had already induced nations and princes to recognise in the Pope not only their spiritual, but also their temporal chief. The holy war was undertaken under the direct protection and guidance of Rome. It brought the Catholics of the West and the centre into contact with the schismatical nations of eastern Europe; and, while it raised the renown of the Latin world, did no service to the Byzantine empire, whose internal decay had been daily becoming more glaring since the time of Manuel Comnenus. The Emperor Frederic Barbarossa's conduct of his crusade induced the Servians to offer him their crown; but the Hohenstaufen refused to erect another Germano-Sclavonic state (he had already set up Bohemia in 1158) behind the Magyars. Upon this, Pope Innocent III. undertook to organise the southern Sclavonians, and resolved to change Stephen the Servian Zupan into the apostolic king of the new state, and so to withdraw Servia from the Byzantine system and to unite it with the Latin world. This design, so rich in its promises for eastern Europe, was foiled by the jealousy of the Magyars. King Emerich of Hungary expelled the king-elect, to whom the Pope had already sent the insignia of royalty, and demanded that the Wulk whom

he had appointed in Servia should be crowned instead. Upon this the Pope commissioned the Archbishop of Coloczka to perform the ceremony; but it was never done. The Hungarians treated Servia as they had treated Croatia. They wished to make their own country the centre of a circle of states in eastern Europe. They therefore saw with disgust the rise of a new Latin power between their empire and that of Constantinople; for Kalojohannes, the ruler of the new Bulgarian kingdom, had revived the plan of Boris, the Bulgarian prince of the ninth century, to separate from Byzantium, and to unite with the Western Empire, and had gone so far as to write to Innocent III. that he wished to become a servant (*servus*) of St. Peter and his Holiness. The Pope sent him a crown, and ordered him to prepare the Bulgarians to submit to the Latin Church. Emerich attempted also to foil this design, although the Pope, in order to secure the succession of his family to the Hungarian crown, had directed the Bishops to swear allegiance to his young son Ladislaus. Yet it was only a short time before Emerich's death, in August 1204, that the Pope's ambassador was permitted to pass through Hungary to Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Byzantines had vainly endeavoured to induce the Bulgarian prince to repair to their capital to be crowned, and had promised him a special (schismatic) patriarch for his new kingdom, which, they said, could not subsist without one. But the Bulgarians seemed at last to have opened their eyes to the fact that no good was to be expected from Constantinople. It happened, however, that as soon as the Bulgarians had joined the Papal system, the Greek schismatic empire became Latin and Catholic through the crusade of 1204, and so the motive which had induced Kalojohannes to join the Western Empire ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the Bulgarians bestowed on their new neighbours, the Latins of Constantinople, the same enmity which they had formerly shown to the Greeks.

The overthrow of the Greek government at Constantinople had only tormented the Popes with fresh cares, without improving the condition of the Holy Land. The Latin West had to defend the Latin Empire of the East, as well as the Christian government of Asia; its action, already divided, was further paralysed by the renewal of the wars between the Hohenstaufen and the Popes, when the sudden invasion of the Tartars obliged it to concentrate itself within its own boundaries. This was the Bulgarians' opportunity; now or never they might crush the Latin Empire at Constantinople, and make themselves masters of the Byzantine

world. They captured Baldwin I., the first Latin emperor of Constantinople, cut off his arms and legs, and threw him into a hole, where he was devoured by unclean birds; at the same time, the Emperor Frederic II., who owed so much to the protection given him, while king of Sicily, by Innocent III., and to the favour shown him in his rivalry as German king with Otho IV., made an alliance with Vatazes the Greek, the chief enemy of the Latins at Constantinople. Thus failed the high promise of 1204 to form in Bulgaria and Wallachia\* a counterpart of the apostolic kingdom of Hungary, through the overthrow of the Greek empire and the spread of the Latin Church in the eastern peninsula of southern Europe. In 1261, eight hundred Greeks penetrated through subterraneous passages into Constantinople, and overthrew the Latin Empire, "to the everlasting reproach of the Latin name." And now the Bulgarians invited the Mogul Tartars to help them against the restored Romaic dominion, as they had formerly fought the Latins with the aid of the Romaic Greeks. Against this danger the Byzantines sought the aid of the Ottomans, while the Bulgarians looked as far as Egypt for friends in the Mamelukes, but to no purpose; they had at last to submit to Amurath, and have ever since repented at leisure their insincerity and fickleness in the matter of their annexation to the West.

The new system of states perished for want of a leader. The Popes, whether remaining in Rome, or at least in Italy, or whether seeking refuge in France from the German emperors, could not act like generals or victorious monarchs. From the first their system had borne the stamp of a voluntary submission. The consequences were disastrous. Thus in Poland, the Peter's pence were paid when the coinage, which was changed three times every year, had become most depreciated. Innocent III. was obliged to censure this proceeding as early as 1207. In 1246, the Russian Prince Daniel of Halicz, whose rule extended from the mouths of the Danube to beyond the Dnieper, placed himself under the protection of the Holy See, and was made king by the authority of Innocent IV. But in three years better times came, and Daniel did not hesitate to fall away. Again, in 1256, the Lithuanian Prince Mendaz (Mendanus, Mindane) applied to the Holy See, and Innocent IV. received him under his protection, and ordered the Bishop of Kulm to crown him king of Lithuania. Soon afterwards Mendaz became a for-

\* Kalojohannes wrote to the Pope: "Et ita habeat imperium meum justitias Bulgariae et Vlachie, quod rex Ungariae habet justitias Ungariae." Raynaldus, 1204. 31.

midable patron of paganism, and thus the extension of the Christian system to Lithuania and Galicia was strangled in its birth. This was just a case in which a temporal head of the system of states might have called on the secular powers that owed him fealty to support his authority. But the Pope was obliged to think first of the conversion of these people, and could not defend his temporal authority by means which would have frustrated its principal object. Thus towards the end of the thirteenth century, the east of Europe was nearly in the same position as it had been at the beginning, before the Servians and Bulgarians had entered into negotiations with Rome. In the middle of the century, the Mongols invaded Russia, and disabled her, and thus saved the Catholic Slavonians from Russian intrusion; but they also broke the power of Poland, and turned Hungary into a desert. From this time, the history of these two nations begins almost anew; both needed a fresh population. Poland received numbers of German colonists, and the Pope was obliged to erect it into a kingdom to defend it against Wenceslaus II. of Bohemia, and to protect Hungary from an invasion of the Germans under Rudolph of Hapsburg. At this time, the above-mentioned Daniel of Halicz had submitted to the Holy See, and there was a prospect of uniting Bosnia by stronger ties to the Latin political system. But the breaking out of the last great struggle between the Popes and the Hohenstaufen dashed all these hopes. Bosnia became the seat of the Patarenes, a wide-spread and pernicious sect, which carried on a deadly war against the Catholic Church in the towns of Italy. Pope John XIII. vainly invoked the aid of the Emperor Frederic the Fair, King John of Bohemia, King Wladislaus Lokietek of Poland, and King Charles Robert of Hungary, against the Servians, who at times made as though they desired union with Rome, while they prevented the Byzantine empire from recovering its strength, and at last assisted the Ottomans to consummate the fall of Constantinople.

While the Slavonians of eastern Europe, after failing to secure a common centre in the empire, like the Germans, seemed to be seeking the same end by union with Rome, a similar attempt was being made in western Europe.

The kingdom of Arragon had become a model of chivalry. It was governed by its high nobility (*ricos hombres*) more than by the king. The reigning monarch received knighthood on his marriage, or on his attaining the age of twenty years; this was all the coronation he received. In the hierarchy of the state, he was only first among his equals. This order of things was innovated upon by Don Pedro I., who

went to Rome in 1204, and was anointed by the Cardinal Archbishop of Porto, and afterwards crowned by Innocent III. in S. Pancrazio. After his coronation, the king proceeded to St. Peter's, where he laid his sceptre and crown on the altar of the Apostle, received his knight's sword from the Pope's hands, and in return gave to St. Peter his kingdom as a tributary state in perpetuity, in confident hope that Innocent and his successors would ever defend it by their apostolic authority. The Pope ordered that the coronation of all future kings of Arragon should be performed at Saragossa, by the Archbishop of Taragon.

This step of Don Pedro is sufficiently accounted for by the danger which menaced Christian Spain from the quarter of the Al-mohades, and by his wish to emancipate the crown from the influence of the grandees. The step was successful; for when Mahomet Ben Nasser, Emir al Mumenim, was preparing the formidable expedition of 1212, which was to crush Christian Europe, Pope Innocent summoned the Provençales, the French, the Germans, and the Italians to defend Spain. One hundred and eighty-five thousand Saracenic knights, and countless infantry, marched into Africa. On the 16th of July 1212, the battle of Nares de Tolosa was fought, and decided the fate of Europe and Africa. Spain was completely victorious, and Africa was depopulated. The victory was celebrated in Arragon as a triumph of the cross. Valencia, Cordova, and Seville threw off the yoke of the Al-mohades, and rendered the victory of the Christians more easy. Their superiority was decided for ever. But the next year brought evil days to Arragon; Don Pedro led an expedition to Toulouse to aid Count Raymond against Simon de Montfort, the conqueror of the Albigenses. The Spanish king was defeated and slain at Mures; his son, Don Jayme, after being educated by Simon at Carcasson, took possession of the throne of Arragon, and received homage as early as 1214.

The first care of Honorius IV. for his young vassal was, to prevent him declaring war on Simon de Montfort to avenge his father's death; the second step of the Pope was to summon the Spanish princes to assist Don Jayme in his struggles with the Moors. This step carved out the course for the heroic *Conquistador*, and made him one of the most significant figures of the middle ages. As early as 1225 he had forced the King of Valencia and Mursia to become tributary. In 1229 he conquered Majorca, upon which Minorca submitted, and Iviza was overcome. Then came the great blow against Valencia, and the annexation of that rich and flourishing kingdom to the crown of Arragon. Don Jayme,

the Pope's vassal, wrested eastern Spain from the Moors, while Ferdinand of Castile drove back the infidels of the interior as far as Granada.

The early part of the thirteenth century, which witnessed these important events in the east and west of Europe, displayed equally stirring scenes in Southern Italy. The Sicilian crown of the Hohenstaufen would have been lost after Henry's death, if Innocent III., as feudal lord, had not protected the rights, as well as the person, of the boy Frederic, not only against the German princes, whom Henry VI. had invested with Italian fiefs, but also against Walter Count of Brienne, who was about to become the husband of the eldest sister of the Norman King Henry III., and against Frederic's uncle Philip of Swabia and his adversary Otho the Guelph, whom, however, Innocent crowned emperor. This great Pope's policy was always to keep the German crown, the highest political power of Christendom, apart from the Sicilian crown, the fief of the Holy See. He bestowed the first on Otho the Guelph, and the second upon Frederic the Ghibelline: the first was reorganised by restoring the suffrage of the German princes, and renewing the emperor's power in Central Italy; the second by securing the succession of the crown, limiting the ecclesiastical privileges that had been granted by Adrian to King William, fixing the annual feudal tribute, and establishing the canonical election of Bishops, thereby, as Innocent hoped, cutting off all occasions of future ecclesiastical disputes between the Pope as feudal lord and the king as his vassal.

And now the conquest of Constantinople by the Latins had, it was hoped, slain and buried the schismatical system of states for ever and ever. This event induced Otho to reverse, as far as he could, all the regulations of Innocent III. He violated his oath, and even attacked Frederic II. in his hereditary dominions; a feat that drew upon him the excommunication of Innocent, and so caused the Hohenstaufen faction in Germany to raise the young king of Sicily, who had before been German king, to the imperial throne of his father.

In this crisis, the Holy See, as suzerain, still adhered to the policy of keeping distinct the imperial from the Papal circle of states; though with respect to Armenia an apparent exception is to be found in the fact, that the Pope ordered Leo to be crowned king of that country in 1199, by the Archbishop of Mayence, in the joint names of the Pope and emperor.

When Frederic II. became German king, he promised to

emancipate his eldest son Henry, and to make him king of Sicily. If he had fulfilled his promise when he became emperor, the house of Hohenstaufen might have been saved from its conflicts with the Church, and its two lines in Germany and Sicily might have risen to vast importance. But the emperor was faithless to his promise; he brought his son from Sicily into Germany, where he caused him to be clandestinely crowned German king, while he himself usurped the government of Sicily. In order to succeed in this political trick, he was obliged to involve himself in engagements to Germany as well as to Rome, which weakened the empire, and at last placed him in the unpleasant dilemma of either appearing a manifest perjurer, or else of leading a crusade to the East. The first effect was a rupture with the Pope (Gregory IX.); and when this was composed, another arose with his own son, who was no more at ease on German ground than his father could be. This dispute ended in the emperor's deposing his eldest son, abolishing the rights of primogeniture, and thus depriving his grandsons by Henry of the succession, and raising his second son Conrad to the German throne. Then came the establishment of absolutism in Italy, which had to be effected by violence, and by strongholds filled with Saracenic guards. This led to new ruptures with the Popes, who could not but condemn Frederic's doings in Sicily, which he ransacked and ruined, and deprived of its privileges, while he imprisoned its prelates and nobles. Sicily was impoverished by his tyranny, and Central and Upper Italy were split into the two factions of Guelphs and Ghibellines, who fought for life or death. There can be no doubt that Frederic, the vassal-king of Sicily, by his continual efforts, in spite of all his oaths, to undo the relations of his kingdom with the Holy See, ruined Frederic the Emperor and the whole imperial house of Hohenstaufen. His impatience of the state of vassalage was the parent of an insincerity which soon degenerated into utter faithlessness. He rejected all offers of reconciliation; and the result was, that the Council which he had himself convoked to decide between him and Gregory IX., but which he afterwards forcibly prevented from meeting, pronounced him to be guilty of perjury, and of violating the allegiance of a vassal, in 1245. He had begun as a priests' king, and he was ending as a persecutor of the Church! But his ruin might have been still delayed, if he had not obstinately adhered to the unnatural union of Sicily with Germany, and if he had not bequeathed to his son Conrad, in 1245, a system which had proved his own ruin. Innocent IV. summoned Sicily to vindicate her li-

berty, and his call has been echoing and reëchoing there ever since. In its best days, the house of Hohenstaufen was divided against itself, and these intestine broils were only aggravated in the days of its decay. Conrad IV.'s death was mysteriously sudden, as were the deaths of Frederic's other sons and grandsons. Men began to whisper about treason and assassination. The Emperor Manfred excluded Conrad II. (Conradin) from his inheritance of the crown of Sicily, which he usurped for himself by spreading a false report of his nephew's death, just as the Emperor Philip Hohenstaufen had served his nephew Frederic. Manfred's unfortunate sons, the last of the Hohenstaufen, perished in the dungeons of Charles of Anjou early in the fourteenth century. Peter of Arragon, the husband of their sister Constance, was too knowing to demand their liberty, and so to bar his wife's claims to Sicily. It was the unexpected vacancy of the Sicilian crown, through the deposition of Frederic II., the death of Conrad IV., the defeat of Manfred by Charles of Anjou and his death, and the defeat and execution of Conradin, that influenced the other states of the Papal system in a way that at last led to the dissolution of the system itself. This influence showed itself first of all in England.

In the latter part of the twelfth century, the royal house of England was esteemed the principal support of the Guelphs. Duke Henry the Lion, son-in-law of the Emperor Henry II., found there his support against Frederic Barbarossa. Richard Cœur-de-Lion made a most moving petition to Innocent III. in behalf of his nephew Otho, and promised in his name to maintain the rights of the Roman Church, and to observe the fealty that had been sworn to her (*debitam et juratam fidelitatem*). But when Otho IV. had succeeded to the royal and imperial crowns, and had proved false to his fealty, Frederic, his successor, withdrew the English support from the descendants of the Guelphs by marrying Isabel Plantagenet, the daughter of King John, and thus becoming brother-in-law of King Henry III., and of Richard Earl of Cornwall, afterwards German king. In his disputes with the Popes, Frederic endeavoured to gain the support of England, but could only win over the barons to his side. There was at this time marvellous discontent in England against Rome, because of the numerous Italians who obtained English benefices while the States of the Church were in the hands of Frederic. The English ambassadors at the Council of Lyons, in 1245, represented to Innocent IV. that Italians were receiving over 60,000 marks a year, a sum that exceeded the income of the king (*qui est tutor ecclesie, et regni gubernat-*

*cula moderatur*). Not receiving an answer to their mind, the ambassadors withdrew, with the threat that England would no longer pay the Roman tribute. But in spite of the barons, the English Bishops declared in favour of the tax, and put their seals to the deed whereby King John surrendered his crown to Innocent III. The parliament, however, in 1246, limited all further grants of English benefices to foreigners; and though Innocent's energetic measures prevented further resolutions to the same effect, he was unable to allay the national discontent against Rome, or to calm the tempest to which it gave rise.

In English history two antagonistic principles may always be found, not as Thierry thought, the Anglo-Saxon and the Norman elements, or the partizans of elective against hereditary monarchy, or the party that supported the claims of the house of Montfort, the collateral line of the Plantagenets through Eleanor, daughter of King John and wife of Simon of Leicester, in opposition to the party that supported the male and principal line. The dualism of English policy lay deeper than this, and consisted in the antagonistic principles of *common life*, peculiarly, almost exclusively expressed by the Church, and of *nationality*. Unless England was to be gradually brought to a state of complete isolation, which threatened to unchristianise her nationality, it was necessary for her to be bound with strong ties to the common centre of Christendom. It is said, that before King John became a vassal of Rome, he had been coquetting with the faith of the Koran; and the ferocious sensuality of his character disposes one to believe the report. We think that this nationality characterised the Anglo-Saxon period of English history.

A little later, Innocent IV. had to spend one-half of the Church revenues on the great contest which was called *negotium ecclesiasticæ libertatis*, and the other on the defence of the Holy Land, for which he had to depend on the English and French ever since Frederic II., king of Jerusalem, had allied himself with the Saracens against the Pope. The origin of the miserable state of Palestine may be traced to the hasty retreat of Richard I. with his Englishmen, who for the last fifty years of the Christian power in the East were the chief cause that Saladin's favourite idea of transplanting the war of invasion into Europe could not be carried into effect in the thirteenth century.

In the days of Henry II., the Popes had to watch that the feudalism of the Normans did not use the Constitutions of Clarendon to crush all liberty. In like manner, Alexander IV. had to write to Henry III. with an earnest admonition

to him to maintain the ecclesiastical rights, liberties, and immunities which were contained in the general charters that he had granted, and which had been sanctioned by the excommunication of all offenders. But whilst in Germany the lay opposition found its expression in the emperor, throughout the west of England it was concentrated in the nobility. The articles which the English Bishops declared themselves ready to prove in 1257, show how little the prosperity of England would have gained by a victory of the narrow-minded national party over the defenders of the common cause.\* Prince Henry, the son of Isabella, was at first, as Matthew Paris pretends to know, destined by his father Frederic II. to inherit the crown of Sicily; and some Apulians, Sicilians, and Calabrians had already rendered him homage. But the emperor on his deathbed declared in favour of keeping the whole monarchy undivided, and fixed the sum to be paid by the Emperor Conrad to Henry as his indemnity, unless he chose to give him the kingdom of Arles or of Jerusalem. But in 1255, after the premature death of Henry, Alexander IV. offered the Sicilian throne to Edmund, second son of Henry III. of England. Both Edmund and his elder brother Edward I. thus seemed destined to become vassals of the Holy See; and their father was delighted with the thought, that by gaining Sicily for the house of Plantagenet, the French kingdom would be surrounded, and ground, as it were, between two millstones.† Thus the annexation to the Papal system of states opened to England a splendid prospect, not only of recovering the continental possessions which had been lost to Philip Augustus, but also of confining France to the right bank of the Loire. If this had taken place, there would have been no Babylonish captivity of Avignon in the Church's annals. In 1257, Prince Edmund had already received the Papal investiture by the ring; his father had recognised him as king, and had shown him to the English barons in an Apulian dress. But whilst Henry III. was hesitating to advance the large sums required for the expedition to Naples, Manfred was strengthening himself in Lower Italy. Edmund preferred a crusade in the East to the doubtful chances of conquest in Sicily; and the Holy See, which was forced to find a vassal that could protect it, offered the crown that he slighted to the French Prince Charles of Anjou. Thus were all Henry's hopes for England

\* "Imprimis quod vacantibus ecclesiis cathedralibus seu conventualibus, conventus talliantur, terræ relinquuntur incultæ, vastantur nemora, parci, et vivaria, corruunt ædificia, diripiuntur bona, depauperantur villani et male tractantur, ita quod mendicare cogantur." Matth. Paris, p. 129, ed. Paris. 1644.

† Matth. Paris, p. 613.

dashed to the ground; and he had the further mortification of seeing the Count of Provence and new King of Sicily procure the apostolic crown of Hungary for his descendants, and threaten even the Byzantine empire. The hesitation of the English gave the French the preponderance in the west, south, and east of Europe. But both in England and in Arragon the union with the Papal system of states tended to increase considerably the national power and greatness.

The nature of this political system is further elucidated by the relations of the Holy See with Don Pedro I. of Arragon. Honorius III., the successor of Innocent III., demanded from Don Jayme I. a tribute for Barcelona, in 1218; it was paid, and Jayme and his companion in arms, Theobald King of Navarre, were taken under the particular protection of the Holy See. The great King of Arragon wished to be crowned at Rome in 1229, but was prevented by the breaking out of the dispute of Frederic II. with the Pope. When the last possessions of the Christians in the Holy Land were attacked by the Mamelukes, the conqueror of Valencia took the cross. His conquests had already freed the Spanish and Italian seas, and he prepared a great fleet to carry him and his army to Ptolemais. He had embarked, when a storm separated him from the rest of his fleet; and he was persuaded, it is said, by his beloved Berengaria, to relinquish the crusade. This left Charles of Anjou, the king of Sicily, who had already wrested Provence from the Catalonian princes, at full liberty to give the expedition the more convenient turn of an attack on Tunis; but it was unsuccessful, on account of the death of King Louis IX. of France in 1270.

We see, then, that the dependence of Arragon upon Rome did not hinder its greatest monarch from any important undertaking. Nor did it prevent the marriage of his successor, Don Pedro, with Constanza, daughter of Manfred, the great enemy of the Popes. This union was the cause of many political changes. Jayme—the hero, legislator, historian, and king, a combination rarely found in the mediæval princes—died, and his kingdom was divided. His younger son Jayme received the Balearic Isles, together with Roussillon, Conflans, and Montpellier, but in 1279 he was obliged to swear an oath of allegiance to his elder brother Don Pedro, who had inherited his father's principal possessions in the east of Spain, as Catalonia, Arragon, and Valencia. For nearly a century past, the fate of Apulia and Sicily, the feudal kingdom of the Popes, had given rise to complications, which, after shaking Italy and the empire, were now about to draw France and Spain into their eddies.

## SIR WALTER SCOTT.

It is a somewhat remarkable fact, that since the appearance of the biography of Sir Walter Scott by his son-in-law in 1835, none of the leading Reviews, with one exception, have attempted either a comprehensive criticism of the work itself, or a thorough analysis of the character of its subject. The *Edinburgh*,—to which Scott was in various ways related for many years, first as a contributor, afterwards as a determined opponent,—though it ably criticised his works while living, has had no word, either of praise or blame, to bestow upon his character when dead. The *Quarterly* has observed a similar silence. *Blackwood*, though its pages abound with affectionate and admiring allusions to Scotland's greatest writer, has abstained from the task of estimating the several parts and total weight of his character. The *Westminster Review* alone published so early as 1838, before the publication of the concluding volume of the *Life*, a long and remarkable paper on Scott from the pen of Mr. Carlyle. This article has since been reprinted among the writer's miscellaneous works. Yet, striking and suggestive as it is, and graphic as are many of its touches, we are not sure that the reticence of other journals was not a wiser course than the hasty verdict of the *Westminster*. Mr. Carlyle has not disposed of Sir Walter Scott by that somewhat supercilious criticism; the cause is weighty, and will require a re-hearing—perhaps more than one. Scott is a man who will take a great deal of killing :

“ Merses profundo, pulchrior evenit.”

No one has given better and abler counsel than Mr. Carlyle as to the necessity of being quite sure that we *see* a great man before we attempt to *over-see* him, that we *apprehend* the genius which we profess to *comprehend*. Yet we cannot think that in the article in question he has entirely followed his own counsel; and we shall have to point out, before we conclude, more than one passage marked, as we think, either by misapprehension or unfairness.

Mr. Carlyle quarrels with the biographer for having given to the public a “ compilation ” rather than a “ composition.” “ To picture forth the life of Scott, so that a reader might say, ‘ There is the physiognomy and meaning of Scott’s appearance and transit on this earth; such was he by nature; so did the world act on him, so he on the world;—with such result and significance for himself and us,’ ”—this, ac-

according to the critic, was looked for at Mr. Lockhart's hand, and this was balked. We are told that "seven biographical volumes are given where one had been better." Now, for our part, we profess that, having, we hope, a due horror of prolixity and tediousness, we should deeply regret it, and think the world would have cause for regret, had Mr. Lockhart acted on such advice as this. Instead of fulfilling the humbler task to which the instinct of pious reverence impelled him,—the collection, namely, and orderly arrangement of those copious memorials which were in his possession, so that Scott might, as far as possible, tell his own story,—he might undoubtedly have produced a clever volume *about* Scott,—in the style perhaps of Mr. Edwin Paxton Hood upon Wordsworth,—in which the skill of the artist would have been more conspicuous than the qualities of his subject. But in the preface to the last volume he modestly grounds his adoption of the former plan on the consideration, that the reader is so "really treated as a judge, who has the evidence led in his presence, instead of being presented merely with the statement of the counsel, which he might have both inclination and reason to receive with distrust. Let it be granted to me," he continues, "that Scott belonged to the class of first-rate men, and I may very safely ask, who would be sorry to possess a biography of any such man of a former time in full and honest detail? If his greatness was a delusion, I grant that these Memoirs are vastly too copious; but had I not been one of those who consider it as a real substantial greatness, I should have been very unwilling to spend time on any record of it whatever."

Nor did Mr. Carlyle himself wholly fail to see the force of such considerations. "Scott's biography," he says, "if uncomposed; lies printed and indestructible here in the elementary shape, and can at any time be composed, if necessary, by any one who has a call to that." Moreover, the biographer of Frederic has not adopted for his own guidance the advice which he tendered to the biographer of Scott. Granting, which we readily do, that the historical sketch of the rise of the Hohenzollern family and of the kingdom of Brandenburg forms, like the vestibule before the temple, a desirable and beautiful proem to the life of Frederic the Great, yet, when we come to the Life itself, what reader but must have contemplated with amazement the dextrous literary manipulation by which—*e.g.* in the chapter headed "Journey to the Reich"—a few trifling particulars which might have been told in ten lines are spread over twenty or thirty pages. Scott's letters, according to Mr. Carlyle, are

“not interesting generally,” and he evidently thinks that great curtailments and omissions might have been made among those—but a selection, after all—which were printed by Mr. Lockhart. Yet the Prussian hero, even while in his ‘teens, cannot write a trumpery note to his sister, or to some confidant of his youthful scrapes, without its being religiously presented entire by Mr. Carlyle, and ushered in by an *apparatus criticus* of illustrative information, which throws such a flood of light upon the poor little scrap of correspondence, that the brilliancy of the encircling *nimbus* sometimes contrasts ludicrously enough with the insignificance of the object illuminated. The rule of compression, which it seems was good enough for Scott, is to be reversed into the rule of dilatation, not to say dilution, for Frederic. For the latter, the telescope; for the former, the telescope reversed!

For ourselves, we are of opinion that Mr. Lockhart executed his task admirably well. Had he attempted to “picture forth” the life of Scott according to his own conception of it, he would have produced, we believe, a faithful and a striking portrait, yet one in which it would have been impossible to place the same confidence as in that which these seven volumes, as it were involuntarily, conjure up before us. Conceive if Boswell had given us a Boswellian portraiture of Dr. Johnson, instead of recording his conversation and printing his letters! In that case posterity would certainly have known next to nothing as to the “physiognomy and meaning” of Johnson’s “appearance and transit on this earth;” nor would the world have ever seen that admirable article by Mr. Carlyle himself, in which he first recognised the true greatness of the hero, and did justice to the loyal loving heart of the biographer. Lockhart certainly would have made a much better “composition” than Boswell—there is no question of that; but how many features might not even he have overlooked or misread the expression of! A great genius may be compared to the pillar of fire of which Brama could never soar to the summit, nor Vishnu dive down to the base; it roots itself “deeper than e’er plummet sounded” in the innermost substance of nature and of fact, while it blooms and waves above in an ideal solitary world. To take the measure of the spiritual being is a far different task from portraying the outward features. Even this latter is a task which is seldom done thoroughly well; how much less probable is it that the painter of the mind shall place aright all its lights and shadows! We cordially agree with Mr. Carlyle that most biographies are too long; but the reason is, that with most men whose lives are written

in these times the materials, if used in their full extent, are soon felt to be redundant. Why? Because the subjects of most of these memoirs are not so interesting that we care to know all that we might know concerning them. Facilities exist for ascertaining every dame-school in Bristol and its vicinity which Southey frequented in his childhood, with full particulars as to the names, ages, tempers, acquirements, peculiarities, &c. of the worthy dames. Again, the reader of Wordsworth may find out by consulting his biography the precise circumstances under which nearly every one of his effusions was conceived and composed. But the answer is, that we do not *care* to know such matters; that life is not long enough; and that neither Southey nor Wordsworth are sufficiently heroic characters to induce us to convert our brains into reliquaries in order to treasure up the minutest shreds and parings of information about their personal history. We own that the Life of Wordsworth is a lengthy and heavy work, though only in two volumes; and that the six-volume Life of Southey will remain unreadable until it shall have been reduced five-sixths. But we say still,—find a man whose life is *worth* being told in detail, and that becomes the right way to tell it. Among the innumerable memoirs—unreadable or but half-readable—which burden the shelves of the circulating-libraries, impatiently waiting for Charon and a safe convoy to eternal forgetfulness, let us be properly thankful that here is at least one biography which contains the story, told in the main by himself, of a capacious, earnest, brave, clear-sighted, ready-witted human soul;—a biography which does not chronicle and catalogue the solitary schemes of the dreaming poet, nor detail the petty incidents that mark the tame existence of the professional *littérateur*, but which paints in manifold presentation and bright vivid colours a complete order or cosmos of human society, in which—ranging through every stage and status of it, from court to camp, from castle to hovel—the first and most honoured head was ever that of the author of *Waverley*;—a biography which, should *Old Mortality* and its compeers be ever forgotten, may still be conceived to survive by centuries the doom which blotted them out of remembrance, since they after all describe—not with entire truth—an imaginary world and fabled personages; but in this, the very actual life of the first thirty years of a memorable century, the life of its kings, nobles, soldiers, statesmen, poets, and *savants*, is compendiously illustrated, with a distinctness to which no other hundred contemporary volumes can make equal pretension.

Yet while expressing a general approval of the plan and management of Mr. Lockhart's work, and—*inter alia*—of the fullness with which Scott's epistolary vein is illustrated, we would not deny that the patience of the critic and the appetite of the admirer are occasionally overtaxed in this particular. The letters to "Jane," his daughter-in-law, need not have been published. Scott himself rightly describes them as "rambling stuff;" indeed, they are such as many a ready-writing kind-hearted man rattles off every day. The letters to his son Walter, though some of them are most admirable and characteristic, would bear abridgment, and also those to Mr. Terry on theatrical and other matters.

Perhaps one or two other slight blemishes might be mentioned; but as our present object is not to review Lockhart's biography, but to endeavour to form some correct estimate of the rank amongst men, intellectual and personal, to be assigned to its subject, we shall merely record our conviction here that this is the most valuable and interesting biography in our language next to *Boswell's Life of Johnson*. Let us now endeavour so to sketch the life of Scott that the total power and distinctive qualities of his genius may become apparent, and that certain lessons may be deduced which to all thinking and acting men, but more peculiarly to men of letters, the spectacle of his changeful fortunes, his incredible activity, his aims, virtues, and failings, is well calculated to convey.

A fragment of autobiography, extending to about sixty pages, gives us Sir Walter's own account of himself from his birth to his twenty-first year. It is high praise to say of it that, although inferior, it much reminds us of Goethe's *Aus meinem Leben*. With a like easy and graceful touch, the writer describes clearly, but without undue minuteness, the antecedents and status of his family, the circumstances of his boyhood, the line of his self-education, and his first launching into active life. Southey, in *his* autobiography prefixed to the *Life* by his son, was much more liberal of information. About a hundred and forty closely printed pages are devoted to the delineation of the great man's career *up to his fourteenth year!* After wading through it, we remember that our first feeling was, that we had never been so "bethumped with words" before. With the minute and elaborate dullness of a third-rate Dutch painter, the author details a crowd of petty incidents, and introduces us into half a dozen domestic interiors, drawn from the life, with every accessory of habit, dress, and furniture complete, which

under no conceivable circumstances could interest any mortal except himself and his own near relations.

The leading outlines of the life of Scott are to be found in biographies, cyclopædias, and editions innumerable, and we shall not waste much time in retracing them here. Born at Edinburgh in 1771, of a respectable family, belonging to that house or clan of Scott of which the Duke of Buccleuch is the feudal head, brought up mostly in the country at his grandfather's farm of Sandyknowe, not a dozen miles from the Tweed and Abbotsford, educated at the High School and College of his native city, apprenticed to his father as a lawyer's clerk, called to the bar at the age of twenty-one, happily married at twenty-six,—there is nothing in all this foreign to the lot of a thousand ordinary Scotchmen, similarly situated as to family and worldly advantages, who have lived, laboured, and died, in the course of the last seventy years. However, considering the character of the times when he was arriving at manhood, the absence of eccentricity and extravagance in a young man so greatly gifted, the steady sober application to common duties, are in fact a greater marvel than the opposite demeanour would have been. While Coleridge and Southey were arranging the details of a Pantisocratic community on the banks of the Susquehanna, and Wordsworth was fraternising at Orleans with republican generals, Walter Scott, having no faith in the current nostrums, nor conceiving that he was born to set right the disjointed time, was minding his own business instead of mankind's, and ever more firmly rooting himself in the present and past life of his own nation. He was no "rolling stone;" rather, he was the very opposite of the character which the proverb implies; and hence, from first to last, his whole being went on accumulating and aggregating to itself, like a snow-ball, fresh layers of association and new stores of kindred thought, without being compelled by any violent change of place or circumstances to submit to the abrasion of any portion of these moral incrustations. Passionately fond of open-air sports, and enabled through his great strength and courage to excel in them, in spite of his lameness, he was not only thus placed in sympathy with a large class of vigorous and robust persons for whom the common type of the pale sedentary writer was an object of pity or indifference, but gained thereby, to be made use of afterwards, an insight into a province of antiquity which cannot otherwise be fully understood,—the *play-life* of our forefathers. Holding fast to the skirts of the law, and taking the good of his profession with the evil, the drawbacks with the further-

ances, he kept always a recognised rank in society, became *au fait* with the traditions and freemasonry of an important profession; and in this direction also was enabled to observe and to sympathise with many worthy and remarkable persons, who would never have unbent, nor disclosed their inmost selves, except at the talismanic *shibboleth* pronounced by a brother of the gown. A Jacobite in feeling, a Tory in practice, he preferred the ties of kindred and party to the alluring theories of political and social perfectibility which were then prevalent. With eager zeal he flung himself into every patriotic scheme of national defence to which the exigencies of the time gave rise; he became quarter-master of a regiment of volunteer cavalry, and was familiarised with military exercises, and in some sense with the life of camps: hence, again, the twofold advantage; community of aim and employment brought him into close relations with the aristocratic and governing classes, to whose hands the military preparations were mainly committed; and when he came to write of war and statecraft, it was with more than the mere second-hand knowledge of a civilian that he handled the pen. Sandyknowe, Kelso, Ashestiel, Abbotsford, and Dryburgh all lie within the circuit of a few miles; Edinburgh and Lasswade are within forty miles of Abbotsford; yet when we have gone over these names, we have mentioned every home that he ever had between birth and the grave. The fruits of a tree so deeply rooted may well be "racy of the soil;" the marriage of the poetic imagination to a life so real, so masculine, so practical, may well have resulted in creations fitted to captivate either sex and every age, to charm the pensive student and the experienced man of action, to exhibit the ideal, without loss of beauty, under the forms of the real.

Scott, we have said, was happily married at the age of twenty-six, and the union endured through nine-and-twenty happy years; but the power of love had taken earlier possession of that strong heart, and left there indelible traces. In the matter of love, the nature of many men is like sand—impressions are quickly made and as quickly effaced; his was like Egyptian granite—once deeply engraved, it bore the mark for ever. There was a lady, the daughter of a Northern baronet, to whom Scott became attached at the age of eighteen. There was an engagement, or *quasi-engagement*, between them, which subsisted for several years; but she broke it off at last, and married another. There are some touching allusions to her in the Diary. Thus, in the entry for December 18th, 1825:

"What a life mine has been!—half-educated, almost wholly neglected or left to myself; stuffing my head with most nonsensical trash, and undervalued by most of my companions for a time; getting forward, and held a bold and clever fellow, contrary to the opinion of all who thought me a mere dreamer; broken-hearted for two years; my heart handsomely pieced again; *but the crack will remain till my dying day.*"

Again, speaking of a visit to St. Andrew's in 1827:

"I sat down on a grave-stone, and recollected the first visit I made to St. Andrew's, now thirty-four years ago. . . . I remembered the name I then carved in Runic characters on the turf beside the castle-gate, and I asked why it should still agitate my heart. But my friends came down from the tower, and the foolish idea was chased away."

Imagination and wonder, acting on the strong tendency of his nature to the real, determined from the first the nature of his self-education, and the bent of his literary endeavours. Living intensely in the present, and yet a native of an old historic land, and allied to ancient families, he was prompted by patriotism and family pride, and enabled by his strong power of imagining, to realise the life of the past also; and he found in a memory of preternatural tenacity the aids and materials which he required. Works of pure imagination delighted him first: "Spenser," he says, referring to his tenth or eleventh year, "I could have read for ever." Tasso, Ariosto, and all the romances he could come at, were read about the same time. But the love of the real grew upon him; he took to Percy's *Reliques*, which he first read "under a plane-tree in a garden sloping down to the Tweed at Kelso." In those noble old ballads, the characters, places, and circumstances are many of them real; and the scenes of some of the stories are laid in the very border-country which he knew and loved so well. "From this time," he says in the Autobiography, "the love of natural beauty, more especially when combined with ancient ruins or remains of our fathers' piety or splendour, became with me an insatiable passion, which, if circumstances had permitted, I would willingly have gratified by travelling over half the globe." In his first essays at authorship,—his version of *Lenore* and other German ballads,—he put forth but little of his strength; and they naturally failed to attract much notice. Perfect finish of expression was never his *forte*; and what force and fervour of thought these poems might have would naturally be attributed to the German originals. The version of *Götz von Berlichingen*, published in 1799, succeeded ill, for this among other reasons. It may be remarked *en passant*, that

Mr. Carlyle's theory that Götz was the parent of the romantic literature of which Scott was the chief representative, and Werther the spiritual fountain whence flowed the Byronic school and the "literature of despair," seems, if examined, to be more ingenious than true. Scott, at least, was influenced in his literary development neither by the dramatic form of Götz,—a form which he never once seriously employed,—nor by its subject and pervading spirit, since nature and circumstance had already settled his literary bent years before Götz had met his eyes. Undiscouraged by failure, he began now to trust more to his own genius, and to imitate, or rather *parallel*, those old ballads which he was all this time indefatigably collecting. Thus were produced the poems which he contributed to Lewis's *Tales of Wonder* in 1801, and the two volumes of the *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*, which came out in 1802. The stirring poem of "Count Albert," and some of the original pieces in the *Minstrelsy*, could not fail to attract attention. But still an achievement so novel, so well-sustained, and so variously beautiful, as the *Lay of the Last Minstrel*, took the world completely by surprise. Originating in a request made by the "fair Buccleuch" to the bard of the clan,—which, coming from her, amounted to a command,—the *Lay* was the first adequate illustration of the powers of the rarely-gifted man whom Scotland had nurtured for mankind. A most potent imagination was required to conceive so vividly, a rare intellectual energy to portray so forcibly, the ancient life and manners of the border; only a brave and generous spirit could so tell of war; only a being overflowing with activity, and replete with knowledge of every kind, could write a poem which, whatever its defects, is nowhere tedious, but full of rapid movement from beginning to end. If any one wishes to understand the full force of this praise, let him read and compare with the *Lay* Wordsworth's *White Doe of Rylstone*. This poem was written in 1807, only two years after the appearance of the *Lay*; and the metre, the subdivision into cantos, the kind of subject, even the date of the action, seem all to be borrowed from the earlier poem. The language is purer, the versification, perhaps, smoother; really beautiful passages are not wanting; the morality is unexceptionable, and the moralising incessant. And yet, and yet, the *White Doe* is *heavy* reading; we do not read it through at a sitting, and wish there were more, as we did when the *Lay* first fell into our hands. Is not the reason of this, that the *Lay* is a genuine piece of the life of man? that it is not so much Scott who describes that rough ancestral world, but that that world, through his

agency, unfolds itself in a solid-seeming vision before the reader's eye; that it is a piece of objective, not subjective, writing? On the other hand, in the *White Doe* the musing, designing, moralising individuality, William Wordsworth, is never for a moment hidden from your sight.

The popularity of the *Lay* naturally induced Scott to go on working in the same mine; *Marmion* came out in 1808, and the *Lady of the Lake* in 1810. Of Lord Jeffrey's criticisms on these poems, since published among his Essays, the first excited by its severity the ire of Scott and his admirers, and was thought by them to be not untinged with a hostile political animus. Yet if any one were to take up these essays at the present day, he would probably consider them both substantially just. *Marmion* is an exceedingly faulty poem; and there is a certain pretentiousness about it which makes its faults the more offensive. The introductions to the cantos, addressed to six of his friends, are so long, and touch upon such a variety of topics, that the impressions they create jar violently with those which the story itself is designed to produce. Some of them are as very doggerel as ever was written—the “very false gallop of verses;” there is but one, that to William Rose, containing the famous lines on Pitt and Fox, which seems to have been written with care, and possesses any permanent interest. Again, the favourable criticism on the *Lady of the Lake* is equally sustainable. In this poem Scott's poetical style reaches its acme; here the romantic tale culminates; the utmost that can be expected from a kind of poetry far below the highest, and from a metre essentially inferior to the heroic, is here attained. The story is conducted with much art; the characters are interesting; the scenery glorious; the versification far less faulty than in *Marmion*. Succeeding efforts—*Rokeby*, *The Lord of the Isles*, *Don Roderick*, *Harold*—did but witness a progressive declension. With the last, published in 1817, Scott grew utterly disgusted before he had finished it, and worked off the concluding portion in an agony of angry haste. “I left off writing poetry,” he said, in 1832, “because Byron *bet* me.” In truth, the spicy subjective element which Byron introduced into his *Corsair* and *Childe Harold* made Scott's romantic tales, if written in any thing short of his very best manner, seem superficial and twaddling. But then Scott, as he goes on to say, was too proud, too manly, to strip, like Byron, for the public amusement, after the fashion of his own gladiator.

Upon the whole, we regard much of Scott's poetry as likely to live for the same reason that Horace's or Boileau's

satires command an undying fame ; not because it is poetry of the best kind, but because in its kind it is the best. The best specimens of it are pervaded with that healthy elastic freshness, and surround us with that pure bracing moral atmosphere, without which romances will not *keep* ; such as are seasoned with morbid feeling or sentimentality, much more, impurity, leave a pleasant flavour behind them for the moment ; but time develops their inherent rottenness, and they become, sooner or later, offensive to the moral sense. The *Lady of the Lake* will probably outlive the *Corsair*, because it appeals to wider and more permanent sympathies. The young, the vehement, the restless, delight in the one, because it reflects and glorifies to their imagination the wild disorder of their own spirits ; the aged and the calm find little in it to prize or to commend. But the former poem, besides that "hurried frankness of composition which pleases soldiers, sailors, and young people of bold and active disposition,"\* has attractions also for the firm even mind of manhood and the pensiveness of age : the reality and vividness of its painting, whether of manners or of nature, delight the one ; the healthy buoyancy of tone, recalling the days of his youthful vigour, pleasantly interests the other.

But we have got beyond the point to which we brought down his personal history. In 1799, two years after his marriage, Scott was appointed Sheriff of Selkirkshire, with a salary of 300*l*. The duties of a stipendiary county magistrate, which were thus imposed upon him, he discharged zealously and efficiently for the remainder of his life. Compelled to transfer his residence to the county where his duties lay, he settled at Ashestiel, a manor-house on the Tweed belonging to Colonel Russell, in 1804. Parts of the scenery surrounding the house are finely described in the introduction to the first canto of *Marmion* :

"Late, gazing down the steepy linn  
That hems our little garden in,  
Low in its dark and narrow glen  
You scarce the rivulet might ken,  
So thick the tangled green-wood grew,  
So feeble trilled the streamlet through :  
Now, murmuring hoarse, and frequent seen  
Through bush and brier, no longer green,  
An angry brook it sweeps the glade,  
Brawls over rock and wild cascade,  
And, foaming brown with doubled speed,  
Hurries its waters to the Tweed."

Ever since he had begun to pay serious attention to

\* Scott's *Diary, Life*, vi. 321.

literature, Scott had made slow progress at the bar ; and the duties of the shrievalty interposed a fresh obstacle to his professional success. Determining, therefore, to abandon the law as a career, he cast about to obtain one of those comfortable berths which, in the days of unreformed parliaments, were considerably provided for briefless barristers who could command good interest. He obtained, through the Duke of Buccleuch and Lord Melville, in 1806, the reversion of a clerkship in the Edinburgh court of session, with a salary of 1300*l.* a year. He performed the duties from this date, but did not draw the salary till 1812. These duties, it should be said, were far from being nominal, since they compelled him to close attendance in court on five days in the week during seven or eight months of the year.

He remained at Ashestiel for eight years, until the approaching return of its owner from India, with the intention of making it his residence, obliged him to make a change. A few miles lower down the Tweed, on the right or eastern bank, lay an estate of about a hundred acres of heathy hill and marshy lowland, uninviting enough in appearance, which was then in the market. Scott, who believed himself to be rich, or fast becoming so, bought Clarty Hole, as this property was named, in 1811 ; and, having made some trifling alterations in the cottage which stood upon it, performed his flitting in May 1812. The mania for acres—the desire *arrondir sa terre*—soon seized upon him ; and, after 1814, when the Waverley series began to appear, and their unheard-of popularity brought him in large sums, he began to buy up, often at extravagant prices, any patch of neighbouring ground which the owner desired or could be induced to sell. Abbotsford—for so the place had been immediately renamed from the ford across the Tweed hard by, belonging formerly to Melrose Abbey—thus grew by the aggregation of particles until, in 1818, it made a very pretty property of near one thousand acres. Meantime the original cottage had been altered, added to, eclipsed, and at last fairly crowded out of existence by the Gothic castle which gradually arose on the banks of the Tweed, and attained its completion in 1821. The hilly part of the property was planted with great care and judgment, and now forms a striking and beautiful feature in the scenery of a country generally bare of trees.

The period between 1814 and 1826, which witnessed the publication of the first twenty-two of the novels, was one of great prosperity, of labour unremitting, and of reputation ever widening. *Waverley* appeared in July 1814. Nothing

can be more pleasant than to read of the casual way in which the thing came to pass,—the Ms. of the first volume, which had been written years before, having been accidentally stumbled upon in rummaging an old cabinet, glanced over, approved, and completed in three weeks;—of the indefatigable hand and pen, seen through the window of the house in Castle Street during those three weeks, which “bothered” William Menzies by their preternatural activity;—or of the healthy alacrity with which Scott, as soon as the work was finished, started off on a voyage to the Shetlands; on returning from which, two months later, he found all the world talking of *Waverley*. For all such details—and most interesting many of them are—connected with the composition and publication of the novels, we must refer to the “Life” itself. We can only notice some few occurrences during this period which happen to illustrate in any special way the temper and character of the man.

In 1817 and the two following years, Scott was attacked at intervals by an excruciatingly painful malady,—spasms in the stomach. Even a man of his robust frame could not task his brain with impunity as he had done. *Guy Mannerling* written in six weeks,—the last two volumes of *Waverley* in less,—and the mind of man so perilously and inextricably knit up with every fibre of his bodily structure, as we know it to be! The first attack came on during a dinner-party at his own house in Castle Street, when he was obliged to leave the room with a scream of pain which terrified his guests. His hair turned white during one of these severe fits of pain, which only yielded to the severest medical treatment,—copious blood-letting, blistering, and opiates. Yet such was his self-mastery, so great the ascendancy in him of the spiritual principle over the weakness of flesh and blood, that some of his most carefully-planned and highly-wrought works—*Rob Roy*, *The Heart of Mid-Lothian*, and *The Bride of Lammermoor*—were written during this period of pain.

The year 1819, which was marked to Scott by severe family afflictions, brought with it also anxieties of another kind. Distress was rife among the weavers of Glasgow and Paisley, and in the mining districts of the north of England, and constant but secret communication was carried on between the leaders of the disaffected operatives in both countries. It is curious to note the different spirit in which the Tory poets of the day met this alarming crisis. Scott—in his threefold character of aristocrat, country gentleman, and county magistrate—instantly forms a plan for “rising in arms” to put down these wretched half-starved weavers, and

organises, with all the enthusiasm of a poet, and all the cautious shrewdness of a Scotch laird, a volunteer corps of loyal borderers, whom he and his neighbours—Scott of Gala and Pringle of Torwoodlee—are ready to lead in person against all disturbers of the peace of the marches. Scuthey, who has no property and no official status, whose class-feelings would naturally have led him to sympathise with the grievances of the malcontents, since he was himself of humble origin, fires at them whole broadsides of patriotic declamation from the pages of the *Quarterly*, and repels the cry for reform with a lofty air of injured innocence and oppressed virtue which it is amusing to contemplate. Wordsworth was busily employed during this terrible year in carrying through the press *Peter Bell*, *the Waggoner*, the sonnets on the River Duddon, &c. There is nothing either in his biography or in his poems to indicate that, during a crisis big with the fate of England, his social sympathies extended beyond the peaceful valleys of Westmoreland.

It does not seem to occur to any one of the three Tory bards to inquire whether these terrible Radicals might not have some real wrongs to be redressed, some sound and wise reforms to advocate. But in Sir Walter opposition at least assumes an intelligible and manly form. He belongs to a class whose privileges are threatened by the menacing attitude of the classes below it; and the natural instinct of self-defence—quite independently of the strong Conservative cast of his mind, which attached him to all that was traditionary and prescriptive—would have led him to resist the claims of the Radicals. Such Toryism must be, if not respected, allowed for; for it is in the nature of things. And speaking generally, all political action which is connected with real social interests and springs naturally from a given social status, is, if not always commendable, at least legitimate; the actor is, as our neighbours say, *dans son droit*. The political success of England is a consequence, not of the indifference of her citizens about their class-interests, but of that sense and self-control which induces men who are indissolubly wedded to those interests, and earnestly bent on promoting them, to make compromises with each other in order to maintain the stability of the *common weal*. On the other hand, the political activity of a mere theorist is generally suspicious and always nugatory. Not that the philosophy of politics, or even the pros and cons of any special measure, may not be properly and exhaustively handled by a political thinker, quite apart from any personal or class interest, provided he write *as a thinker*, not as a partisan. But it is

surely an abuse of literary gifts to employ for party-purposes that facility and impressiveness of style which nature intended to be "as general" in its benefits "as the casing air;" having no interest in the disputed question yourself, to thwart to the utmost of your power those who have, and instead of arguing on the merits of the proposed reform, to pour forth volleys of fluent invective on the reformers. Yet it was in great measure by such unworthy employment that Southey gained his livelihood. He wrote against Parliamentary Reform and Catholic Emancipation, not as a political essayist, not as an aristocrat, not as an Orangeman, but as a professional declaimer or rhetorician. It was, therefore, not surprising that William Smith quoted against him in the House of Commons the frantic Jacobinism of his own *Wat Tyler*, or that Byron wrote with grinding scorn of the piously-profane rhapsodies of the *Vision of Judgment*.

Assuredly Scott's Toryism was infinitely more respectable than Southey's; and yet it too had its selfish and unpleasing side, which was well exposed in an article which appeared at the time in the *Edinburgh Review*. The writer said, evidently alluding to the warlike preparations of Scott and others,

"If, without any indication of a desire to conciliate, the complaints of the people are repressed with insults and menaces; . . . if the whole mass of their complaints, reasonable and unreasonable, are to be treated as seditious and audacious, and to meet with no other answer than preparations to put them down by force,—then indeed we may soon enough have a civil war among us, and a war of a character far more deplorable and atrocious than was ever known in this land,—a war of the rich against the poor," &c.

Allowing, however, for that illiberality which strong class-feelings engender, even in the noblest minds, Scott, as a citizen, remains an object of true admiration. In his relations to the poor he was kind and wise, understanding thoroughly their class-feelings, always ready to help in case of need, but jealously guarding and cherishing in them the sense and the desire of a manly independence. When any emergency occurred demanding new adaptations, such as a year of high prices, or a dearth of employment among the Galashiels weavers, he struck out at once, with ready sagacity, the true way of meeting the difficulty. When employment by piece-work seemed advisable, he resorted to it, however contrary to country usage; where daily wages were preferable, he employed that method. All the suggestions and reasonings that his letters contain on the condition of the poor, or on the poor-

laws, are always clear, practical, and sagacious. In truth, Scott's powerful and many-sided capacity for action cannot well be overrated. Of no man could the saying of Sydney Smith be predicated with so near an approach to truth, that he would be "ready at an hour's notice to write the play of *Hamlet* or take the command of the Channel fleet." He was certainly a most efficient county magistrate; and when the higher organising and ruling powers were called for, he was never found at fault. The occasion, indeed, was pitiful enough; but the man who arranged the whole ceremonial for the reception of George IV. on his state visit to Edinburgh in 1822, surmounted equal difficulties with the statesman who administers the affairs of a great free nation. For the same mixture of gentleness and firmness which reconciled the miserable claims for precedence of Highland chieftains and their "tails,"—the same quick perception of character which assigned to each performer his proper place and function in the show,—the same union and concentration of varied powers which made out of the whole affair a signally successful pageant,—would have been correspondingly effective *in altiori materiâ*. Few modern men have shown themselves more successful governors and organisers than Sir George Grey, now Governor of the Cape Colony. Yet we speak from some personal knowledge when we say, that the talents which have caused his success, while they remarkably resemble, certainly do not surpass, those which Sir Walter had clearly the power of applying at will to the management of affairs.

Yet, with all this keenness of observation and perfection of the practical faculties, Scott, with his eyes wilfully blinded, walked over the precipice of ruin! "It was a favourite saw of his own," says Mr. Lockhart (iv. 175), "that the wisest of our race often reserve the average stock of folly to be all expended upon some one flagrant absurdity." Such an absurdity was the commercial connection which he formed in 1805, and maintained till 1826, with the brothers Ballantyne. Yet this, the most prosaic and commonplace part of his life, is strangely linked with the illusions which were the daily bread of his imagination. Upon this coarse thread, running through the gay silken texture of his poet-life, depended the stability of his fortunes, and with these was bound up the success of his peculiar ambition. Ambition must always have some "illness that attends it," and Scott's has been handled without mercy by Mr. Carlyle. What can be urged in his excuse has been beautifully and forcibly said in a passage at the conclusion of Mr. Lockhart's work, part of which we shall

presently quote. But the main external facts of the business must first be briefly narrated.

In the year 1805, soon after the publication of the *Lay*, Scott having recently sold the estate of Rosebank on the Tweed, left him by his uncle Captain Robert Scott, for the sum of 5000*l.*, invested the money in the printing and book-selling concern of James and John Ballantyne, who had both been his schoolfellows at Kelso. His motive, it seems, was the desire of enlarging his income to an extent beyond what literature as yet promised, or his slackening assiduity at the bar permitted him to hope for. In answer to Lockhart, immediately after the crash in 1826, he wrote :

“It is easy, no doubt, for any friend to blame me for entering into connection with commercial matters at all. But I wish to know what I could have done better ; excluded from the bar, and then from all profits for six years by my colleague’s prolonged life. Literature was not in those days what poor Constable has made it ; and with my little capital I was too glad to make commercially the means of supporting my family. I got but 600*l.* for the *Lay*,” &c.

This commercial connection with the Ballantynes was always kept a strict secret. For a time affairs went well, and large sums of money were placed at Scott’s disposal. But James had not had the education of a printer ; and being naturally indolent, and increasingly employed and confided in by Scott as the reader and critic of his works before publication, he failed to bestow that close personal attention to the business details of the printing-house without which no such speculation can succeed. John, the “picaroon,” was a dashing little *roué*,—an excellent mimic, a first-rate singer, a gay, light, reckless adventurer. His utter incompetency to manage a publishing business is evident from this description ; but Lockhart burdens him with a more serious charge than incapacity. It seems that by the system of acceptances and renewals which he introduced, and by cunningly hiding from Scott the real state of the firm’s affairs, particularly the extent to which it had become indebted to Constable in the crisis of 1813, he prevented him from making so searching an inquiry into his real position as would have infallibly resulted in the winding-up of the partnership. His motives for this conduct are placed in a clear light by Mr. Lockhart ; but it falls not within the compass of our design to linger over them. His devotion to Scott will mitigate in some minds the severity of their judgment on his delinquencies. “The chief enjoyment and glory of my life,” he says, in a private memorandum which came to light after his death, “was the possession of the friendship and confidence of the greatest of men.” Lastly, the “Great

Unknown" partner, Scott himself, was too sanguine and *complaisant* a man to conduct a business on those strict mercantile principles which alone can make it *pay*. He always over-rated the works of others, particularly of his personal friends; and there were several such works which he recommended for publication at the risk of the firm, which turned out ruinously bad speculations. Again, as, through John Ballantyne's management, he never knew the exact position in which he stood, nor the real amount of his liabilities, he launched out into purchases of land and lavish expenditure on building and furniture, which his real resources, even had the firm been economically managed, would probably have been inadequate to meet.

The partnership narrowly escaped a dissolution so early as 1813. In the spring and summer of that year, Scott was continually harassed by letters from John Ballantyne containing urgent applications for advances. The correspondence may be summed up on Scott's side by the pithy postscript to one of his letters: "For God's sake, treat me as a man, and not as a milch-cow." This crisis was terminated by Scott's obtaining the security of his chieftain the Duke of Buccleuch to a cash-credit for 4000*l*. In 1814 commenced the publication of the novels; and elated by their extraordinary sale, the partners one and all seemed to have cheated themselves into the belief that all was right, and that their financial position was thenceforth secure. John Ballantyne died in 1821, in utter ignorance of the real state of his affairs, imagining himself to have 2000*l*. to leave, whereas he was in fact deeply in debt. Scott went on enlarging his domains, and raising up new buildings. But the bubble was sure to break at last, and it only remains to tell the precise time and manner of the rupture.

Various premonitory indications had prepared Scott in some degree for the fatal 17th January 1826. Towards the end of the previous year he became aware that the house of Hurst and Robinson in London, the affairs of which he knew to be much mixed up with Constable's, and those with Ballantyne's, was labouring under severe financial pressure. On one particular day, the 18th December 1825, his Diary shows him to have been thoroughly alarmed; and his imagination immediately painted to him all the exposure, the publicity, the finger pointed at the humbled pride of the mushroom baronet, the compassion still more unendurable, the ruin of all that he had striven for during life, and the clouded future of his beloved children. But again there was a temporary gleam, and he hoped that he might win through the storm. Con-

stable went up to London, infuriated and almost beside himself at the near approach of his ruin; had interviews with Lockhart; pressed him to use Scott's name in negotiating with London bankers, which Lockhart peremptorily refused to do; and then astounded him by the revelation of the personal interest which Scott, as the Ballantynes' partner, had in bolstering up the credit of his house. Lockhart's first feeling was evidently one of deep mortification. A proud man himself, and of ancient lineage, he was quite unprepared for the announcement that his father-in-law had dabbled in "business," and was a partner in a printing concern. A more justifiable ground for annoyance might be the feeling that Scott had not treated him with perfect openness, and that the equivocations and dubious transactions in which the maintenance of the secret had involved him, cast a certain dimness over the bright escutcheon of his hero. Constable returned *re infectâ* to Edinburgh; in the middle of January, Hurst and Robinson dishonoured a bill drawn on them by Constable, and on the 17th of the month James Ballantyne called upon Scott and informed him of the necessity of suspension. All the world knows how Scott met the announcement, and faced the grim fact of ruin. The pages of that wonderful Diary, which he had fortunately begun to keep a few months before, show, in brief and indirect but unmistakable allusions, at what cost of inward agony he bore a calm front to the world. His liabilities were finally ascertained to amount to about 117,000*l.* This sum he had reduced by incessant labour to about 54,000*l.* at the time of his death.

In this connection with the Ballantynes, there are two circumstances to which we must devote a few words. First, how did the firm, considering the great success of the novels, fail for so enormous an amount? One can understand that Scott should have miscalculated his position by thousands, but how by scores of thousands? This question, as a whole, must for ever remain a mystery. Who can see his way through that financial imbroglio? Even Lockhart, with all his peculiar facilities for understanding the matter in all its parts, seems to be baffled by the complications of the problem. One intimation there is, however, which partly accounts for the magnitude of the liabilities, though at the expense of Constable's integrity. It seems that when it was not convenient for either Constable's or Ballantyne's house to take up their acceptances at the date of maturity, sets of counter-bills were drawn, which were accepted by the *other* firm, by means of the substitution of which in the market the original bills might be taken up. Now this practice was often resorted to

in apprehension of a difficulty which, when it came to the point, was got over. In this latter case the counter-bills, which evidently represented no "value received" to the acceptors, should of course have been cancelled. But it seems that a large number of such acceptances given by Ballantyne and Co. had, by the culpable carelessness and indolence of the brothers, been allowed to accumulate in Constable's desk. When the storm was darkening round him, Constable, it seems, half frantic at the prospect of his ruin, took these bills and threw them upon the market. Of the precise extent to which the liabilities of Ballantyne and Co. were thus increased, we are not informed; but it is obvious that the financial pressure upon them might easily in this way have been suddenly and indefinitely augmented.

The other circumstance to which we referred is the disingenuousness into which Scott was led by the secrecy in which he chose to involve the whole transaction. Vanity, it would seem, was the original motive to this secrecy; his professional comrades would have looked coldly and scornfully on the fact of his being engaged in *business*. And strong and fearless though he was in the ordinary emergencies of life, Scott could not brave *opinion*; there he was vulnerable and weak. Here, of course, he was wrong at the outset; if the commercial enterprise were unworthy of him, he should not have engaged in it; if unobjectionable, he should not have been ashamed of it. The frequent recommendations of the printing-house which his early letters contain leave a disagreeable impression. The high-minded and polished Ellis, so true a friend and admirer, did not deserve to have an *interested* recommendation conveyed to him of the *Edinburgh Annual Register*; an undertaking originated by the firm early in 1809, which turned out in every sense a disastrous failure.

But what was it that lay at the root of the whole matter? Whence the haste to be rich which made him not content with the very respectable income which the shrievalty, his wife's fortune, and his fast brightening literary prospects secured to him? Why, above all, did he not break off the connection in 1812, when he came into the enjoyment of 1300*l.* a year, the salary of his clerkship in the Court of Session? To answer the last question first,—Scott was by that time habituated to the connection; James Ballantyne was exceedingly useful to him in the ways already mentioned; and both brothers, according to Lockhart, knew how to practise an adroit and peculiar kind of flattery, which found a weak corner even in that robust and elevated mind. But the answer to the former question is not so easily given; it in-

volves, in fact, the further inquiry, For what did Scott truly live? whitherward did those marvellous powers aspire? Mr. Carlyle simply replies, For nothing, and no-whither. "One knows not," he says, "what idea worthy of the name of great, what purpose, instinct, or tendency that could be called great, Scott ever was inspired with. His life was worldly; his ambitions were worldly. There is nothing spiritual about him; all is economical, material, of the earth earthy." And further on: "There is small vestige of any such fire" (that of a living and guiding Idea) "being extant in the inner man of Scott."

Mr. Lockhart, in the concluding chapter of his work, though he disclaims the endeavour to present a complete analysis, examines minutely those features of Scott's character of which Mr. Carlyle's is the above reading. We must find room for one extract:

"An imagination such as his . . . . soon shaped out a world of its own, to which it would fain accommodate the real one. The love of his country became, indeed, a passion; no knight ever tilted for his mistress more willingly than he would have bled and died to preserve even the airiest surviving nothing of her antique pretensions for Scotland. But the Scotland of his affections had the clan Scott for her kernel. Next and almost equal to the throne was Buccleuch. Fancy rebuilt and most prodigally embellished the whole system of the social existence of the middle ages, in which the clansman (wherever there were clans) acknowledged practically no sovereign but his chief. The author of the *Lay* would rather have seen his heir carry the banner of Bellenden gallantly at a football match on Carterhaugh, than he would have heard that the boy had attained the highest honours of the first university in Europe. His original pride was to be an acknowledged member of one of the "honourable families" whose progenitors had been celebrated by Satchels for following this banner in blind obedience to the patriarchal leader; his first and last worldly ambition was to be himself the founder of a distinct branch; he desired to plant a lasting root, and dreamt not of personal fame, but of long distant generations rejoicing in the name of Scott of Abbotsford. By this idea all his reveries, all his aspirations, all his plans and efforts, were overshadowed and controlled. The great object and end only rose into clearer daylight, and swelled into more substantial dimensions, as public applause strengthened his confidence in his own powers and faculties; and when he had reached the summit of universal and unrivalled honour, he clung to his first love with the faith of a paladin. It is easy enough to smile at all this; many will not understand it, and some who do may pity it. But it was at least a different thing from the modern vulgar ambition of amassing a fortune and investing it in land. The lordliest vision of acres would have had little

charm for him unless they were situated in Ettrick or Yarrow, or in

‘ Pleasant Tiviedale,  
Fast by the river Tweed.’ ”

This is a singular sort of ambition certainly ; yet not altogether of that “earthy” “material” kind which Mr. Carlyle defines it to be. It flowed from a deep central idea, which was the light and the strength of Scott’s being,—the fire that burned within him, to use Mr. Carlyle’s own metaphor, and had power to burn up much of noisy vapouring pretension, and to harden with purifying flames many an element of good which of itself might not have withstood those days of trial. It was essentially an idea of conservation, not of revolution ; it had not the gloss of novelty, nor the charm of audacity ; its fruits were less manifest for the time, because it tended to maintain society erect, while the revolutionary idea tended to overturn it ; yet it was not the less the master-thought of the whole life of him whom it possessed. Human society—such as in the revolutions of ages it had been able to fashion itself under the complex operation of religion, law, and special circumstance—had in its aspect for Scott something venerable, something even divine : it was his Palladium, his ark of the covenant ; and whatever symbolised its majesty and stability was precious in his eyes. It is told of him, that when he was a young law-student, a party of Irish having combined together to prevent the performance of “God save the King” at the Edinburgh theatre, he headed a party against the democrats, which insisted on the performance of the loyal air ; and on their resisting, engaged in a battle-royal with them, drubbed them soundly, and drove them out of the theatre. The Irishmen were doubtless animated by the idea of democracy, which Mr. Carlyle honours as the early and pure inspiration of Napoleon ; but was the queller of the Irishmen possessed by no idea ? Yes, truly ; and perhaps it might have formulated itself somewhat in this wise : “These hot-brained Irishmen, who despise that traditionary deposit of right and freedom whose value they are incapable of perceiving, and would pull down in haste that which wiser and better men built up with infinite toil—why should I be daunted or duped by their parrot-cry of liberty and equality, to despise civil rights which my forefathers, from generation to generation, slowly won for me ; and to join in a general assault upon other rights which the classes above me still retain, and, for aught I know, deserve. Not by theorising and fine writing, but by doing and suffering, was this Scotland of ours formed and built up out of the long barbaric

night, until knit together into this goodly fellowship of self-relying, law-obeying men. That place in the organism which I hold, and am proud to hold, I mean to keep; and therefore I will respect and defend the places of others, whether above or below me; for the value, the very significance, of each place is relative, and depends upon the preservation of the entire fabric in dignity and security." So Burke finely said, "To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle, the germ, as it were, of all public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love of our country and of mankind."

If England is still "a land that Freedom chose;" if in her national life there is no discontinuity, but the past and present mingle with and temper one another in an inextricable network of links and fibres; if we would rather have our *old* England than belong to any nationality in the world, though perfected and organised after the most approved revolutionary model, we must remember that it was these idealess, soulless worldlings, who are the objects of Mr. Carlyle's disparaging sentences,—the Scotts, and Burkes, and Johnsons,—who, winning the *intellectual* battle against the anarchists, saved their country even from engaging, much more from sinking, in the internecine *social* strife which ruined France. First, when the elements were getting electric, but the storm was still far off, came the English Johnson, confounding, like another Socrates, the sophists who were labouring to import and naturalise the Voltairian philosophy, and securing for the cause of the old and received ideas that intellectual ascendancy among the upper ranks of society which in France the scoffs of Voltaire and the heavy metal of the encyclopædic had transferred to the side of scepticism. Next, Burke the Irishman, when the thunder-cloud first broke, stood firm against the exciting influences of the heated atmosphere; and, addressing himself especially to the political question, demonstrated how empty and delusive were the current cries, how sordid the motives of their utterers; and predicted, with marvellous sagacity, the exact course of declension which the revolution would take. The last among these heroes of order was the Scotchman, Sir Walter Scott. In a somewhat different province of human affairs, he fought substantially the same battle which Johnson and Burke had fought before him. The elemental strife was now raging with doubtful event, and all the massiveness of his character, all the force of his will, all the resources of his mind, were employed to sustain British society under the exhausting

struggle, to harden and confirm the old and inveterate pertinacity of the race, to speak words of encouragement in dark days, and raise high the song of victory when fortune smiled once more. Of such a man it is not true to say, as Mr. Carlyle has said, that there is "nothing spiritual" about him; that all is "of the earth earthy." True, your Atlas makes less noise and turmoil than your Enceladus or Briareus; but these will, sooner or later, be whelmed under Mount Etna, and heard of no more, while the pillar which supports a world, the moral prop which stays society from rushing into ruin and collapse, will be valued more and more with the lapse of years, and consecrated to perpetual honour by the grateful veneration of posterity.

In our deliberate judgment, then, Scott's life was not that embodiment of ignoble self-seeking endeavour which Mr. Carlyle would represent it. And yet it cannot be denied that prosperity begat a certain hardness in him; and that, in the half-dozen years preceding the crash, even his own singular ideal, in itself not of the highest order, was partially overlaid and obscured by the heterogeneous machinery which he employed to realise it. No man has a right to be so intent on providing the means of life as to forget to live. The allegiance to law and established order was somewhat overdone, when it prompted a man like Scott to indite a minute and faithful narrative of the proceedings at the coronation of — George IV.! The solemn moral import of that antique ceremonial must have been forgotten in the admiration of its outward forms; else how could the mockery of such vows, taken by such a man, have failed to strike him? Again, the ideal end of the feudal relation between landlord and dependent ran no small risk, one would say, of being buried under a multiplicity of details, when the laird of Abbotsford came to think that his side of the relation required such floods of correspondence about upholstery, such a world of contrivance and negotiation about knick-nacks, as the letters to Terry and others exhibit. Scott aimed at more than that *sufficient* provision of temporal good which Aristotle defines to be, not an ingredient, but a collateral condition of happiness; and by a just retribution he found himself left with *less*.

In that day of supreme humiliation, Scott, we have always thought, played the man; sat calmly down amid the ruins of his pride, and acquitted himself as a brave and good man should. But it seems there was a yet more excellent way in which the disaster might have been met, and Mr. Carlyle would show us how to "gild refined gold." He might, it seems, have confessed himself vanquished,—owned

that he had been all along pursuing a false ideal,—and acquiesced in ruin, without an effort to repair its effects. He did not do so, but proudly and doggedly set himself to the vain task of reversing fate's decree and paying his creditors. This view assumes that his vanity, and the selfish part of his ambition, remained the same after his ruin as before it. But the facts recorded, the entries in his Diary, and the distinct testimony of Mr. Lockhart (vii. 408) contravene this assumption. We hear of no more grand receptions, no hospitable banquets *en grand seigneur*, no plate-glass windows or marble chimney-pieces. Hard stern work, habitual self-denial, take the place of all such vanities. To have acted otherwise, would, in our poor judgment, have argued, not humility, but dishonourable sloth. The "novel manufactory," which Mr. Carlyle justly holds in no great respect, had long ministered to vanity; now it must minister to the discharge of those obligations with which vanity had burdened him. Nor would Scott have allowed, as neither do we, that his ideal had been altogether a perversion or a dream. "Some at least," he says (Diary, 18th December 1825), "will forgive my transient wealth on account of the innocence of my intentions, *and my real wish to do good to the poor.*" But had the case been so, and had his eyes been opened as thoroughly as Mr. Carlyle could desire to the enormity of his errors, we still do not see why his conduct should have been different from what it was. The debts were due, whatever judgment might be passed upon the debtor; and if he chose to regard them from the point of view of a gentleman, instead of that of a trader, and resolved if he could to pay all, instead of availing himself of the bankruptcy law, and paying only part, is he to be censured for that? He forfeited health and life in the struggle; but what then? He is not truly unhappy who can say, *tout est perdu fors l'honneur*. What Burke calls "the chastity of honour" is not so universal among us as to make it becoming to deride and condemn one of the few whom the principle truly actuated.

The severity of Mr. Carlyle's tone, when estimating, in 1838, the character of Sir Walter, seems traceable to the theory which he then held concerning the true functions and dignity of the man of letters. The author of "Sartor Resartus" and of "Past and Present" would fain have invested the modern writer with the attributes of a Hebrew prophet; despairing of religion, he would have set up literature as the guide of life, made the author the only authentic preacher, and the publication of a book synonymous with the evangelisation of a people. "Literature," he said, "has other

aims than that of harmlessly amusing indolent languid men ; or if literature have them not, then literature is a very poor affair." That there is much nobleness, and something of truth, in this theory, we would not deny ; and such works as "Past and Present," "Chartism," and "Hero-Worship," are memorable embodiments of it. That Scott, like Shakespeare, conceived of literature and its functions altogether differently, is most certain. He regarded it as a means ; Mr. Carlyle as an end. The responsibilities of literary gifts were perhaps underrated by the one ; but they were certainly overrated by the other. This radical discordance explains, we think, much of Mr. Carlyle's severity. Yet he should have been candid enough to allow that Scott might have an ideal, though he placed it elsewhere ; that there were earnest purpose and fixed direction in his life, although writing books was to him rather a pastime or a business than the fulfilment of a duty. Mr. Carlyle himself would seem to have changed his view as to the prophetic office of the man of letters. Admirable as is the execution of the *Life of Frederic*, its excellence is of a kind essentially literary ; it is addressed to the educated and critical few, and does not attempt, in the old prophetic vein, to sound and stir up from its depths the general human heart.

There is one aspect of Scott's mind of which we have hitherto said nothing,—we mean the religious aspect. Yet, although to a Catholic the account of the position which a man holds in regard to saving faith must ever seem the most momentous and permanently interesting portion of his life's history, it must be owned that in the present case such an inquiry would be found singularly sterile. It would be a great waste of time to investigate the religious convictions of Lord Burleigh or Maurice of Saxony ; and although, morally, Scott stood far above either, yet the reason why a religious biography of these worthies would be impracticable is at bottom the same which makes it useless to ask whether Scott approved of High Church or Low Church, whether he tended to Catholicism or swore by Calvin. The truth is, that Sir Walter was simply of the religion professed by the aristocratic and cultivated class in British society to which he belonged. In his time and country, that religion happened to be the Anglican form of Protestantism ; but whatever form it had been, he would probably have adhered to it. Though born and brought up in a rigid Presbyterian family, he attached himself when he grew to manhood to the Church of England, for no other reason, that we can discover, except that it was the religion of his king, of his literary friends, of

the leaders of society and the political chieftains in both countries, above all, because it was the religion of Buccleuch! The Catholic reader must not be surprised at finding here and there, in the diary and letters, severe and unjust expressions respecting the Church and her ritual. He will remember that Scott, able as he was, was destitute of "the philosophic mind;" and that although he may be implicitly trusted when he states a fact, his inferences from it, or attempts to account for it, are generally valueless. Thus, in writing to Joanna Baillie, after his visit to Ireland in 1825, he speaks of Catholicism as "a helpless sort of superstition," which "destroys ambition and industrious exertion;" and adduces in proof the fact that Irish Catholics seldom or never rise above the social station in which they were born. The fact was probably so in 1825; Scott was too shrewd to be deceived in a matter which had come under his own observation. But it is notoriously no fact in 1860, and yet the Irish are not less Catholic now than they were thirty-five years ago. Now, as the intervening period has been one of constant progress in the direction of the establishment of religious and civil equality between Catholic and Protestant, it may be probably inferred that the onerous restrictions and disabilities under which the Catholics formerly lay were the cause of the fact observed by Scott. At any rate, his own inference, from the fact to the character of the religion they professed, is shown to have been futile.

The innumerable passages in his works in which the faith and religious observances of Catholic ages are referred to without bitterness, and described with a certain reverence, prove nothing as to Scott's own religious tendencies. If, indeed, Bishop Tait or Bishop Philpotts were to handle "medieval superstitions" with the like tenderness, he would be considered as half-way on the road to Rome. But Scott deals with all religious manifestations simply as an artist; he finds in the Church history of the middle ages an exhaustless mine of picturesque material, and makes profitable use of it accordingly. Similarly he makes literary capital out of the lofty fanaticism of the Covenanters. There is, however, one trace of genuine personal feeling which it is pleasant to meet with; Scott always loved the Latin hymns of the Catholic ritual. In writing to Crabbe in 1814, he said, "To my Gothic ear, *Stabat Mater*, the *Dies Iræ*, and some of the other hymns of the Catholic Church are more solemn and affecting than the fine classical poetry of Buchanan." In his last illness, the almost divine music of those ancient strains lingered around his failing faculties. Speaking of the wanderings of

his delirium, Lockhart says, "We very often heard distinctly the cadence of the *Dies Iræ*, and, I think, the very last stanza that we could make out was the first of a still greater favourite:

"Stabat Mater dolorosa,  
Juxta crucem lacrymosa,  
Dum pendebat Filius."

Of the last sad years, from 1826 to 1832, we can give no account in detail; but there is a mournful tragic interest attaching to them, which makes the last two volumes of the *Life* impress us far more deeply than the records of the flowing tide of prosperity in the period which preceded them. Indeed, the effect of all this latter portion of Scott's life is deeply tragical,—using the word in the sense of Chaucer, who in the "*Monk's Tale*" defines a tragedy to be the history of a person, who having been raised up from a mean position to a great height of prosperity, is afterwards involved in misfortune, and comes to a ruinous and miserable end. Even so it is with Sir Walter Scott. As great as the rise had been, so great and overwhelming is the fall. In vain does the heroic man brace his already fading energies to the task of reconstruction; in vain does he "work double tides," and cut down to the lowest point all personal expenditure; in vain do pitying nations applaud the endeavour, and Scottish creditors, lifted above themselves by strong sympathy, transform themselves into the chivalrous and forbearing friends of their toiling debtor. All is in vain; the struggle is against time and circumstance, against nature's neglected laws; and it cannot be ultimately successful. Wonderful feats are performed, but the race is *not* won. Nature sinks beneath the strain; paralysis seizes upon the over-wrought powers; and the curtain falls upon a scene of quick decay, insensibility, and death.

One more extract descriptive of the last hours:

"As I was dressing on the morning of Monday the 17th of September, Nicholson came into my room, and told me that his master had awoke in a state of composure and consciousness, and wished to see me immediately. I found him entirely himself, though in the last extreme of feebleness. His eye was clear and calm—every trace of the wildfire of delirium extinguished. 'Lockhart,' he said, 'I may have but a minute to speak to you. My dear, be a good man—be virtuous—be religious—be a good man. Nothing else will give you any comfort when you come to lie here.' He paused; and I said, 'Shall I send for Sophia and Anne?' 'No,' said he, 'don't disturb them. Poor souls! I know they were up all night. God bless you all.' With this he sank into a very tran-

quill sleep, and, indeed, he scarcely afterwards gave any sign of consciousness. . . . . About half-past one P.M., on the 21st of September, Sir Walter breathed his last, in the presence of all his children. It was a beautiful day—so warm, that every window was wide open; and so perfectly still, that the sound of all others the most delicious to his ear, the gentle ripple of the Tweed over its pebbles, was distinctly audible as we knelt around the bed, and his eldest son kissed and closed his eyes.”

We will not spoil this beautiful image of final peace by indulging in any further reflections on the busy life and manifold work of the illustrious dead. Much more might be said on both; but we have accomplished, however imperfectly, the task we undertook,—the attempt, namely, to show that Sir Walter Scott, in spite of what has been or may be urged against him as an author or as a man, was one of the most memorable persons of modern times; that his true greatness has been as yet inadequately acknowledged; and that, whatever may be the final sentence of criticism upon his writings, no blinding partiality guided Mr. Lockhart’s pen, when at the conclusion of his work he designated its subject “A GREAT AND GOOD MAN.”

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## Communicated Articles.

### THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE.

#### I. THE EXACT SCIENCES.

BECAUSE the physical sciences do not demonstrate the existence of God, some physical philosophers deny Him. Nature, they say, is a law to herself, and needs no lawgiver; chemical laws act of themselves; electro-magnetism operates on matter in a gaseous state, solidifies it into masses, which it poises and balances, and so produces the mechanism of the universe—nowhere does the will or the action of a free personal God crop out. There is intelligence, but it is natural, not personal. Nature stands alone.

This, they tell us, is certain. Mathematics are inherent in matter, and do not depend on a mathematician, any more than physical forces on a Hercules, or chemical forces on a chemist. All is *thing*, nowhere do we find *person*. The *thing* is science. Mathematical, chemical, physical laws are realities that exist substantially in matter, and not intellectually in any supreme personal spirit.

But the philosophers who assert this are themselves mathematicians, chemists, naturalists. What law of nature gives them these characters? What distinguishes them from the things which they observe, study, and analyse? Whence this power of abstraction which makes them see things not visible on the surface? Do they get it from nature? Yes; from their *own* nature, not from external nature. What, then, is this nature so essentially distinct from external nature, that one knows and is conscious, while the other, with all its brute force, is blind, deaf, and lifeless? How can we get at the abstract science of mathematics,—not the mathematics inherent in matter, which we can imagine, but the mathematics abstracted from all matter, which we cannot imagine, but can employ?

Here, then, are two points which philosophers have to establish. How do they distinguish themselves from things, and know themselves to have a mind distinct from nature and the universe? and how do they prove the identity of science with reality, of the laws conceived in the mind with the laws incorporate in the world? Will they tell us that there is a material mind,—that mind is matter, and matter mind? Impossible! Matter is contrary to mind. Mind is myself, my person, in opposition to things. Perhaps, then, mind is an attribute of matter, a quality, an emanation, or a

possession, like the table-rapping force which it was lately the fashion to believe in? But there is no conceivable mind without freedom: matter does not possess mind, but mind possesses matter; matter does not constitute mind, but mind may in some degree spiritualise matter, by making it the expression and image of its thought.

Reality stares us in the face; the world, that wonderful combination of force and matter, is a reality. Chemistry informs us that the world has not existed as it is from all eternity—we know that matter was in a gaseous state before it was solid; science takes cognizance, not only of the existing world, but also of the world in process of formation, after the analogy of the decomposition and recomposition of any portion of matter. But science is brought up short at the limits of experience; it knows nothing beyond gas and the physical forces which lie at the base of the whole material universe—yes, it knows somewhat more. It can prove, or rather create, a *vacuum*. It can pump all gas, every particle of perceptible matter, out of a bell-glass. What is possible in a cubic foot is conceivable in universal space; thus the non-existence of the world is supposable, matter and physical force can both be annihilated. Science, then, can show, beyond the elements of the world, the existence of *vacuum*, or nothing. It has, then, to account for the existence of the world.

Let us now turn to the mind, and see how she manages to eliminate God. Reason, she says, shows us a chain of causes and effects in human affairs; she shows us a thinking soul, which is human nature, and which weaves in us the tissue of our thoughts and deeds. Here is no God; nothing but ourselves. We can fancy a God, but He will only be an abstraction of reason. Be it so. But reason also is an abstraction. How does it account for the person?

It is a great misapprehension, both of nature and of mind, to set up absolute reason as an independent quality, without any absolute mind in which it can inhere; to isolate the laws of matter, and to take the average of the laws of mind, and to form of these two an absolute reason, a kind of statistical total, or an arc of vibration,—a *laxum* within which every reason must move, a universal reason which is the type of each individual reason,—and then to set up this compound reason as the test of all truth, and thus to make nature and man the measure of all things. In doing so, we deny one half of nature and one half of mind. We completely overlook the *life* in nature, which endures no abstraction; and we overlook the imagination in the mind, the power which

sees and furnishes the reason with all its materials of reflection. Reason, then, is no independent being; it is a quality inherent in some substance.

These difficulties in the isolation of pure reason have forced others, who perceived the reality of the natural life which physical and mathematical science cannot reduce to any formula, and of the mental imagination of which logic can give no account, to form two other sciences,—biology, to unlock the mysteries of life, and æsthetics, poetry and art, to unlock the mysteries of the imagination. And then reason is to give a full account of reason, life of life, poetry of poetry, art of art; there is no mystery left to require the *Deus ex machina*. I will postpone the consideration of art and poetry without God, and inquire into the theory of life without any living God.

The scale of life ascends in a zigzag or spiral line, from the vegetable cell, through all the developments of the animal, up to man. Now what is the force which bridges over the gulf between the lifeless *thing* and the living *organism*, between mathematical crystallisation and biological growth? It is chemistry, said the scientific atheists of the eighteenth century: but the scientific atheists of the present day have been the first to combat this theory, to accuse their predecessors of deserting the road of experiment and induction, and of indulging in fanciful speculations; the modern idea is, that embryology is to provide the bridge, to account for the phenomena of life, and to trace the development of the thinking being from the rudimental cell.

I do not question the importance of the action of chemistry in the phenomena of life, and in the cerebral instruments of thought. Nobody denies the reality of the laws of organic chemistry which preside over the organisation of vegetables, animals, and men, or the distinction of these laws from those of inorganic chemistry, though the subject-matter of both is the same elementary matter, the same gases, earths, and metals. But organic matter is not life; no one has yet proved that life is, like heat, a product of electro-magnetic forces. I believe that the future discoveries of chemistry will be enormous; but I will defy all future chemists to produce the smallest seed, the least germ, the minutest animalcule, not to speak of the human embryo. If chemistry could work this miracle, I would own its divinity.

Life, like thought, is an unknown force, and electro-magnetism has nothing to do with it. Life and thought are creative; electricity only adds and divides, and acts on dead and inanimate masses. It disorders the living body, but cannot

produce it. It has nothing in common with the living thinking soul, the central creative form of the living body and of living thought. The "spark of life" is but a metaphor; the "electric spark" is a fact; vitality is a different thing from the heat of chemical decomposition. We can understand life springing from life; can we understand life springing from any other source?

To deny the existence of a personal God in relation with man and the world, is to profess to explain the world by physical science alone, and man by biology alone. The eighteenth century jumped all difficulties; it assumed a vacuum, space, and atoms, or ultimate and indivisible magnitudes. Then it brought in pressure, shock, chance, or the principle of time. From these data every thing else followed. Thought, the product of brain, sprung (so to say) from an electric discharge through man's head; sensation sprung from the same discharge passed through his nerves; ideas were images, thoughts were sensations; all of them were impressions, modifications, or motions of the brain or the nervous system. These notions are no longer current; but the men of science are still experimenting with more silence, but with no less hopes that chemistry will one day strike out the secret of thought and of life.

Throughout all this there is a constant element which these men dare not think about or attempt to explain; this element tells man that he is something different from all other visible beings. It is consciousness, which they dare not deny, though they will not confess it.

Each man knows himself to be a *me* distinct from all other *mes*; an individual, a person. Each of us has his individual personal consciousness, and a human consciousness besides. Whatever his nationality may be, the colour of his skin, or the form of his skull, each of us is conscious that he is a man, one of the human species, a constituent portion of mankind.

Beneath the *me*, beneath consciousness, we possess, in virtue of our organised body, a distinct force, which in the brutes is instinct, and which in them supplies the place of our consciousness. This is why our instinct is so much weaker than that of brutes; for we have a substitute for it in consciousness. And as we share instinct with the brutes, so do we participate in the vegetative principle of plants. The brute has more vegetative force than we, but less than the plant; our vegetation is inferior to that of the brute, our instinct inferior to his: our superiority lies in our consciousness; it alone raises us above the sphere of all animal and vegetable life, and carries us into the realms of spirit, which belong to

a third order of things. The first order, that of physical chemistry, ends with the edifice of the universe. The second, that of life, pervades the vegetable, the animal, and the human kingdoms. The third, or spiritual order, stands by itself; for its principle is not to be found in either of the other orders. Or perhaps some philosopher would be kind enough to inform me what it is that develops matter into life, and then develops life into thought.

Some will tell us that there is a threefold soul, the soul of the world, the vital soul, and the thinking soul—any thing rather than admit God, the Soul of souls.

This theory exceeds the bounds both of pure physics and of pure reason. It is a kind of mysticism to intrude a soul of the world into the order of the physical, chemical, and mathematical sciences, or a vital soul into the order of biology and anatomy, or a thinking soul into the order of psychology, philology, history, morals, and social science. It removes us from the platform of materialism and of rationalism, but it lands us anew on the platform of naturalism under another shape. What is the nature of this threefold soul? Is it one or is it three? and what are the relations between the mechanical soul which moves the machine of the universe, balances its motions, and sounds the strokes of time, the vital soul, which grows in the vegetable, acts in the animal, and feels in man, and the thinking soul, which has the idea of universals, and possesses self-consciousness?

A soul of the world can never be proved. How can a machine have a soul? The ancients never thought of the world as of a machine; they considered it to be a living, even a lung-breathing animal. Science has discovered the *mécanique céleste*, and since Newton's days the idea of a living Pan has been exploded. Now, no machine can make itself; the burden of proof is with those who think it can: but the proof is impossible; there is no machine without a maker. The ancients knew this well when they spoke of the Demiurge, the architect or workman of the world. I own the existence of a vital soul; but we must come to an understanding about the exact sense of the word 'soul.' Beasts have souls; it is a gross mistake of Descartes to make them mere machines. The soul of the animal is obscured and fettered by instinct, utterly without self-consciousness, but with sentiments and passions, and with the power of instinctive action. We cannot say that plants have souls; but they live after their own fashion. The soul in my sense is something more than vegetative or perceptive—it thinks. The true soul is that which lives and feels and thinks. It slumbers like the plant, it has passions

like the animal; but it also rises above the order of the world by its reason, which discovers the system of the universe, conceives the idea of the world, and thus transcends its limits; for it raises itself towards a higher and living Reason, which is not abstract, like the human understanding, but realises the contents of its eternal thought, which creates the world, and multiplies its image in the human soul.

Consciousness may be obscured, but not extinguished; if it were, manhood would be extinguished too, and only a brute nature would remain; and not even that, for the instinctive infallibility which characterises the brute would be wanting. Man's instincts do not wax as his self-consciousness wanes.

The ancients, as we said, considered the soul of the world to be a living being, an animal, a ζῷον, gifted with intelligence, which was a harmonious νοῦς according to Plato and Pythagoras, or a mechanical νοῦς according to Aristotle. In the system of our modern scientific atheists, who substitute *the divinity* for God, the soul of the world is not such as the ancients conceived it; the divinity is something impersonal, which flashes in the electric spark, acts in chemical combinations, and moves in the harmonious mechanism of the system of the world. This divinity, which is neither a divine soul, nor a first mover of the heavens, nor the living God, is a mere word, set up to hide a pure vacuum. It is something immeasurably beneath the idea which the ancients formed of a soul of the world after the analogy of the human soul, moving the body of the universe as our soul moves our body—the idea was false, because it is founded on a false analogy; but it nevertheless contains the germs of the highest truth.

For this God, innate in the body of the universe, and at once its demiurge and its νοῦς, who makes the world His home, and clothes Himself with it as with a living body, expresses, however imperfectly, the idea of a providence, a system whereby the world is upheld. It is quite true that the world is in God, ideally; and it is true that God is in the world, because He upholds it. It is quite true that, in some sublime sense, God is that Pole of the universe around whom the stellar nebulae revolve, with their numberless suns and planetary systems. But He is not the Soul of the world which the ancients conceived, contained in the world and inseparable from it, nor is He the *divinity* invented by certain philosophers to explain the threefold mysteries of nature, life, and thought; a sort of mechanical living and thinking gas,—or rather guess, for the science of its inventors cannot furnish a single proof of it, and their assertion of it only shows that they are less ashamed to own their ignorance than

to confess the true God. They will not acknowledge any thing beyond or above nature, and they say that the divinity is nature, or rather the progress of nature, beginning with the machine of the universe, advancing towards the living organism of plants and animals, and perfecting itself in the self-consciousness of man.

But experiment throws down all this scaffolding, by discovering a vacuum from which every particle of matter is excluded, and where, therefore, the forces of electricity have no play. Experiment, therefore, proves the existence of absolute vacuum, or nothing. Once more, therefore, whence comes this thing, or the universe? out of nothing? But your first principle is, "*Ex nihilo nihil.*" You say that there is no God. You prove experimentally that there *was* no nature, for you have substituted vacuum for it. How, then, do you account for the beginning of things?

You appeal afresh to experience. Every thing, you say, proceeds from nature. There we may trace to an indefinite extent a double set of phenomena, the composition of elements and the metamorphosis of the embryo. Chemistry and anatomy unfold these mysteries. They unfold a process of nature, but no miracle. But the act of creation, as you suppose it to be, is a miracle, absolutely distinct from all processes of nature. *Fiat lux, et facta est lux*, is only darkness for science.

This they attempt to prove somewhat in this way: In nature every thing has its law, therefore every thing is necessary. Nothing ever deviates from its plan, or wanders from its path. But if you admit the volition and operation of a mind, you immediately introduce the action of free-will. Will, then, can only be admitted on the condition of not willing at all, or of adhering rigidly to a predetermined plan. But however determined the will may be, however strong the character, will necessarily implies the faculty of altering one's plan, and changing one's direction. Without this, will is no longer will, but fatality; and from the liberty of God we come down to the necessity of nature.

Further, if God's freedom was entire, how could we help thinking that He might create trees with red instead of green leaves, or give men horses' heads? Why should He not alter every thing, and interfere arbitrarily in His work? The schoolmen who have spoken of the will and power of God in this spirit were more faithful to the dogma of the Creator's freedom than those who argued from His wisdom that He could not do otherwise than He has done, because all that He has done is wise. This is the pretext on which certain phi-

losophers refuse to account for the production of nature out of nothing, when they cannot deny the fact of the vacuum.

It is certain that absurd fancies entered the heads of several of the scholastic theologians: some lost themselves in subtleties; others, for want of taste, caricatured their thoughts and expressions. Some ascetics had eyes only for the world of spirits; nature appeared to some of them a superfluity, to others a curse, and to others a prison. They seem to have unintentionally forgotten that man was made in the image of God, not God in the image of man. They did not understand that the absolute freedom of God is identical with His absolute wisdom and will; that His wisdom is law, admitting of no capricious change. It is good to compare an image to its type; but we should never forget that man is no exact copy of God. He is God's creature, partaking of His likeness, but not of His divinity. Man's will is no adequate resemblance of the Divine wisdom.

Other philosophers object, that though divines see nothing but wisdom in God's creation, yet they completely misunderstand its meaning and its wisdom. They pretend that God can contradict His own laws, that He can interfere on all occasions with the regular order of the universe, can change the eternal course of the stars, and can overturn the whole system of His providence; not, indeed, capriciously or arbitrarily, but for some end of His own, often merely to make Himself known or feared by man. These philosophers are in their glory, when they meet with theologians who distinguish thesis from *hypothesis*; who admit the system of Copernicus or of Newton, of Lyell or of Herschel, as *hypothesis*, but deny it as *thesis*, and so pretend that there can be no dogmatic infallibility of science, but only the dogmatic infallibility of the Church. This objection deserves attention.

First, then, I observe, that it confuses two orders of things, not opposed to one another, but radically distinct. The Church is not built on her physical, chemical, and mathematical teaching,—her object is man, not nature. She teaches that God created the world; the different conceptions of the world that prevailed among the Jews, the pagans, the mediæval Christians, and the schools of modern science since the times of Copernicus are nothing to her. There are grand guesses, splendid presentiments, immortal ideas, in the ancient and mediæval systems of physics, but no proper science. If I may say so, it appears to me that God comes out much greater in the system of modern science than in the innocent simplicity of the ancient systems. His wisdom shines incomparably brighter in the telescopic masses and microscopic atoms of modern

science, in the celestial mechanism and in the embryo; His immensity strikes us dumb with awe and adoration. But these things speak to very few; their practical importance is small; the simple method of contemplating nature as the senses represent it, will always convey a deeper moral lesson than all the lore of chemistry and mathematics. Now the Church is for the many, not for the few.

I mean this as an answer to the chemists and meteorologists, who protest against good Christians praying for the cessation of drought or deluge. They know quite well that God does not disturb the deep harmonies of the world to deliver man from his occasional discord with the course of nature. But there is a mighty difference between those deep harmonies and the accidental variations of the atmospherical changes which affect us. Those who mock at these prayers are like Voltaire, who annihilated man in comparison to the world, not because he doubted his own greatness, but because he liked to rob the sufferer of the idea that God would stoop to so lowly a creature, and to tell him, that so far from being king of the universe, man was not even king of the earth. "Worm," he seemed to say, "art thou vain enough to fancy that God thinks of thee, or can even distinguish such an infinitesimal atom as thou art, when He is engaged in rolling in their orbits the multitudinous worlds, of whose very existence thou art ignorant?" I need scarcely observe that these mockers, who degrade man beneath matter, and laugh at him for believing that he bears the image of God and is called to the knowledge of God and of the world, are by no means behindhand in believing in their own dignity, and in their original superiority to the rest of men. They have overcome all the oldest superstitions of mankind; they are immeasurably above their fellow-creatures, who are weak enough to believe in a personal God. There is nothing, they say, superior to nature. They are too modest; for they forget that nature is unconscious, and that they are above nature, because they know it and understand it. They are therefore superior to the globes of matter.

But seriously; these philosophers who confine themselves to their own science, and feel a supreme contempt for all theology and metaphysics, what do they know outside the limits of their science? As naturalists, chemists, mathematicians, biologists, and anatomists, they are great in all that concerns the material world; but without knowledge of God, how can they know man? They know, perhaps, that man is a social and political being, that he can learn, and become as eminent in science as themselves. But what do they know

of man as a religious, free, moral, and intellectual being? nay, what real knowledge have they of man as a social and political being? And with such profound ignorance of man's real value, his true nature and character, how can they decide on the relation of man with God? Granting, as we must, that God does not change the laws of the world to please men, how do they know that there is no true connection, no real communication between God and man; that prayer is in vain, and that man's relations to the world are such as preclude God's interfering in his favour without violating the laws of the creation? I know not, I affirm not; but I believe. How do they know, how can they affirm the contrary? Outside the limits of his experience, what can man ever know of nature?

But besides this miracle of God's answering prayers, there are others, they tell us, which are, if possible, still more offensive to philosophic ears. The grace of sanctity seems partially to free a man from the usual organic conditions of the body in his elevations and his ecstasies; his body seems for a time to live in an exceptional state, and to be more or less absorbed into a sphere of action unknown to natural agents: all this, they say, is in plain contradiction with the natural condition of mankind.

Another objection,—they deny all diabolical influence; no devil can bring man into contact with any evil powers that people the world, and that can draw him beyond the natural sphere of his bodily existence. Here, again, they tell us, faith and the Church disturb the order of things, contradict all our knowledge of the natural powers of the human body, and confuse a vast chain of cause and effect which experience reveals to us.

I think we may answer, that the miraculous sanctity given by God's grace, and the miraculous abomination of diabolical possession, are objects of popular belief in all the religions of the world. The Old and New Testaments are not the only sacred books which assume the reality of man's being sometimes possessed by a spirit, whether of good or of evil, and of the effects which this possession causes either in the human subject or in those who approach him. Paganism, in its own way, is full of this kind of manifestations, as is also the Koran in its way. This fact alone proposes to science a problem both of psychology and of physiology, and when that is settled, a still more obscure problem of those mysterious forces whereby the soul acts on the body, and whose inexplicable currents act on the vital forces in the normal state of slumber, and in the abnormal state of nervous and hysterical

affections. Psychology, physiology, and medicine record many facts in man, while biology records many more in other living beings, which would puzzle the naturalist, the chemist, or the anatomist to account for.

A great deal has been said about *animal magnetism*, the very name of which shows the determination to view it as a function of common electro-magnetism. By this gate men have tried to penetrate the sphere of the unknown; and we have seen some who denied a God, and thought that soul was only a natural phenomenon, renewing a kind of religion of witches and sorcerers, similar to that of Epicurus and his herd. Still we must own that only a few *savants* have tried to make any scientific application of animal magnetism. The rest have formally denied its reality, and have pronounced all the pretended phenomena of sympathy, antipathy, and clairvoyance to be hallucinations, dreams, fanaticisms, or impostures, like all the other miracles which men work either by grace or by the power of evil spirits.

It must be owned that there are certain exceptional states of physical nervousness or of moral unhealthiness to be found not only in single men, but at times also in the masses. There are periods when whole nations seem subject to a moral over-excitement, which unhinges the soul. You may find manifestations of purity, innocence, and simplicity mixed up with symptoms of an epidemic madness. The history of pagan sects is full of examples; in Judaism they are rare, owing to the rigidity of the Mosaic law, and the strictness of its discipline. The phenomena reappeared in full force among the Christian sects, both before and after the age of Constantine, several times in the middle ages, and among the Protestant mystics, reaching, though with diminished force, quite into the days of modern Europe. Mahometanism has not escaped the influence, any more than the Bonzes of China and the followers of Lao-Tsen. Its effects, both moral and physical, have ever been unhealthy. Generally man's earthly vocation is to ceaseless toil, both of mind and body; it is only savage and uncivilised men who abandon themselves to dreams and hallucinations. Our fancy, our intuition, our self-consciousness, our love, and the mystical elements of our imagination, heart, and mind, have other objects to aim at than the dreamy state of nervous irritability, which, on occasion, should be studied by physiologists and psychologists, theologians, philosophers, and even politicians; but which is the disgrace of the classes who call themselves enlightened, when they give way to these chimerical fancies. Then science can only, as it were, suck its thumbs; for, apart from all imposture and self-deception, the

facts are of such a character as to offer no opening to scientific investigation.

To resume. It is certain that the system of worlds is the effect of absolute wisdom, and is quite different from the work of a human mechanic, whose machine, however perfect it may be, is always wanting repair. It is certain also that the variations of the atmosphere have their causes, which are being elucidated by meteorology, and the investigation of the ocean-currents. Moreover, the discovery of *nebulæ* in the most distant regions of space seems to prove that the creation is not yet finished; that new formations of worlds may yet be progressing, just as terrestrial bodies are continually decomposing and being recomposed. All that began in time is developed in time; nothing is eternal but God, and that which He makes after the image of His eternity. Matter, and the fount of life, are alike inexhaustible, fathomless as the thought of God, by which they were created. Only that which man makes soon comes to an end; and we have no reason to stand aghast at the relative infinity of space and time; for it has nothing moral in it, and therefore nothing that has any relationship with eternity.

Honour, therefore, to science in all its branches, and in all its discoverers,—in Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Herschel, Laplace, Lavoisier, Cuvier, Volta, Davy, Owen, and Faraday. The more it enlarges its field, the farther it examines into chemical and organic mechanism, the more it studies the embryo and looks into the depths of life, the more it will glorify the One Spirit without whom the Universe is simply unthinkable; for mere matter, which is no universe at all, is the only thing that is physically demonstrable.

There was once a time, happily long past, when theology overstepped her limits, and pretended to lay down the law for sciences, and to be her own naturalist, chemist, mathematician, astronomer, geologist, anatomist, and zoologist; in virtue of the natural history, chemistry, mathematics, astronomy, geology, anatomy, and zoology, which she fancied might be found in Scripture. The middle age was educated in the Ptolemaic system, and what little physical science it possessed was all derived from Aristotle. The few minds which tried to advance a step from this tradition excited the suspicion of the masses,—like Pope Sylvester II., Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon,—and were secretly accused of magic and sorcery, and of selling themselves to the devil. The age of Copernicus and Galileo had dropped these suspicions; but it had adopted the subtlety of the “dogmatic thesis” and “scientific hypothesis;” the subterfuge of a scholasticism which was unwillingly

retreating before the advance of science. In later days, some men of science, intoxicated with their discoveries, thought they could do without God and the Church. The middle ages and the renaissance saw certain philosophers with their philosophy perish at the stake, in the name of God and of religion. The French Revolution, in retaliation, erected its scaffolds, where, in the name of reason, science, and experience, it beheaded the professors of religious faith as permanent conspirators against the peace and safety of mankind. But neither the fagot nor the guillotine effected any thing for religion or for science.

We no longer burn men or kill them in the name of religion and philosophy, though there is no knowing how far we might go,—priests as well as philosophers, and philosophers as well as priests; for I would not answer for the *savants*, when once they are committed to a theory. But I hope that the time either for a holy Inquisition or for a committee of public safety is gone for ever, and that no Robespierre or Torquemada will ever look upon the sun again. But the stake and the guillotine are not the worst; they never exterminated an idea, or cut off the head of an opinion; they only made martyrs for the causes they tried to crush. Religion and science have other difficulties and perils ahead of them.

Not to enlarge upon the yoke which continental governments are trying to impose on science and religion, on the pretence that the business of the state is to regulate them,—to see that they do not compromise public security, to subject them to a censorship, to submit them to a grossly material kind of moral and intellectual police, and thus by a slow fire to burn them out from the ranks of believers and students,—we have principally to fear the mutual follies of theologians and men of science, and the consequent follies of the ignorant multitudes who believe themselves religious when they curse science, and scientific when they despise religion, and toss about accusations of impiety or hypocrisy. The middle ages and the renaissance were horribly foul-mouthed, both in the school and cloister; celebrated pontiffs and doctors were brimful of outrageous epithets and abominable invectives, which would bring the moderns into the police-courts and the prisons; but these institutions did not exist in those days, when might made right, whether it was force of fist or violence of tongue.

But we must not be deceived in the calm attitude of the moderns; passion still survives: some look upon every scientific man who inclines to materialism or pantheism as half, if not wholly, a felon; while the other side can see nothing in

the religious man but either a knave or a fool. Condorcet, Laplace, and Lagrange, though as astronomers and mathematicians they only followed the road opened by Descartes, Leibnitz, and Newton, called them fools for their religion, and argued that Newton was mad from his commentary on Daniel. I know that this language has been wonderfully softened, and that few men of any merit now hold it; but these few are too many, the fire still lives beneath the ashes. Still, what we have now to guard against is not foulness, but emptiness of speech.

Rhetoric flourished in the mediæval schools,—it was a legacy of the Roman empire, whose cæsars systematically smothered all great jurisprudence, political science, philosophy, and all true theology,—even stoicism and platonism, and paganism itself, were too true for them,—and all metaphysics. For thought is always under misprision of treason in the eyes of a power which would rule men's minds; when they will not let you think, they will teach you to speak: hence came the rhetoric of the *littérateurs* of the Lower Empire, whose grammarians and other writers blocked up all the avenues of the middle ages.

I quite recognise the genius of the great apologists of Christianity, and of the chief fathers, whether Greek or Latin; I recognise also the genius of the schoolmen and canonists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In moral and intellectual greatness they may boldly measure themselves against any thing that antiquity can show, even without taking into consideration the purity of heart and wisdom of mind which they had derived from Christianity. But they lived in unlucky times for the development of language. They inherited the declamation and rhetoric of the cæsarian writers. The language of the Church was no more biblical than that of law was classic; both styles foamed over with those useless words and conventional phraseology which add nothing to the force of thought or the strength of expression. It was in spite of the disadvantages of their rhetorical education that there were so many great thinkers, and occasionally great writers, whether fathers or schoolmen, in the annals of the Church.

The renaissance did good service in restoring the real classical models. The language of the civil law came gradually to throw off the chains of the Lower Empire, though the renaissance loaded it with the new fetters of a Ciceronian and pedantic phraseology. In France, since the time of Montesquieu, the language of law has become what it should be,—has shaken off its phrases and periphrases, and much of

its old tumid rhetoric. Unhappily the language of theology has not followed the example set by the grand Bossuet, the classic and elegant Fenelon, and the terse Bourdaloue. It is not so much scholasticism which loads and lumbers it, as that rhetorical amplification and unctuous turgidity which adds nothing whatever to the meaning of language. Nothing can be indifferent which regards the Church either in her struggles with human thought and expression, with policy, with revolutions, and with the developments of social states; or in her relations with science, and with the totality of our knowledge of the nature of things.

To set up altar against altar, to oppose a doctrine of science to a doctrine of faith, would be to cause the most lamentable schisms that could divide mankind. All truths are in harmony; no truth contradicts a truth: but there are different orders of truth. There is the divine order, the natural order, the human order,—all with their different sides, their several relations; but with no contradictions. The business of the Church is to find her true position here, and to aspire once more, though in a different spirit, to place theology at the head of human science; not to domineer over science or to dogmatise about it, but to penetrate it, to adopt its discoveries, to understand the world as well as it understands God or man. But to do this, it must first learn to simplify its language; clearness of expression is necessary for clearness of thought; all rhetoric and turgidity is out of place.

If the Church makes these advances towards science, and learns to penetrate and understand it, science will be forced to make advances towards her, and to study and comprehend her. Science may still smile at the devout simplicity which likens the Creator to a mechanic who destroys and restores his work, or at the infantine notion of the intervention of God and the saints in the commonest events of nature. But science, when narrowly examined, will soon bring the *savants* to the end of their wisdom on all the greatest and most important questions. Science is encircled and blockaded with enigmas; she has no key except for what she composes and decomposes; she has not the keys of the laws of the universe, not even for those of electro-magnetism. She knows gases, but not the *materia prima*. She may deny miracles, though she can hardly deny creation,—the chief of all miracles; but she must acknowledge the enigmas; even worse, she must own that she has no answer to give them.

If any thing ought to bring back men to God, it is the serious study of nature. It did so, in a certain way, with the

greatest men of antiquity, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle. In another way it did so with Copernicus, Kepler, and even Galileo. It did so with a man who had studied all the deepest problems of mental and physical science, the great Leibnitz. If men like Lagrange and Laplace have remained infidels, it only shows some defect in their great genius. Their disciples will smile at me; they think that it shows want of common sense in Newton to argue from the mechanism of the universe to the Maker. Let them smile: if they have any thing to teach us, let us go to school to them; let us thank them for what they know, and lament their ignorance of what they do not acknowledge. They will laugh at us, and tell us that we are unscientific, uncritical. No matter. They cannot subtract a grain of credit from the scientific authority of Copernicus or Kepler, Newton or Leibnitz; nor can they add a grain of credit to their unhappy denial of God, which comes, in fact, to a denial of man. Let us own them to be great naturalists, if they are so; let us own that they have some parts of a scientific genius, but not all,—God is wanting.

The knowledge of nature is only one side of the modern science; the other side is the knowledge of man under all the variations of time, climate, and condition,—a knowledge which the ancients and mediæval philosophers possessed but imperfectly, but which has grown up since the era of Columbus, Gama, and the Jesuit missions, and has found most delicate instruments of investigation in comparative philology, and in the study of the beliefs, manners, customs, institutions, and origin of nations. By these it has put a new face on biblical, classical, and barbarian antiquity, and has grappled with all the questions of the migration, the colonisation, and the establishment of the various races of men. I will attempt in a future paper to show the relations of this curious renovation of human history with the Church, which alone possesses the keys of human nature, and is preëminently historical, because she gives the answer to the enigma of our existence.

LE BARON D'ECKSTEIN.

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#### THE LIMITS OF OUR THOUGHT.

THE question, What are the necessary limits of human thought? first started by Locke, but first scientifically treated by Kant, and recently forced upon the attention of the thoughtful world in the writings of Sir William Hamilton

and his disciple Mr. Mansel, is certainly the most momentous, if it be not also the most interesting, in all philosophy. The whole history of metaphysics, from its dawn in early Greece until our own days, is the history of a protracted contest, waged with various success, between a dogmatism which would enlarge and a scepticism which would narrow the domain of reason; but it is the merit of modern philosophy to have propounded the only question which can possibly lead to a final issue—What are the limits of cognition? How far can we reason with certainty, and where begins the region of shadows and illusions?

The proper domain of scientific knowledge, according to Kant, is the region of possible experience; its boundary-line the ideas of time and space, which are the forms of sensible intuition. Now there are three grand objects of human belief, he tells us, which cannot be subjected to the conditions of time and space, and which must be consequently regarded as outside the legitimate sphere of human cognition; and these are, substance (material and immaterial), the universe or nature (in its totality), and the Sovereign Being. These are merely subjective ideas, which the reason frames for the purpose of giving a unity and consistency to our thought within the region of possible experience; but they cannot be realised as existent objects for the purposes of speculation; and the practical proof of this is, that the attempt at any thing of the kind immediately betrays us into paralogisms and paradoxes, into illegitimate conclusions and self-contradictions, as a sort of punishment attendant on the ambition to be overwise. For, to take the human soul as an example of the first idea, its immateriality, immortality, and personality can be neither proved nor disproved by speculative arguments, neither can the existence of God (the third idea) be proved or disproved by the speculative reason. But the attempt to speculate on the second idea, of nature or the universe, results not merely in paralogisms, but in downright contradictions. It can be proved, on the one hand, that the world began to exist in time and is limited in space; but, on the other hand, it can be equally counter-proved that the world is eternal in duration and unlimited in space. It can be proved, that whatsoever is compounded in the world is compounded of insoluble elements; it can be counter-proved that no such insoluble elements exist, but only and always the compound. It can be proved that man is necessitated in his actions; it can be counter-proved that he is free. And lastly, it can be proved that either within or without the universe a Necessary Being exists as its Cause; but it can be also equally counter-proved

that the universe has no such cause. These contradictory conclusions, thus briefly stated, are argued out with great subtlety and ingenuity in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the materials from which they are elaborated being amongst the most knotty questions in all philosophy: How could creation begin in time; did not rather time begin with creation? How could it begin at some point or epoch in eternity, since eternity has no such points or epochs, being "*sicut punctus cujus pars non est*" ?\* How about the endless question of the divisibility of matter? How is human liberty consistent with the necessity of causation? These are no questions of to-day or yesterday; they have been in all ages the torment of philosophy. If, then, the instructed reader refuses to admit the paralogisms which Kant attached to the realisation of the first and third ideas, and hesitates, as he well may, to admit the full list of paradoxes affixed to the second, urging that the sceptical conclusion is sometimes due to that subjective account of thought which is the radical defect of the Kantian metaphysics (as when, for instance, the law of causation is robbed of its proof of the existence of God); yet, on the whole, he must admit that in his *Antilogies of Reason* (as they are called) Kant has not, in his own words, "played a sophistical game," but that philosophy has set more riddles than philosophy can answer, and hence has become a by-word for confusion and contradiction. What are we to conclude, then, argues the philosopher of Königsberg, from these *Antilogies*, but that the Creator has limited the application of reason to the world of possible experience, within which so long as the speculator is content to confine himself, its conclusions are clear and certain; but that if he dare trespass beyond the appointed bourne, Reason herself will be the first to protest against the outrage, answer his inquiries with a double tongue, and leave him to grope his way in darkness? This decision so treats the opposed combatants in philosophy as to allow on the one hand no boast of glorious victory, and on the other to oblige no confession of inglorious defeat; but both were right and both wrong: right, inasmuch as the conclusions on either side were in accordance with reason; wrong, inasmuch as Reason herself, consulted on matters in which she has no proper jurisdiction, was, as a consequence, no trustworthy guide. And as to those grand objects of human faith, which seem compromised by such a conclusion, Kant reminds us that such truths as human liberty, immortality, and the existence of God, rest on other grounds than these school-proofs, which after all were not what really convinced men that they are free, immortal, and

\* St. Thomas, Summ. 1, q. 10, 1 ad 1m.

under the government of God, but were merely so many ingenious efforts to justify to the reason conclusions already suggested by our moral nature; in short, it is in the practical as opposed to the speculative reason that we must find a solid basis for the grand objects of human belief.

The grand aim of Kant in his paralogisms and antilogies was to put an end to licentious speculation; but his disciples soon disdained the narrow limits of time and space which he had prescribed as its boundaries. Fichte was even persuaded that to saddle the master-mind with contradictions was a blunder, and that in his Antilogies Kant's object was not to clog speculation, but to indicate its only proper channel—the thinking subject; nor was he undeceived until Kant himself made a formal protest against so arbitrary an interpretation of his teaching.\* Later on, Herbart (whose whole philosophy was inspired by the Antilogies) argued that these contradictions, far from being obstructive, are rather provocative of speculation; that they are the mainspring of philosophy, which only energises in order to solve them; and to let them stand over unsolved would result in the paralysis of reason. In vain Jacobi had protested that our transcendental ideas, which form the mind's true riches, are, like the impressions of sense, to be taken as facts, and not made the objects of a prurient speculation, lest we come to trifle them away altogether.† What, in a word, was the main scope of the German philosophy, from Kant (exclusively) to Hegel, but an attempt to reconcile contradictions? This reconciliation was effected by Hegel himself, who defined philosophy to be “the science of the identity of the identical and the non-identical.” It was this climax of absurdity which has brought about the retrograde movement, and philosophy asks once more, “What are the limits of human cognition?”

To speak now of the modification of Kant's theory proposed by Sir W. Hamilton. In his Antilogies (we hear no more of the paralogisms, for where Kant only found paralogisms his present disciples find contradictions) Kant had made the speculative reason contradict itself, and had thrown the burden of proving a supra-mundane order of things upon the practical reason. But this Sir William Hamilton maintains was a fatal step; for if the reason cannot be trusted in its speculative relations, neither can it be trusted in its practical relations; mendacious in one aspect, why veracious in another? and thus there is no escape from downright scepticism. But in these Antilogies Kant almost hit upon the “law of the conditioned,” viz. that the conceivable, which is

\* Chalybäus, *History of Speculative Philosophy*, lect. vi.    † *Ib.* lect. iii.

identical with the conditioned, is always the mean between two inconceivable (contradictory) extremes, of which, however, as contradictories, one or the other must be true. Its lamented author gives three examples in illustration of his theory, which he had barely sketched; they are, as follows, taken from time, space, and causation. We cannot conceive time as infinite, but neither can we conceive it as finite, though one or the other it must be; what we can and do really conceive is an indefinite time. So with space. We cannot conceive infinite space,—such a thought is quite beyond us; but neither, on the other hand, can we think space as finite—realise any end of space, although finite or infinite it must be; what we really conceive is an indefinite space. And so, lastly, with causation. We cannot conceive the absolute commencement of existence *out of nothing*, no more than we can conceive its absolute reduction into nothing—annihilation; but, on the other hand, we are just as unable to conceive its absolute non-commencement: and hence our idea of causation; for since we cannot conceive the phenomenon to have actually begun to be, we are forced to allot it a state of existence prior to its manifestation, and such a state of existence is what we call a cause.\* Thus the intelligible is always limited and conditioned by the intelligent, and every conceivable bounded on either side by inconceivables, that is, by contradictories in thought. Sir W. Hamilton thought, that the greatest work he had achieved for philosophy was his explanation of the antilogies so as to save the reason from being convicted of mendaciousness in its highest potency;† for it no longer says, as with Kant, affirming and denying, “The world is eternal and infinite, the world is temporal and finite; matter is simple, and matter is compound in its constitutive elements; I am free, I am not free,”—thus contradicting itself; but it says, “I cannot conceive the world as eternal and infinite, neither can I conceive it as temporal and finite, yet one or the other it must be. I cannot conceive matter as essentially simple, nor can I conceive it as essentially compound, yet one or the other it must be. I cannot conceive myself free, but neither can I conceive myself not free in my actions, yet one or the other I must be.” The speculative reason is thus shown to be weak indeed, but not mendacious; and it is hereby left open to the practical reason to prove the grand objects of natural faith by arguments based on the constitution of our moral nature; and the inconsistency of Kant is avoided. Human reason, then, within its legiti-

\* Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures*, vol. ii., lect. xxxix.

† Ibid. vol. i. Appendix (p).

mate sphere, the conditioned, does not contradict itself; but how, when it goes out to speculate beyond the sphere of the conditioned, if it would, for instance, attempt the knowledge or try to construct a science about the Absolute Being? Then there is no help for it; but contradictions of the most glaring kind will be the inevitable result. The very start would suppose such a contradiction, viz. that the finite could measure the Infinite, or that, while to think is itself to condition, there can be any thought of the Unconditioned or Absolute, precisely as such.\* Here Kant and Sir W. Hamilton are at one; they both deny the possibility of the sciences of ontology and rational theology in denying a cognition of the Absolute Being, who is the basis of both these sciences. But the contradictions which are supposed to forbid the construction of any science whatsoever, however imperfect and inadequate, of natural theology are exhibited by Mr. Mansel in his Bampton Lectures on "The Limits of Religious Thought." Perhaps the importance of the subject will justify me in going into this part of my subject at some length.

The primary conceptions of the Deity are chiefly three: He is absolute, He is cause, and He is infinite; and these, Mr. Mansel maintains, are to our minds contradictory conceptions. The Absolute, in the genuine sense of the word, signifies that which exists of itself, and by itself, and out of relation with any other being. Far other is our conception of cause; for while the Absolute can only be conceived as out of relation, the cause can only be conceived as in relation with somewhat else—with the effect; for cause and effect, as relative and correlative, cannot be conceived asunder, the cause being cause of the effect, the effect effect of the cause. Hence by thinking the Deity as cause, we bring Him into the very relationship which we had forbidden in thinking Him absolute.† But for awhile this contradiction may be

\* To say that the mind thinks the Absolute and Infinite, is it a contradiction? I distinguish with St. Augustine (Ep. 147, ad Paulinam), "*Aliud est videre, aliud totum videndum comprehendere; totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videatur ut nihil ejus lateat videntem.*" In the very idea of a Necessary is implied *that* He is absolute,—exists of Himself, and out of necessary relationship with another; but *how* He so exists we know not. And, again, it is implied in the same idea *that* He is infinite—*only implied*; for the mind cannot embrace, comprehend the Infinite: "*Hoc solum omnino de Ipso comprehendi potest nempe quod immensus et infinitus est.*" Is it still contradictory that the finite can in any sense think the Infinite? Not more so than that an unextended soul can be joined to or can perceive an unextended body—*contradictions to our ignorance*. But as in this latter case the question is, Is the soul joined to, does it perceive, the unextended body? so in the former the question must be, Do we or do we not (in the sense laid down) think the Infinite?

† The contradiction, *as it stands*, is the sheer product of pantheism, which makes the Cause to create by necessity of His nature, so that He only exists

evaded thus: "God is not at once," we might say, "both Absolute and Cause; but *first* He was absolute, and then He became cause." Here, however, we clash with the third conception, that of Infinite. How can an Infinite Being become cause? The Infinite must be all that exists or can exist, or how can it be infinite? Is aught conceivable which the Infinite is not?—how is it, then, the Infinite? Is the Infinite exhaustive of reality?—what room, then, for the finite? Thus we can only think the Deity infinite by denying Him as cause, only think Him as cause by denying Him as infinite. I gather also from Sir William Hamilton that the Absolute and Infinite, while they are thus in antagonism with the conception of cause, are again in mutual antagonism; for the Infinite denotes somewhat unfinishable, but the Absolute somewhat complete, finished (*absolutum*).<sup>\*</sup> The primary conceptions of the Deity being thus in mutual antagonism, what wonder (it is persisted) if the flaw which lies at the root be reproduced in the trunk and branches, and if the whole science of scholastic theology prove a mere tissue of knotty contradictions? Absolute and yet cause, Infinite and yet cause, Infinite and yet Absolute; necessary and yet free; many and yet one; simple yet omnipresent; He endures without time; He is intelligent without consciousness,† immense without magnitude—But enough; such contradictions are quite familiar to the philosopher and to the divine. For what, in all ages, has mainly contributed to the generation of theories in metaphysics and theology? What has swollen up those gigantic volumes of the schoolmen? What has suggested discussions and sharp disputations innumerable? What is the very effort to speculate but the attempt to escape, postpone, transcend contradictions, to advance the domain of reason, and diminish the sum of our philosophical ignorances?

Are these contradictions which abound in speculative science a proof that it is a mere sport of the reason, which amuses itself with shadows or builds up castles of words? or are they only a proof, of what has never been denied, that transcendental science, and especially speculative theology, must at best be meagre, inadequate, and imperfect on account of the immense disproportion between the mind and the objects which it aspires to know and reason about? The school of Kant maintains the former alternative,—that the Absolute

as effectuating the universe; while, in the Catholic doctrine, He is only cause because He chooses by no necessity of His nature.

<sup>\*</sup> Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions*.

† We cannot predicate *our* kind of consciousness of the Almighty, yet it is of course the only kind by us comprehensible.

Being, which is the object of the sciences of ontology and natural theology, is not only incomprehensible, but altogether unintelligible; not merely mysterious, but unthinkable. But we must not forget the principles on which this conclusion must stand or fall. St. Augustine, many hundred years ago, furnished a list of paradoxes which beset the attempt to comprehend the Incomprehensible; yet he rejoiced to know Him whom the mind of man dare not measure as the cause of those wondrous creatures which surround us. But the school of Kant, in opposition to the witness of consciousness, has made the law of causation a mere mental form,—not essentially true, that is, not true in itself, but only true to us and true of the present order of things,—and, as a legitimate consequence, has denied its transcendental application. St. Augustine, again, saw in our necessary conceptions of that which must be true in itself apart from individual instances, of that which must be right and just in itself apart from individual cases and circumstances, and of that which must be beautiful in itself apart from individual associations and comparisons, evidences, nay attributes, of the absolutely good, the true, and the fair; but all this is now regarded as a delusion, dismissed as a dream, though a brave dream of enthusiastic genius, and that by men who, like Kant and Sir William Hamilton, have admitted the fact of an irresistible instinct in its favour deep-rooted in human nature. It is not easy, it must be owned, to answer the objections of these philosophers in a manner which would satisfy themselves; for their demands are exorbitant. If they require the advocates of a scientific theology to exhibit a systematic account of the Sovereign Being which shall never, through the weaknesses of human thought, be convicted of self-contradiction, I do not hesitate to affirm that, whatever we may think of such individual instances of contradiction as those cited from Mr. Mansel, and although we may fairly dismiss some of them as contradictory in sound rather than in sense, still it would argue in us considerable presumption to accept their challenge. Far be from Christian philosophers the audacious spirit of such speculators as Scotus, Erigena, Giordano Bruno, and Hegel, who have theorised on the Divine Nature with impious confidence, and reduced Him who is the Mystery of mysteries to the poor level of human comprehension. But is there, then, no alternative between knowing nothing and knowing *as we are known*? I accept (not, indeed, as it has been recently explained) the inspired solution that “*we know in part*,” for “the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are

made; also His eternal power and divinity.”\* And since we only know in part, since our every conception of the Godhead has its dark and bright side, it is easy for the opponents of rational theology to play off our ignorance against our knowledge, to involve us in paradoxes, to use the very imperfections of human words to our disadvantage, and, lastly, to argue plausibly, but surely not justly, that such conclusions of the reason as are in apparent antagonism must either be repudiated or the antagonism removed—still, in short, insisting that we must know all or nothing.

Having heard the decisions of modern philosophy, it will perhaps be both profitable and interesting to glance back upon the old world. The great fathers of the Christian Church, many of whom ranked as high in philosophy as in sanctity,—those grand and laborious geniuses, the subtle schoolmen of the middle ages, whose stupendous efforts in the search of truth large-minded men like Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel know how to appreciate,—what thought they of the boundaries of knowledge? what of the contradictions which infest our rational imbecility? But the problem was not agitated and sifted in the ancient as it has been in the modern world. You will hardly find, perhaps, in the folios of the Christian fathers and schoolmen the question emphatically propounded, “What are the limits of human thought?” or the law distinctly enunciated, that paradox is the criterion of human ignorance. It was only natural that the construction of a philosophy of the Conditioned should be the enterprise distinctive of a sceptical epoch in speculation. Human reason, in the earlier stages of its career, would be tempted to dare all things, and, impatient of restraint, wait till the event had indicated what was within and what beyond the reach of its ambition; or, if there was any check, it could be only where speculation brought the philosopher into antagonism with the dogmas of Christianity. This we might have expected, and this was what really happened. It was after age had succeeded age, and the world had witnessed the same sort of difficulties constantly recurring, and the same unsatisfactory solutions revolving as by a fixed law; when school had been set up against school, and theory against theory; when men began to regard philosophers as the starters of ingenious questions which they could not themselves answer; and when, lastly, one appeared in the name of philosophy to pull down every thing while he built up nothing;†—it was then, that the herald of a new epoch‡ began to philosophise, not so much on the objects of philosophy as

\* Rom. i. 20.

† Hume.

‡ Kant.

upon philosophy itself; and aspired to quell the storm—to bid “thus far” to the haughty waves of human speculation. But if the great masters of ancient philosophy furnished no theory on the limits of cognition, yet their writings contain ample suggestions towards that end; and it is to such suggestions, combined with the great help of the very school to which I find myself in necessary opposition, that I am indebted for the following system.

We must distinguish two sorts of knowledge in man: one which is engaged about the mere fact, another which is engaged about the theoretical explanation of existence. The Greek fathers called the former the knowledge *ὅτι ἐστί*, or *that* a thing is; and the latter *διότι ἐστί*, or the knowledge *how* or *why* it is. The distinction obtained among the schoolmen the terms “scientia quia” and “scientia propter quid,” standing respectively for the *γνώσις ὅτι ἐστί* and *διότι ἐστί* of the fathers. Now originally the *ὅτι*, or “quia,” was a term identical in meaning with what is now called empirical knowledge; but its usage became subsequently extended so as to include facts of the transcendental order. Thus Scotus, for instance, tells us that of the Divine Being we have only the knowledge “quia,” because, “as is admitted on all hands, God is not otherwise cognisable by us.”\* The distinction cannot be conveniently rendered into English. Perhaps we may substitute the terms ‘apprehensive’ and ‘comprehensive’ for the knowledge *that*, and *how* or *why*, which would sound awkwardly in our tongue. But their difference once acknowledged, it will immediately appear that the boundary-line of these diverse sorts of cognition must be far from identical. We know that many things are, without knowing absolutely *how* any thing is, or *what* any thing is. We can, indeed, attain to a relative comprehension of things in this visible world;—we know what causes the rainbow; we know that bodies fall by the law of attraction; we know the laws which regulate our planetary system; and such relative knowledge of the nature of things in the physical order may be indefinitely extended, in proportion as experience furnishes us with fresh facts as the groundwork of our conclusions. But as our experience, after all, is limited, so the science of the nature of things is limited. At length a question is always possible to which there is no possible answer; such as the question of the absolute nature of a thing—what it is *in itself*. Here we are always in the dark. The absolute nature of God Himself is not more hidden from us than that of the meanest pebble; we are wholly ignorant of both. It must be further

\* Scotus, Opera, tom. iv. lib. i. q. 1, schol. vi. § 37.

observed that, as regards facts of the transcendental order, we have not even that relative comprehension which obtains as to facts of the physical order; for this relative comprehension is only possible by experience, and of the transcendental order, as the term implies, we have no experience. By experience we may discover that it is electricity which causes the thunder; but how material substance affects us with taste and smell we can never learn; the *how* it is done not being given in experience, but only the *fact* that it is done. There is consequently no *real* advancement possible upon the necessary conclusions which reason furnishes regarding the hyper-physical world. We may, indeed, analyse these conclusions, and thus obtain an apparent advance of our knowledge: thus if a Necessary Being exists, it follows that He is eternal and infinite; if He is the cause of the universe, it follows that He contains virtually the perfections which He causes; if He is simple, He is unextended: but this advancement is *only* apparent. We have in reality obtained no new knowledge, but merely analysed, unfolded that which had been already acquired; the notions of the Eternal and Infinite being virtually given in the notion of the necessary; the perfections of creation being, in like manner, virtually proclaimed of the Deity in the very fact of proclaiming Him their cause; and the notion of unextension being also implied in the notion of simplicity.\*

To these different relations of knowledge correspond two different sorts of self-contradiction, viz. contradictions which regard the *fact that a thing is*, and such as regard the *theory*, or *how it is*. Of contradictions, then, which regard the fact that a thing is, one or the other must be true, on the law of excluded middle, *e. g.* either the soul is compound or simple, either the world is finite or it is infinite; but of contradictions which regard the '*how*' of the *fact*, both may be held, as both may be true together. These latter the scholastics called contradictions *quoad nos*—contradictions to our ignorance. Thus the Almighty is at once both simple and omnipresent, which to our minds are so far contradictory attributes that we cannot conceive *how* they can possibly coexist in the same being; but if reason shows that this *must be so*, in spite of our inability to conceive it, what can oblige us to reject what it really tells us merely because it does not tell us more? True, it is a law of our intel-

\* It appears from this that in an *indirect* manner we have also "*scientia propter quid de Deo*;" thus His *aseitas* (as the schoolmen speak) is the *propter quid* of His infinitude. This Scotus remarks in a passage which I cannot recover.

lectual nature that imagination colours with an element of sense our most transcendental ideas (even while reason protests against it); and by this law *bigness* and *littleness*, strive as we may, attach respectively to immensity and simplicity, so that we lose simplicity in immensity, and immensity in simplicity. But here there is no direct contradiction; for it is not said that the Almighty is simple yet compounded, immense yet limited; but it is in the attempt to reconcile these attributes of immensity and simplicity together, which is nothing else than the attempt to comprehend the Divine Nature, that an indirect contradiction (to our ignorance) is manifested. In like manner there is nothing contradictory in the conceptions of Absolute, Cause, or Infinite, taken severally, and supposing such conceptions possible, as Mr. Mansel has admitted, but it is the attempt to reconcile them together which results in contradiction; and this may be admitted without involving consequences detrimental to the science of theology. It is a very old truth, that the understanding begins to utter falsehoods when it meddles in the relations of things with and within their *absolute essence*. "Unde," says the angelic doctor, "*circa quidditatem rei, per se loquendo intellectus non fallitur. Sed circa ea quæ circumstant rei essentiam vel quidditatem intellectus potest falli, dum unum ordinat ad aliud, vel componendo vel dividendo, vel etiam ratiocinando.*"\* Such apparent antilogies, then, which only arise when reason has passed its natural limits, are most salutary and instructive, and only fatal to transcendental science on the hypothesis of the Kantian conceptualism. Theories abound in all speculative science which aim at nothing short of the absolute solution of those dark problems which continual failure pronounces to be absolutely insoluble by human ingenuity; and the student wants some criteria to assist him in the recognition of such problems, lest he waste his time in the fruitless endeavour to comprehend the incomprehensible. A question, then, is unanswerable when (1) the attempt shows two or more sides which can be severally demonstrated, though either be in apparent antagonism with the other, so that (2) the very position of the one side seems equivalent to the negation of the equally demonstrable counter-position; and *vice versâ* (3) when the disputants on either side are mutually triumphant over each other, both being irresistible in attack and impotent in defence; (4) and when opposed errors, or (in theology) heresies,

\* Summa, 1, 2, q. 85, art. 6, and 1, q. 17, art. 3. "Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur; sicut neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo verò, vel dividendo potest decipi."

have been in all ages engendered from an over-bias towards one or another side in the attempted solution.\* But these criteria have in reality one common origin, and are reducible to one canon, as phenomena attendant on the effort to master the absolute 'how' or 'what' of things; and the simple reason for unfolding them at length is, that we are often unaware of the unsatisfactory character of the problem until the above-mentioned phenomena enforce it on the attention. It will be observed that the great intellectual contests which have been waged from the rise of speculation till the present time are rarely such as bear on questions of fact, but such as bear on the relationship of philosophical facts. Such controversies are very various; but perhaps they may be reduced to these four heads: (1) those which regard the relation of the necessary with the contingent; (2) those which regard the relation of mind with matter; (3) those which regard the relation of cause and effect; (4) those which regard the relations of attributes or qualities with their substance, and, what comes in the end to the same difficulty, the relations of the attributes or qualities with one another.

Two instances present themselves conspicuously under the first head of relations, and the first is the doctrine of creation. Now I assume, with St. Augustine† and St. Thomas,‡ that the fact of creation is asserted by the reason, being implied in the law of causation; but how can we conceive the *manner* of creation? When we say that the world was made out of nothing, do we mean that the nothingness was a *quasi* material out of which the solid universe was compounded? Reason protests against so gross an hypothesis. Did the Deity, then, evolve the universe out of Himself? Reason protests against the alternative. But what medium can we find between these two accounts,—the former gross and puerile, the latter absurd and blasphemous,—which may be esteemed the true account of creation? None is by us conceivable, and any attempt at a satisfactory conclusion must result in self-contradiction; for we must either regard nothing as a something out of which the world was made, or confound the necessary with the contingent by making the latter contained in the former in some (we know not what) germinal condition; we must, in short, either make the necessary contingent or the

\* These criteria of insoluble problems are borrowed in substance from Kant's *Critique*.

† "In principio fecisti cœlum et terram. Scripsit hoc Moyses et abiit . . . Quod si et hoc scirem, num ab illo scirem? Intus utique mihi intus in domicilio cogitationis, nec Hebræa, nec Græca, nec Latina veritas, sine oris et linguæ organis, sine strepitu syllabarum diceret, Verum Dicit." Conf. xi. 3.

‡ Summa, 1, q. 45, art. 2.

contingent necessary.\* But should this ignorance of the manner of creation make us discredit our reason, which declares the fact that finite mutable beings "cry aloud"† that they must have a cause, and ultimately, for that is implied, an Absolute Cause? I may take, as another instance, the impossibility (as very many will consider it) of reconciling causation with freedom. But to avoid here all possibility of misconception, I premise that both these doctrines are wholly and evidently true; nor can any one, without being prepared to go fearful lengths, abate one jot of the full meaning of either. Both are emphatically witnessed by consciousness. The law of causation is a necessary truth, which none can deny without impugning the light of reason; the freedom of choosing is a contingent fact, but almost every action men perform witnesses to their conviction that *it is a fact*. We know, therefore, *that* these two truths, as coexisting, must be somehow or other reconcilable; but *how* they are actually reconciled we do not know, and we might accommodate to this difficulty the language of St. Augustine about the analogous difficulty in theological science, that while asserting the necessity of causation, we seem to impugn the freedom of the will; while asserting the freedom of the will, we seem to impugn the necessity of causation. When we say that whatsoever happens must have a cause, do we exempt the *act of choosing* from this rule, or do we not? Do we say that such an act, like every thing else which happens, is determined by a cause—how, then, is it a free act? Do we say that such an act is undetermined by any such cause, and that it determines itself—how now reconcile this statement of the case with the *necessity* of causation, for a single exception must ruin such necessity? To escape this dilemma, many philosophers, both in the middle ages and in modern times, have framed theories in which an influence is exerted on the will according to the ordinary physical laws, while it was still attempted to show how liberty is consistent with such an influence;‡ but of all such systems it must be acknowledged that they have either defended freedom at the expense of causation, or causation at the expense of freedom; and this while the defenders of freedom have fully admitted that causation which they inadequately explained, and the defenders of causation have fully allowed the freedom which was apparently damaged by their theories. The same ques-

\* This, the contradiction of pantheism, is a direct contradiction.

† "Clamant quod facta sint." St. Augustine, Confessions, book xi, ch. 4.

‡ The difficulty is postponed, not removed, by asserting a moral in the place of a physical influence, as some have done.

tion, *mutatis mutandis*, has been discussed in theology, with just as little chance of being brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

As regards problems of the second class, which turn upon the mysterious relations of mind and matter, I may instance those famous theories of divine assistance—occasional causes, preëstablished harmony, plastic medium, and physical influence—which have been devised to account for the communion of the material with the spiritual world, but which, however, the second and third theories explain away altogether, denying the real action of matter upon mind, and mind upon matter; the fourth is as difficult as the difficulty it was intended to remove; while the first and last are only more tolerable because they assert the fact without attacking the real mystery, which is left in its original obscurity.\* The same phenomena are presented in this as in the foregoing problems; for as it is concerned about a relationship which can never be adequately explained, it happens again that, according to their individual bias, philosophers are led to sacrifice one or the other of the facts related; some attributing too much to mind at the expense of matter, others allowing too much to matter at the expense of mind; so that idealism and egoism, sensationalism and materialism, are on either side the respective results. And this, as Reid well observes, is due to the fact, that philosophers have not been content with the knowledge that they see, hear, and taste, but have wished further to rob nature of her secret as to *how* this is accomplished. And here a great inconsistency in the position of Sir W. Hamilton crops out. The ground on which he rejects the science of rational theology, and on which he pronounces the Deity unintelligible, is precisely that of the contradictions which such a science, such an intellectual apprehension, must immediately betray; but the doctrine of the immediate communion of mind and matter, and its corollary of immediate perception, are open to the same objection, and yet have the approbation of Sir William Hamilton. “Material objects are without the mind,” argued the idealist,† “and therefore there can be no union between the object and the percipient; they are disproportioned to the mind, and removed from it by the whole diameter of being.” “It appears to me quite certain,” says Malebranche, “that the will of spirits is incapable of moving the smallest body in the world; for it is evident that there

\* I have not identified, as Sir W. Hamilton does, the theory of divine assistance with that of occasional causes; for Descartes *admitted* and Malebranche *denied* the real intercommunion of mind and matter.

† Norris, cited by Reid, *Intellectual Powers*, essay ii. ch. 4.

is no necessary connection between the will we have to move our arm, for instance, and the movement of our arm. . . . But not only are not men the true causes of the movements which they produce in their bodies ; it seems to me that it is a *contradiction* that they can be so. A true cause is a cause between which and its effect the mind perceives a necessary connection ;”\* and, lastly, Laromiguiere thus comments upon the system of physical influence : “ This system is simple, but it affords us no help in explaining the mysterious union of an extended and an unextended substance.

‘Tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res.’†

Nothing can touch or be touched but what is extended ; and if the soul be unextended, it can have no connection by touch with the body ; and the physical influence is inconceivable or contradictory.”‡ In spite of these objections—which (because they address themselves to my ignorance) I cannot answer—against the immediate union of soul and body, and against the immediate apprehension by the mind of sensible objects, I accept these doctrines, the truth of which is witnessed by consciousness ; but how Sir William Hamilton brought himself to admit an immediate apprehension of sensible things *in spite* of its seeming contradiction, and to reject an intellectual apprehension of the Deity *because* of its seeming contradiction, I cannot tell. If he says “ the finite cannot think the infinite,” I answer that the unextended cannot think the extended ; if he object that to know God we must *be* God, I answer that, on the same reasoning, to know matter we must *be* matter ; if he insist that the attributes of the Deity, as thought by us, can be convicted of contradiction, I answer that the properties of matter itself can be convicted of the same opposition ; nor, lastly, can he bring more authorities against the intellectual apprehension of God than I can bring against the intellectual apprehension of matter itself.

The same difficulties which attach to the relations of mind and matter attach also to the relation of cause and effect in general. We know that whatever happens must have a cause ; that an effect is only effect inasmuch as it has a cause, and that a cause is only cause as producing an effect ; but *how*, absolutely speaking, the cause can produce the effect,—what is the connecting-link between these,—of this we have not the smallest notion. We can frame no theory as to how any thing acts upon another which would not be speedily con-

\* Malebranche, *De la Méth.* livre sixième, part. ii.

† Lucretius.

‡ Quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures*, vol. i. p. 306.

victed of contradiction ; and hence Malebranche and Leibnitz were led into the denial of the action and reaction of finite substances upon each other ; to the one the universe presented a system of occasions, to the other a system of harmony ; but to neither a system of causation.

How attributes, which are contrasted, can exist in the same subject, is another ignorance, beset on all sides with contradictions. We know, for instance, that matter is extended, and that it is compounded ; but no sooner do philosophers attempt to comprehend the nature of matter as extended and compounded than these attributes are made to contradict one another.\* Thus, if matter is extended, it is divisible ; as still extended, it is still divisible ; and so on to infinity. On the other hand, if matter is compounded, it must be ultimately resolvable into a definite number of simple elements ; for as the plural supposes the singulars which go to make it up, so the compound supposes the simple. Matter as extended, then, is infinitely divisible ; as compounded, it is made up of simple indivisible elements. But the reader may set aside the former argument in favour of the latter. “An infinite number is a contradiction direct and in terms,” he will say ; “and an infinite number of extended parts would make matter of infinite bulk, however small those parts might be. On this reasoning, a grain of sand and the whole earth must be equally great and equally small, both being compounded of an infinite number of extended parts. Besides, what we divide *ad infinitum* is not *real extension*, but a mere conception of our mind ; what, on the other side, can be more just and conclusive than the argument, ‘that the compound supposes the simple’ ?” Be it so ; I admit that matter can in no sense be infinite ; but is it not, again, a contradiction to suppose that extension is made up of unextended atoms ?

The attributes of mind fare no better than those of matter, being also to our ignorance mutually irreconcilable. The soul is perfectly one and simple, yet it wills, reasons, and remembers. Willing is quite unlike reasoning, reasoning quite unlike remembering, remembering quite unlike both. How can three distinct and dissimilar powers meet in one simple and individual soul ? The antilogies of the soul have, moreover, this remarkable feature, that we are, for the most part, immediately conscious of both the seeming contradictories, and consequently that they must agree together, while we are utterly helpless as to the manner of their reconciliation. I am conscious that I will, reason, remember—that I am manifold ; conscious, again, that it is *I*, the same individual unit,

\* The second of Kant’s Antilogies.

who will, reason, remember—that I am one. I am conscious, again, that I *now* will who was remembering, *now* reason who was willing—I change; conscious also that I who now remember or reason am the identical self who was willing—I do not change. The simplicity of the soul is also in direct apparent antagonism with the Aristotelian doctrine of its corporeal ubiquity, *i. e.* its being wholly in the whole and wholly in each part of the body. It is the same undivided self (of this we are conscious) which thinks in the brain, feels in the fingers, sees with the eyes, and tastes with the tongue; and not one part of me which feels, another part which sees, and another which tastes:—I am not thus divided against myself. But how the soul can be all over the body without size, and again wholly in the whole, is a mystery analogous with the coexistence of immensity and simplicity in the Creator. In all this there is no *direct* but only an indirect contradiction—no asserting and denying the same thing at the same time and in the same respect. The human soul declares itself, in consciousness, manifold and yet one; but the plurality is asserted of the consciousness, the unity of that which is conscious: it declares itself mutable and yet identical; but, again, the mutability is asserted of the consciousness, the identity of that which is conscious: it declares itself undivided yet in all parts of the body, but it declares itself to be undividedly in all parts. The contradiction we make for ourselves when, leaving the fact, we try to devise a *theory* as to how these many attributes can meet in one—how this one can become many. Vain attempt! that central unity in which the attributes mingle and are identified is substance; but of substance we only know that it is, not what it is: “*Quis enim me doceat, quid sit substantia, nisi illis miseris verbis—res subsistens?*”\*

It must be owned that with contradictions such as these the ideal of God elaborated by human reason is replete. We can prove the existence of a Necessary Being, and hence argue by merely analytical judgments that He is one, simple, eternal, immense, infinite, almighty, all-wise, all-perfect, the climax and fullness of reality, for all such attributes are virtually contained in the very notion of a Necessary Being. It is in answering the *why*, *how*, and absolutely *what* of the Divine Nature that we are made to feel our blindness and ignorance. Reason tells us that there must be a Sovereign Being or nothingness; but should we ask, “Why the Sovereign Being and why not nothingness?” reason is silent. The law of

\* Julius Cæsar Scaliger. Quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, App. I. (B).

causation as true *in itself* carries us beyond the present order of things and the constitution of our faculties; it supposes, from the very necessity of the case, an independent being on which all things depend—a self-existent being by which all things exist. But should we ask, “How can a being exist of itself?” reason has no answer. A self-existent being is a contradiction to our minds; but reason does not contradict itself in asserting the necessity of such a being, however incapable we be of comprehending him; nor, again, is such a conception of a self-existent being wholly contradictory so as to prohibit thought: we know what we mean, we know not how it can be. The schoolmen expressed this when they declared the “*Demonstratio de Deo*” to be “*an sit*,” not “*quid sit*.” But if each attribute taken singly has its bright and dark side, thus verifying the dictum that “we know in part,” much more is this found true of the several attributes when collated. The reasoning is analytical; and so long as we merely develop the several attributes from their source in the idea of a self-existent, we encounter no serious opposition; but the want of more than partial conceptions causes gaps in our knowledge which we would fain bridge over by synthesis, while this, from the nature of the case, can never be fully accomplished; we only postpone contradictions which return upon us again with renewed force; we recur to illustrations drawn from the world of sense, but these rather aid the imagination than assist the reason: they help us to believe that the thing *is so*, but not to conceive *how it is so*; and often they merely reconcile us to our ignorance. “What art thou, then, my God?” says St. Augustine,—“what but the Lord God. . . . Highest, best, most potent, omnipotent; most merciful, yet most just; most hidden, yet most strong; steadfast, yet incomprehensible; unchangeable, yet all-changing; never new, never old; all-renewing, and bringing old age on the proud while they know it not; ever working, ever at rest; still gathering, yet nothing lacking; supporting, filling, over-spreading; creating, nourishing, and maturing; seeking, yet having all things. Thou lovest without passion; art jealous without anxiety; repentest, yet grieveest not; art calm in Thine indignation. Thou changest Thy works, Thy purpose unchanged; receivest again what Thou findest, yet didst never lose; never in need, yet rejoicing in gains; never covetous, yet exacting interest.”\*

It remains now to contrast the doctrine advocated in these pages with that of Kant and his recent disciples. This, then, I conceive to be the fundamental error of the Kantian philo-

\* Confessions, book i. ch. iv.

sophy, that it limits reason itself, instead of merely limiting *reasoning*. But the axioms of reason cannot be limited by the nature of the rational creature, nor their application confined to this visible universe which is his habitation; they are necessary axioms, and to limit is to ignore this necessity. That which is only true to the mind of man, and in the existing order of things, is not necessarily true: that which is the mere expression of a mental imbecility is not necessarily true. But necessary truth is that which *is true* in itself, and consequently applicable in every order of things; that which we cannot annihilate in thought, and would survive the extinction of our minds and our mental imbecilities. Thus endowed with principles true in themselves, the mind of man rises to the full dignity of an immortal spirit; and soaring above these clouds of seeming contradiction, apprehends what it vainly strives to comprehend; and the deceitfulness of our understanding is corrected and compensated by the imperious necessity of our reasonings. We cannot conceive how (so as to escape contradiction) the Almighty exists of Himself, or how such and such attributes agree together; yet reason convinces us that there must be a Necessary Being, and that He has such and such attributes. We cannot conceive without self-contradiction the manner of creation out of nothing; yet reason insists on the necessity of creation out of nothing as implied in the principle of causation. We cannot conceive without self-contradiction how a purely simple substance can agree with many and distinct attributes; yet reason insists that God is a simple substance and has many distinct attributes; and again reason insists, in a voice which compels assent and dispels assent to all delusion, that in all this the contradiction only *seems*, that in reality contradiction cannot be, and that the blasphemy of Hegel is the delirium of philosophy. But such a refuge from contradiction,—is it possible in the philosophy of Kant? Unless we admit a faculty in man which reaches *that which is* through the mists and fogs of *that which seems*, ought not the contradiction itself to be the reality—the only reality for us? This was the decision of the angelic doctor about the Kantianism of his day—for only the name is new: “Quidam posuerunt quod vires quæ sunt in nobis cognoscitivæ nihil cognoscunt nisi propriam passionem; puta quod sensus non sentit nisi passionem organi: et secundum hoc intellectus nihil intelligit nisi suam passionem, scilicet speciem intelligibilem in se receptam. Sed hæc opinio manifeste apparet falsa. . . . quia sequeretur opinio antiquorum dicentium omne quod videtur esse verum, et similiter quod contradictoriæ essent simul veræ. Si enim potentia non cognoscat

nisi propriam passionem de ea solum judicat.”\* Limit the axioms of reason, allow them only a subjective significancy and an application within the order of experience, and it is no longer absurd to say that, beyond the sphere of our thought and in another order of being, things may happen without causes,—two and two make five, mendacity and theft be virtues, or the mania of Hegel become right reason, and pure Being identical with pure Nothing.

To limit reason in its own nature is, therefore, to impugn the light of reason, which is only ours *to use*, and is not consequently limited by the limits of our understanding, but the conditions of its application—our *reasoning* must of necessity be limited by the deficiency or insufficiency of the data we reason upon; and this, I think, would be the common-sense answer to the question, “*What are the limits of our thought?*” which resolves itself into this, “What is the rule and what are cases of insufficient data for thought or reason?” in which latter shape the question has, I trust, been sufficiently answered above. A solution which accepts philosophy while it accounts for the aberrations of philosophers, and pays due homage to reason while it checks the extravagancies of theory, has at least the merit of moderation. It is hard to think that while the Almighty has set in the heart of man an instinct to philosophise, philosophy should have been from first to last a sublime mistake; but, on the other hand, it were folly to ignore what has always been and what is now the actual condition of speculative science. Philosophy is right and reason is right in the hyperphysical as in the physical order; but *theory*, or rather theory usurping the dignity and authority of dogma, has been the bane and scandal of metaphysics. Be it remembered that I use the word ‘theory’ here in a restricted sense (and for want of a better) to designate such expedients and devices as the mind contrives,—for the purpose of filling up, as I said, or bridging over those dark and gloomy chasms of our philosophical ignorances. Not content with a mere system, the philosopher has aimed at an absolute theory of knowing and being, in which every thing should find its place, no fact remain unexplained, and all things be bound up in one harmonious and intelligible unity; nor can it be denied that such an aspiration has its warrant in a sublime instinct of our nature, and is an earnest that what is impossible to us in the present will be accomplished in a future state of being, when we shall no longer know in part, but as we are known. Within its own order, then, and within certain limits, theory is natural, desirable, and

\* 1, 2, q. 85, art. 2.

entitled to an honourable position in philosophy; but its besetting sin is to ambition the chair of dogma. Questions like the following, with the theories they have suggested, need never be banished from speculation: How can one substance act upon another—matter upon matter, mind upon matter, matter upon mind? How can simple elements make solid, extended, stable matter? How is the soul joined to the body? How can the unextended think the extended? How is freedom consistent with causation? or, if you will, How could a world begin in a void time, or be located in a void space? or, How could the Deity have created the world we see? or (blackest ignorance of all!), How comes it there *is* a Deity, and why not rather the reign of formless, empty nothingness? The spirit must beat itself against the barriers of its earthly cage and learn the limits of its prison-house. Had no man ever asked such questions, they would yet remain to be asked; had no man propounded such theories as mediate ideas, pre-established harmony, occasional causes, plastic medium, animal spirits, they would be yet to be propounded; and had not the impiety of unhumble theorists rendered it superfluous, it would be yet to point out how, while the *fact* of creation is given in science, the only *manner* of creation by us comprehensible is one inconsistent with the fact—the spurious creation of pantheism by self-development of the creating principle; and that if, in short, we must have a philosophy in which the spheres of our apprehensive and comprehensive knowledge being coextensive, we shall understand all that we know,—such a philosophy must be that of Hegel, which out of pure *nothing* evolves Deity, universe, every thing! It is natural, it is lawful, and quite consistent with that spirit of humility which should ever be the guide in our philosophical researches, to ask all questions and attempt every solution; but it is unreasonable, it is often blasphemous, to regard our answers as dogmas, our theory of the reality as convertible with the reality itself. Theory aspires to complete and harmonise our knowledge,—to shift back, at least, if it cannot remove the contradiction,—to give a possible explanation of the thing so far as it is capable of explanation; but after all, as it is only the product of reason employed upon materials furnished by the imagination, a *mere* theory of being, a philosophy of the *how* of things would be little better than a philosophical romance. Wishing to comprehend, for instance, how matter acts upon mind, and observing how, in the physical world, two substances which have no chemical affinity may be made to combine by means of some third which has affinity with both, the philosopher *imagines* (he cannot prove) that this manner of

combination obtains in the metaphysical order, and hence the theories of plastic medium, animal spirits, mediate ideas, &c.; or, again, observing how, in this world of ours, things are produced by a process of development,—as the chick from the egg, the plant from the seed, &c.,—he imagines that this rule obtains in the transcendental order, and the pantheistical theory of creation is the result. Such theories have been taught as dogmas, whereas they show at most that the only intercourse of mind and matter we can comprehend (and that inconsistent with the testimony of consciousness) is a mediate intercourse; that the only manner of creation we can comprehend (and that inconsistent with reason) is the creation of pantheists. But if the over-estimation of theory is one mistake, another surely is its disparagement within its proper province. True, its materials are furnished by imagination; yet has that faculty which assisted Leibnitz in mathematical, and Newton in physical science,—has it only no place in metaphysics? We cannot, indeed, prove, we can only suppose, that an order of things which obtains in the visible will also obtain in the invisible world; but when nothing in experience and nothing in reason directly discredits this supposition, when it is in harmony with all we know, may it not become more than a supposition—a justifiable presumption, which we may seize upon, to free ourselves, at least in some measure, from these hampering contradictions; a guess at least in the right direction; an anticipation which will be partially if not wholly verified in the world to come? It is this view of the case which to my mind makes the real value of theory and justifies its location *in science*, if it be not itself a part of science, but rather a sort of supplement, or comment, which hazards explanations of seeming inconsistencies.

The above-stated adjustment of the respective claims of dogmatism and scepticism, if accepted, gives us a clue to the solution of Kant's Antilogies, and a rule for our conduct in speculative controversy. I may, by unfolding the notion of the contingent, demonstrate the natural finitude of the universe as to duration and extension; but I cannot answer such objections as "How could the world begin in a void time, or be located in a void space?" nor would I venture to attempt an answer, lest some advantage should accrue to my opponent through my ignorance. I may disprove the arguments in favour of the infinite divisibility of matter, and approve the enthymeme of Leibnitz in favour of monads; but I must not meet the objection, "How can extension, solidity, stability result from simple unextended atoms?" I may appeal to the plain testimony of consciousness in favour of free-will, but I

must decline to answer the objection, "How is free-will reconcilable with causation?" I may prove from the principle of causation—restoring it its full significancy—that there is a Necessary Being, One who exists of His own nature, and who must consequently have absolutely originated or created that which not existing of itself has only being through efficiency of *the cause*; but I will not answer the objections as to the *manner* of creation which are usually put. Nor has my adversary any right to argue any thing in his favour from my silence on these different heads. The very statement that we know only *in part* supposes that some sort of objections (and I have shown what sort) are unanswerable; and no fair and honourable opponent ought, or should be suffered, to use our ignorance to the discredit of our knowledge. But if, as the whole drift of Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy goes to establish, we must either know all or nothing of the supersensual order, then indeed sceptic and dogmatist are silenced for ever; there is an end of philosophy, and we may burn our books, or only open them to convince ourselves how completely man has befooled himself with the light that was given for his guidance. May I hope to have shown, on the other hand, that man has been the dupe of his imagination, but never of his reason?

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#### THE CHURCH IN THE ANCIENT SYMBOLS.—No. II.

IN my former paper I showed that the Church was symbolically represented by the early Christians under the image of a ship; and here a question of the greatest interest presents itself for discussion. A symbol, as has been frequently said, to be a symbol, must have something about it which shall have a tendency to produce in the mind of the beholder some striking or leading idea connected with the object it is intended to represent. It now remains for us to determine what leading idea is possessed in common by a ship and by the Church, as it was conceived by the early faithful. A glance at the monuments we have described will help to throw light upon this important point. For among them we shall find two distinct classes: one of ships, considered simply as such; the other of ships which are shown by the objects that accompany them to be representations of the bark of Peter. The jasper of Monsignore Borgia (18), the gem edited by Ficoroni (17), the cornelian of the Kircherian Museum (20), and many others, may be cited as specimens of the first class; to the second are to be referred the onyx (16) illustrated by

Aleander, the lamp-ship (24) of the Florence Gallery, and the Vatican ivory (23) edited by Buonarrotti. To this double class of monuments corresponds an analogous double class of passages in the works of the Fathers. As the monuments of the first class exhibit the ship in general as a symbol of the Church, so the first class of patristic passages applies to the Church qualities and attributes which every ship, as such, possesses; and as the monuments of the second class present not any or every ship, but the ship of Peter, as the figure of the Church, so, in the second class of passages, the Church is described in language which identifies it with the same apostolic bark. We have examples of the former in the passages before quoted from Pseudo-Clemens, St. Hippolytus, Tertullian, and St. Augustine; and of the latter in the words of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and St. Maximus of Turin, as will be more fully shown hereafter. The natural conclusion from these facts appears to be, that whilst the Church has many points in common with every ship as such, there exist in addition special reasons why it should be compared to the bark of Peter. The question to which I am addressing myself has, therefore, two parts: the object of the first is, to determine in what respect the Church is like a ship; and, this being once established, to examine, in the second place, why it should be called the ship of Peter. The leading idea common to the Church and to every ship is this,—as a gallant ship, owing to the strength of its timbers and the skill of its pilot and crew, carries its passengers in safety through many a tempest, so does the Church, rendered invincible by its heaven-given power and by the divine protection, bear the faithful through all the storms of the world to the port of eternal life. This is the leading feature which the symbol of the ship naturally impresses on the mind, this the striking idea commonly brought out and dwelt upon in the texts of the Fathers. But over and above all this, the Church is the bark of Peter, because, as St. Ambrose has it, “the Lord is not to be found on board every ship, but only on board the one in which the Apostles sail or Peter fishes,” that is, as he explains it, “teaches;” because, as St. Maximus declares, “the ship of the Church is the one which Peter is commanded to pull out into the deep, and from which he is to let down his nets to catch fish, that is, to unite men by faith;” because, as the same Father declares, “The Lord ascends only into that ship of the Church in which Peter is constituted master, since He has said, ‘upon this rock I will build my Church;’” because, as he says again,\* Peter had “such merit in the eyes of his Lord,

\* Hom. iii. de St. Petro et Paulo, p. 225.

that, instead of the care of a little craft, the government of the whole Church was intrusted to him; because, in one comprehensive word, the Church is the Church of Peter—*Ecclesia Petri.*”\*

Let us now endeavour to gather from all that has been said some idea of what the early Christians believed the Church to be. According to them, the Church is like a ship on a stormy sea, buffeted by the winds and waves of the world, but victorious over both and invulnerable. She is a ship whose master and owner is God the Father, whose pilot is Christ, and whose sails are filled with a favourable breeze by the power of the Holy Ghost. She carries with her a vast multitude of passengers, gathered together from every corner of the earth; for she is catholic and universal. But although she is made the sport of the tempest, there is no confusion on board, no disorder; for a regularly-constituted hierarchy of ministers have her in their charge. The Bishop is at the prow, to watch the coming storm, and provide against the danger it threatens; the priests and deacons and inferior clergy have each their appointed stations and office. Many, indeed, and varied are the dangers that beset her path,—dangers from seducers and false prophets, dangers from those who doubt of the truth, dangers from hypocrisy and sin. But she perisheth not; for she bears aloft the saving cross of her Lord; she is held together by the charity of Christ, she is guarded by the holy angels. She is the bark of Peter; and although her Lord may appear to slumber awhile, still will He awake to save her. In her alone Christ teaches; outside of her there is no true faith. To have the faith, men must be drawn into her from the depths of the world; and the fisherman appointed to this work by Heaven is Peter. She is the ship of Christ, and the ship of Peter; the Church of Christ, and the Church of Peter. From all which we can easily deduce the notes of the Church. As the ship is one, so is the Church one. When Horace wished to describe symbolically the Roman empire, he found no symbol more apt to express its unity and its nature than that of a ship. She is holy, because directed by Christ and led on by the Holy Spirit; she is catholic, because all have a place in her; she is apostolical, because propelled by apostolic hands, and committed to the charge of the Prince of the Apostles.

Hitherto I have considered the symbolical monuments as if they exhibited only a single figure, and were designed to convey only a single idea. But, as will be seen from the description above given, the ship, in many of them, is found

\* St. Maximus, Ser. de divers.; ser. lxxxix. de Mirab. p. 639.

in combination with other symbols, especially with the *ixorx* and the dove. Likewise the relations between the ship of the Church and St. Peter are expressed with such peculiar significance as to call for our special attention. I now proceed to consider these combined symbols; but before doing so, it is necessary to make a remark. Not every combination of symbols in a monument is a sign that a hidden meaning is intended to be conveyed; but if we find the same combination recurring in many instances, and in the same evident connection, then we are warranted in concluding that the artist has had a design in grouping them together. Now in the monuments upon which we are engaged there are instances of this kind.

In the sepulchral titulus of *Cassus Dominus* (1), in the onyx (16), in the gem edited by Ficoroni (17), we have the ship combined with the *ixorx* in a very remarkable way. To these I am inclined to add the jasper of Borgia (18) and the ivory carving edited by Buonarrotti (23), both of which are marked with the name Jesus. For it is well known that the symbol of the *ixorx* principally means Jesus Christ, Son of God, the Saviour, according to the explanation given by St. Optatus of Milevi\* and by St. Augustine.† Hence, perhaps, the two latter gems express, by the name they bear, the same idea of union between the ship of the Church and our Saviour as the former three by the presence of the mystic fish.

We shall be able to learn what this union means, by attending to some similar combinations of the *ixorx* with other symbols. For instance, in the monuments still existing of the union of the symbols of bread and the fish, we have the most complete key to the mystery contained in the union of the fish and the Church.

There are at least three tablets on which, according to Cav. De' Rossi, the bread and fish are united; but there is one composition which presents the most perfect parallel to the group on the onyx (16), and which on that score deserves an attentive study. I allude to one of the paintings recently discovered in the cemetery of St. Callistus. In the second chamber there is a representation of a living fish, swimming in the water, bearing on its back a large wicker basket. This basket is filled with loaves of that peculiar make and colour which belonged to what was known as sacred bread. Through an opening in the wicker-work is distinctly visible a red object like a glass vessel full of wine. This painting at once suggested to De' Rossi the words of St. Jerome,‡ “No riches

\* Lib. iii. Adr. Parmen.

† De Civ. Dei, lib. xviii. c. 23.

‡ Ep. ad. Rust. no. 20.

can equal his who bears with him the body of the Lord in a wicker basket, and His blood in a glass phial;" and the entire series of the other paintings of the chamber bear out his interpretation, that the union of the mystic fish with the bread and wine is a symbolical expression of our Lord's real presence in the blessed Eucharist.\* Near the fish and bread is depicted the banquet at the Sea of Tiberias, which the Fathers declare to be a historical figure of the Eucharist; so that the figure and the sacred reality are thus brought into juxtaposition, and what is shadowed forth in the one is expressed as plainly as symbols will allow in the other. Now in each and every one of these particulars, the engraving on the onyx (16) is the exact counterpart of the painting in the Catacombs. In both is seen the living fish, which in each supports a certain object, in the one bread and wine, in the other the Church. In the one is described the banquet at the Sea of Tiberias, which is a figure of the reality expressed in the union of the fish with the bread and wine; in the other is described Christ walking on the waters and rescuing Peter from certain death, which, according to the Fathers, is a symbol of the care He has for His Church. Now have we not here a wonderful undesigned coincidence between the teaching and language of the Church of to-day and of the Church of the Catacombs? It is taught by theologians that the Eucharist is the real and true body, and the Church the mystic body of Christ; and here we find this language of the schools accurately expressed in symbols on the monuments of the very earliest ages of faith. How true it is that the Catholic Church, like Christ, is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. To develop still more clearly and fully the extent of the meaning of this symbol, let us subject to a closer analysis the consequences of the doctrine that the Church is the body of Christ. That I may not be accused of heightening my description by borrowing the more glowing colours of later times, I will bring forward as the witness of antiquity the learned Origen, and confront him with one of the greatest of modern theological writers.† In the passage which I shall quote, he is defending against his pagan opponent the truth of the union of the Divine Word with a human soul. His argument is as follows: "We hold, after the Holy Scriptures, the entire Church of God to be the body of Christ animated by the Son of God, and the members of that body, as a whole, to be all those who have faith; for just as the soul gives life and motion to the body, which by its nature is not capable of any vital movement, so the Word acting on and moving in things necessary, His entire body,

\* De Christt. Monum. IXΘYN exhibentibus.

† Cont. Cels. vi. 48.

that is, the Church, moves in like manner each of the Church's members, so that without the Word they can do nothing." Compare with this passage the words of Moehler :\* "So Christ established a community; and His divine word, His living will, and the love emanating from Him exerted an internal binding power upon His followers; so that an inclination implanted by Him in the hearts of believers corresponded to His outward institution. And this, a living, well-connected, visible association of the faithful, sprang up, whereof it might be said, There they are, there is His Church, His institution, wherein He continueth to live, His spirit continueth to work, and the word uttered by Him eternally resounds. Thus the visible Church, from the point of view here taken, is the Son of God Himself, everlastingly manifesting Himself among men in a human form, perpetually renovated and eternally young—the permanent incarnation of the same as in Holy Writ even the faithful are called, 'the body of Christ.' Hence it is evident that the Church, though composed of men, is yet not purely human. Nay, as in Christ the divinity and the humanity are to be clearly distinguished, though both are bound in unity, so is He in undivided entirety perpetuated in the Church. The Church, His permanent manifestation, is at once divine and human; she is the union of both. He it is who, concealed under earthly and human form, works in the Church; and this is wherefore she has a divine and a human part in an undivided mode, so that the divine cannot be separated from the human, nor the human from the divine."

The other symbol combined very frequently with the Church is that of the dove, either with or without the olive-branch. The dove is without the olive-branch in the titulus of Flavia Secunda (3), in that of Serenilla (13), in the ship from the cloister of St. Lawrence (14), in the onyx (16); it appears with the olive-branch in the titulus of Genialis (4). According to the Cav. De' Rossi, the dove with the olive-branch certainly signifies peace. Without the olive-branch it may be taken in two senses, namely, as signifying either the Holy Ghost or the souls of the departed. The first signification is obvious to every one who reflects that the Holy Ghost appeared in that form at our Lord's baptism, as is related in the Gospel of St. Matthew. Paschasius Radbertus, in his commentary on that Gospel, has a sentence which seems to unite both senses: "The Holy Ghost appeared under the form of a dove, to show by it what those were one day to become who would arrive at the grace of the same Spirit."

\* Symbolism, ii. 6, Robertson's Translation.

If we say that the dove on the symbols of the ship signifies the Holy Ghost, a new and glorious privilege of the Church presents itself to our mind. As of old the Holy Ghost moved upon the face of the waters, infusing productive energy and order, so, according to this view, does the same Holy Spirit abide with the Church to guide and assist it. "The breeze that impels it," says St. Hippolytus, "is that Heavenly Spirit by which the faithful are sealed for God." On the other hand, should we prefer to believe that it signifies the souls of the departed, what must have been the faith of the early Christians in the greatness of the Church, when they thus gloried, even in death, in professing themselves its children? And when the olive-branch is added, it is insinuated that a life spent in the Church is the sure path to that heavenly peace in which the just shall sleep and rest in the self-same.

It now only remains to add a few remarks in illustration of the monuments which exhibit St. Peter in close connection with the Church; as, for example, the onyx (16), the cornelian of the Biblioteca Reale of Turin (19), the Vatican ivory (23), and the lamp-ship of the Florentine Gallery (19); the last-mentioned object is of especial importance, since it supplies us with a key to the interpretation of the rest. Antiquaries of one accord admit that the person at the helm is St. Peter, whose office of supreme governor of the Church is therein expressed. That this opinion is accurate, we are now in a position to prove. It has been shown that the ship is undoubtedly a figure of the Church; now, according to St. Maximus of Turin, St. Peter is the only one who had such merit in the eyes of his Lord, that instead of the care of a little craft, the government of the entire Church was intrusted to him. The same explanation may be given concerning the helmsman in all the other monuments above mentioned; and this enables us to add the finishing-stroke to the description of the Church we have derived from the early Christian symbols. For from this it follows that there exists the same relation between the Church and St. Peter as between the ship and the helmsman; that as the ship is guided and directed by the helmsman in the least movement it makes, so also the Church is guided and directed in all things by St. Peter. "Let us see," says the same St. Maximus,\* "what is this ship of Simon Peter, which of the two the Lord judged more suited for preaching, and which both protects our Saviour from injury and bestows upon mankind the lessons of faith; since we find that the Lord had already made a voyage in another vessel, in which He had

\* Serm. de diversis, serm. lxxxix., de Mirab. p. 639.


been seriously injured. For He sailed with Moses in the Red Sea, when he led the people of Israel through the waves of the deep; but He was badly treated by them, as He Himself complains to the Jews in the Gospel, 'If you believed Moses, you would also believe Me.' Now the incredulity of the synagogue is an injury offered to our Saviour. For that reason does He choose the ship of Peter, and desert that of Moses; that is, He rejects the faithless synagogue, and takes to Himself the faithful Church. For there are two ships destined by God to fish men unto salvation in this world, as in the sea; as the Lord said to the Apostles, 'Come, I will make you fishers of men.' Of these two ships, one is left on the shore, empty and void; the other is brought out into the deep, laden and full: for the synagogue is left empty on the shore, because it had lost Christ with the oracles of the prophets; but the Church is brought out laden into the deep water, because it has received the Lord with the teaching of the Apostles. Therefore is it said to Peter, 'Pull out into the deep water;' that is, into the deep questions of the divine generation. For what is so profound as the address of Peter to the Lord, 'Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God'? what so earthly as the words of the Jews concerning the same Lord, 'Is not this the son of Joseph the carpenter?' The former, with divine nobility of soul, proved Christ's nativity; the latter, with venomous mind, carnally estimated His heavenly generation. Wherefore unto Peter the Saviour says, 'Because flesh and blood hath not revealed this to thee, but my Father who is in heaven;' but to the Pharisees He says, 'How can you, being evil, speak good words?' The Lord ascends only into that ship of the Church in which Peter is constituted master, since He has said, 'Upon this rock I will build My Church.' Which ship so swims in the deep waters of this world as to preserve uninjured in the general ruin all those whom it has on board. We have a figure of this in the Old Testament; for as the ark of Noah preserved safe amidst the general destruction all those who were carried in it, so also the Church of Peter will preserve unhurt in the general conflagration all those whom it contains. And as of old, when the Deluge was ended, the dove brought the token of peace to the ark of Noah, so likewise, when the judgment is ended, will Christ bear the joy of peace to the Church of Peter; for He is the dove, or peace, as He promised, saying, 'Once again shall I see you, and your heart shall be glad.'"

C.

## Correspondence.

## THE SIGNS OF MARTYRDOM IN THE CATACOMBS.

SIR,—In your Number for January you inserted an article on the “Signs of Martyrdom in the Catacombs,” and in your March Number one of your readers, whose initials will cause *his* readers to recognise in him the great English authority on this matter, has signified his intention of publishing an article to controvert it. On this subject I am in a position to affirm that, ever since the Roman Catacombs were re-opened, towards the close of the 16th century, there has been a *catena* of most learned men who had but small confidence in the genuineness of the *corpi santi* extracted therefrom, because they doubted of the sufficiency of the evidence of the palm-branches engraved on the tomb, or of the so-called phials of blood which were usually found at the head of the graves, to prove the martyrdom of the tenant of the tomb. In 1855 there was printed at Brussels a work of considerable compass, entitled *De Phialis rubricatis, quibus Martyrum Romanorum sepulchra dignosci dicuntur observationes V.D.B.* Very few copies were printed, and the work has scarcely been communicated to any one. But a friend of mine at Rome has seen a copy, and he tells me that the volume, though little spoken about, has exerted a great influence. A short time ago a pamphlet of M. Ed. Leblant, a learned antiquarian of Paris, was brought to Rome; this was also directed against the phials of blood being considered as signs of martyrdom. The pamphlet is said to be very weak; but it has made an impression. My friend was present at a conversation where he heard one of the most learned members of the Commission of the Catacombs affirm that new regulations had been already made; that M. Leblant’s pamphlet had come a day after the fair; that for five years past a work of a very different calibre had been in existence, which had anticipated M. Leblant’s conclusions, &c.

I would also remark, that the writer of the “Signs of Martyrdom in the Catacombs” was quite mistaken in appealing to the authority of M. de’ Rossi in support of his views. M. de’ Rossi is well known at Rome to entertain exactly the contrary views. You have only to read what he says in his memoir upon the IXΘΥΣ and upon the age of the monogram , which is found upon most of the tombs which possess a phial of blood, to know his sentiments about it. This being the case, I am sure that no Catholic can be so fearful of exploding a popular error as to object to Mr. J. S. N.’s developing his ideas in your pages. I hope he will do so boldly. After the decision that has been made at Rome, no scandal could possibly arise from demonstrating its reasonableness. And even if it were possible, our fathers used to say, *Utilius scandalum nasci permittitur quam veritas opprimatur.*

J. P.

## THE ECCLESIASTICAL POLICY OF LOUIS NAPOLEON.

SIR,—Acting on a hint at p. 413 of your Number for March, I have examined the writings of Napoleon III. to see if I could find there any clue to his ecclesiastical policy.

Among the works of Louis Napoleon, I only found one small fragment that treats professedly of ecclesiastical matters. It is a small essay, called "*Le Clergé et l'Etat*,"\* and it treats of education. The writer says that the clergy claim liberty of teaching, while the State claims the right to direct absolutely all public education. Each of these bodies would, he says, for its own interests, influence the rising generation, but each in a different, even a contradictory, way. Yet for all this he does not think it will be necessary to separate the Church from the State; for, though the clergy are unhappily opposed to the Revolution, to stop their pay would be, in fact, to shut out the poor from Church; and it is one of the aphorisms of Napoleon I. that "no one has the right to deprive the poor man, because he is poor, of that which might console his poverty." All the ceremonies of worship should be gratuitous for the people.

But the object of the statesman is to destroy, as much as possible, all spirit of caste, and to unite all citizens in one way of thinking, and into one line of interest. For this end he must find how to prevent the university being atheist, or the clergy ultramontane. The university will be reformed when the best men are chosen for professors, without any after-thought of pleasing at once the disciples of Loyola and the disciples of Voltaire; the clergy will be furnished with proper sentiments when there is no separate clerical education. This is the case in South Germany; and there the clergy are most learned, most tolerant, and most liberal.

Instead of being separated from the world from their childhood, and instead of imbibing in the seminaries a spirit hostile to the society in which they are to live, the German clergy are first taught to be citizens before they are priests. Hence it comes that they are so distinguished for their profound erudition, and for their ardent patriotism. In their eyes, to be a priest means to teach morality and charity, to make common cause with all sufferers, to preach justice and toleration, to foretell the coming reign of equality, to teach men that political redemption is a proper consequence of religious redemption.

If, then, the priests will give up their own separate education, Louis Napoleon (in 1843) promised that they should have the education of all other classes in their hands; and then, he says, citizens will become more religious the more the priests become citizens.

Since his accession to power he has done nothing to carry out this programme. On the contrary, when the Pope founded three new bishoprics in the French colonies, the President of the Republic took care to complete the work by obtaining the foundation of seminaries for them.

\* *Œuvres*, tom. ii. p. 31, ed. 1856.

His language has always been respectful to the clergy; on one occasion it has been even clerical. Sept. 25th, 1852, on laying the first stone of Marseilles Cathedral, he said, "In all places, in fact, where I can do so, I endeavour to maintain and propagate religious ideas, which are the most sublime of all, because they are our guide in prosperity and our consolation in adversity. My government—I say it with pride—is one of the only ones which have maintained religion for itself; which maintains it, not as a political instrument, not as a means of gaining a party, but solely from conviction, and for love of the virtue which it inspires and the truth which it teaches." Then he begged his hearers, whenever they entered the new temple, to remember in their prayers the sinner who laid its first stone. I do not know whether any of the bystanders thought of the proverb, "When the fox preaches, beware geese!"

He appeals to the loyalty of his deeds in reëstablishing the Papal government in 1849. But we must not forget the explanation of his motives that he gave at the time. In his message to the Legislative Assembly, 7th June 1849, the President of the Republic said, "With regard to the situation of the Pope, after Austria and Naples had decided to march upon Rome, and reëstablish the Papal authority pure and simple, we had the choice of three methods of acting. Either to oppose by force of arms all kinds of intervention, and thus we should have broken with all Catholic Europe simply for the benefit of the Roman republic, which we had not recognised; or to leave the three powers of the coalition to reëstablish the Papal power as they liked, without any modification; or to act independently for ourselves, and thus to make the Romans see that, amidst their dangers, France was their only refuge; for if France brought back Pius IX., he must, in all good faith, confirm the liberties he had promised; and, the French once in Rome, France would guarantee the integrity of the territory, and deprive Austria of all pretext for interfering in the Romagna. Moreover, the French flag thus fixed in Central Italy, might extend its protective shadow over the whole peninsula, none of whose sorrows are beheld without sympathy by France."

Probably the religious party hoped, and tried to think, that this language was more for the sake of making good his policy in the face of the parties that divided the Assembly than expressive of his own sentiments; but this hope received a rude blow by his letter to Edgar Ney, August 18th, 1849: "My *résumé* of the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope is, general amnesty, secularisation of the administration, *Code Napoléon*, and liberal government." However his later actions have disappointed our hopes, it is not fair to say that they contradict the language which we were too sanguine to comprehend.

As I do not find any more decided expressions of the religious policy of Louis Napoleon, I will turn to the book which I believe to be his Bible and his code,—the aphorisms of his uncle, collected by Liancourt.

First, then, what is religion? It is "the mystery of the social order."\* But it is a mystery of man's making, not of God's. "All religions are the offspring of men; and they are the true supports of virtue, of true principles, and of good manners" (p. 215). But there is no supernatural truth in any religion: one is as good as another. "A change of religion is inexcusable when made on personal grounds, but may be perhaps allowed because of the importance of its political consequences" (p. 217). "Every man ought to abide in the religion of his birth" (p. 219). Religion is not true, but only useful! "Religion was not meant for philosophers, they have no faith either in kings or priests. As to the faithful, it is impossible to give them, or to allow them to keep, too many miracles. If I had to make a religion for philosophers, it should be something quite contrary to that of believers" (p. 217).

With regard to the education of priests, he says: "The task of forming the young clergy should not be left to ignorance or fanaticism; we may say of priests what has been said of the tongue,—it is either the worst or the best of things" (p. 201). "The ignorance of the clergy is the greatest scourge of the world" (p. 204); and "The popes have done too many foolish things for me to believe them infallible" (p. 205).

With regard to their jurisdiction, he pronounced, October 27th, 1808, that the reason why the celibacy of the clergy was enforced was, "that family cares might not take them off from spiritual affairs, to which they ought to be exclusively devoted" (p. 207). "Priests ought to guide consciences, but ought not to exercise any exterior and bodily jurisdiction over the citizens" (p. 203). "The clergy should confine themselves to the government of heaven" (p. 135). "The decadence of Italy dates from the time when the priests wanted to govern the finances, the police, and the army" (p. 207). "Nothing degrades a nation so much as religious despotism" (p. 131).

With regard to the relation of Church and State, he says: "So far as police is concerned, all religion in a state ought to be entirely in the hands of the man who governs" (p. 85).

And with regard to the conduct of the governor towards religion, this is his advice: "Fanaticism must be put to sleep before one can root it out" (p. 141).

These are the maxims of a man who was nursed in the Revolution, and who saw religion at its lowest ebb; but who certainly, by more than one act of his life, deserved the thanks of Catholics, though I do not suppose he was much of a Catholic himself. Still Montholon wrote about him: "As a man Napoleon believed; as king, he considered religion to be a necessity, a powerful means of governing." If we did not otherwise know his splendid talents, his sayings about religion would give us a very low idea of his capacity; many irreligious men have had a much better practical understanding of it than he. He never seemed to think it was much more than an amusing or interesting ceremony,—a kind of gratuitous Sunday-

\* Liancourt, ed. Manning, Lond. 1848, p. 213.

morning opera. Bonald somewhere says of him, "He gave pictures to churches, revenues to bishops, and pensions to churchwardens ; and this he called the restoration of religion."

The uncle saw religion as it were crucified between two thieves ; the nephew lives in a period of revival, and has far other opportunities of knowing. But his immobility of intellect is unable to emancipate itself from the line which he has accepted as the *Napoleonic idea*.

R. S.

P.S. Since I found among the political aphorisms of Napoleon I. many that receive a great significance from the circumstances of the day, I will add them here.

First, as to the fate of conquered countries : "The chief good of nations is their independence, their political existence" (p. 13). "There is no condition more hideous than that of a people that is subject to another" (p. 71). The feeling of freedom goes so far that "no government which is under the protection of foreigners will ever be accepted by a free nation" (p. 41).

Yet for all this, he considered that this "first good" of nations was to be sacrificed without remorse for considerations of empire : "Peace based upon the independence of all nations is one of those Utopias which fools delight in, but which experience demolishes" (p. 51).

If the nation in its national capacity was free, he does not seem to have considered that each individual need ask for freedom also. They had enough if their lawful enjoyments were permitted. "True social happiness consists in the harmony and peaceful use of the enjoyments proper to each person" (p. 13). The true strength of nations he considered to reside in an institution that is quite opposed to social liberty : "The conscription is the root and marrow of a nation, the purification of its morals, and the true foundation of all its habits" (p. 17). "It is an eminently national institution when it has become a point of honour, for which each person feels jealous ; then the nation is great, glorious, and strong ; then it may defy misfortunes, invasions, and time" (p. 15).

The two following aphorisms will give an insight into his domestic ideas : "Divorce is a law in conformity with the interests of married people ;" and "The wife is made for the husband ; the husband for his country, his family, and for glory" (p. 139).

These two sentences are applicable to the present empire. The Emperor may be popular with the mob, because "a monarch ennobles plebeian merit, while an aristocracy snubs it" (p. 59) ; but he will be hated by the thoughtful classes, because "a prince crushes freedom when it stands in his way" (p. 55). Hence "courtiers and men of letters do not agree" (p. 117).

With regard to the conduct of government, he says : "To govern by a party, is to put oneself sooner or later into its power" (p. 39). "Half measures are always hurtful, and never conciliate an enemy" (p. 59). "In a revolutionary state there are but two classes, patriots

and suspects" (p. 33). "In making a constitution, one should never bind oneself by laws too much entering into detail. Constitutions are the work of time, and one can never leave too large a margin for improvements" (p. 41.) And the following sentence, which may suggest many an anxious misgiving about the success of the present *diplomatic* endeavours to prop up the temporal sovereignty of the Church, when we compare them with the organic movement of the masses by which the Popes were borne up to their earthly throne: "The men who have changed the world never obtained their success by gaining over the leaders, but always by stirring up the masses. The first method is the way of intrigue, which never brought about more than second-rate results; the second is the march of genius, which changes the face of the world."

I will wind up with an aphorism to which I cordially say, Amen: *Malheur à ceux qui ne respectent pas les traités!* (p. 97),—"Woe be to those who disregard treaties!"

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#### RUSSIA.

SIR,—You ask me for some general observations upon my country; but as I have been some time out of Russia, I can only communicate to you the impressions which still remain to me. And first, concerning the Latin or Polish Church. In this, as in all other matters, it is the fundamental principle of our government to destroy all things that can oppose its movements. Every living thing in our vast empire must be Russian, and must subsist in the completest and most absolute dependence upon the government. The whole empire is to become one vast *phalanstère* from which all nationalities and all individualities are to be wiped away. This, for the last hundred and fifty years, has been the Utopia of our rulers. And their great bugbear in their labour of assimilation has ever been Poland. The resistance of Poland depends on two things; its religion, and its national spirit. For a long time these two forces have been divorced from each other; those who were strongest for nationality were weakest for religion; a great part of the nobility was poisoned with a Voltairean infidelity. But this infidelity is gradually diminishing, and is on the way to disappear. In spite of the oppression which the Polish clergy has to put up with, it is daily improving both in education and in behaviour, and we have only to thank God for the present religious condition of the country, especially when we think of what it was thirty years ago. Community of sufferings has drawn together the patriots and the Churchmen, and both parties have been improved thereby. Nevertheless this fact, though palpable to the most slovenly inquirer, has not had the slightest influence on the conduct of our government. The successive demolition of our convents, the refusal to permit the repair of our dilapidated churches, the obstacles thrown in the way of vocations to the ecclesiastical state, the attempts to poison the springs of education, the

vexatious interference with the zeal of our Bishops and clergy, the spy-system carried into the smallest details, the faithful molested in the performance of their religious obligations, the purchase of apostasies, and, in a word, all the ancient proceedings of the persecution are still in full operation. It is clear that the desire of government is to suck all the blood out of the Polish Church, with a view to its union with the orthodox communion. For a long time this has been the path pursued. But, I repeat, there is now gradually springing up a happy reaction. The importance of this fact receives a vast accession from the new phase into which the Russian empire is now entering. It is useless to conceal the fact that an immense revolution is now in progress. The signs of the times are becoming daily more clear. The question of the abolition of serfdom still remains insoluble. Every one has his own solution to propose, but every one else rejects the solution. If the position of the serfs is to be improved by the emancipation, all the nobility is next door to ruined. But the destruction of the nobles in Russia would be every bit as disastrous as the ruin of the aristocracy in England. If the condition of the serfs becomes worse after the emancipation, the immense majority of the population will be on the verge of insurrection. At present, the serfs are made to respect their masters; what will follow when the bridle is broken, and when, after such a change of position, the same men continue to live close to each other? Fancy a disbanded regiment, deprived of its officers, but still living together in barracks! Such must be the position of the serfs after their emancipation. The government now sees all this. It wishes emancipation, because it is pledged much too loudly to be able to shirk; and yet it is unwilling, because it fears the consequences both to the serfs and to the proprietors: its wishes and its fears cancel each other, paralyse its movements, reveal its weakness to every eye, and discredit it more and more.

And this discredit of our government is a fresh evil. Throughout Russia a vast number of writings are being published, both by natives and by foreign residents. The tendencies of these publications are partly revolutionary, partly conservative; but it is very remarkable that they all agree about the existence and the intensity of the evils which are sapping the life of Russia. Whatever part of our administration they talk about, all is rotten. The army, the judges, the police, the civil administration, the navy, the treasury, the public works, the clergy, are all hopelessly shaken to the very foundations. From time to time an example is made; but these examples only serve to draw attention to the evil, without having the slightest remedial influence. The first step in any reform must be to double the pay of nearly all the *employés*, and then to be most severe in punishing abuses. But our finance ministers will never find the required funds, neither are our superiors capable of any strict supervision of their inferiors. Old habits would soon cause the accustomed extortions to be added to the double pay. This would be the whole effect of the reform. What is wanting is a public opinion to force the administration to bring the offending *employés* to justice.

But to form this public opinion we want a press or a tribunal permitted to reveal the abuses which the administration would conceal; and a press or a tribunal of this sort would put our whole machinery of government out of gear in less time than it took Mirabeau and his associates to destroy the old French monarchy, an institution whose solidity was of a very different order from the lath-and-plaster erection of Peter the Great. It is not difficult to divine the deplorable effect of this administrative corruption on the government. Few people have any thing to do with the heads of offices; but every one has his business with the lower officials, among whom corruption is most universal, their superiors being by no means spotless. Thus it comes to pass that the government presents itself to the governed in the character of the meanest and most barefaced swindler. This is the secret of the astonishing success of the sects which abound in Russia. The dishonesty of officials is, three times out of four, at the bottom of those continual secessions of the mercantile and industrial classes and of the serfs and peasants from the orthodox Church. The simple people conceive an equal hatred for the official Church and for the government which supports it, and which is in fact one with it. All these sects have an organisation, generally a very simple and solid one, depending on mutual confidence; the spirit of association, moreover, is deeply seated in the character of the Slave race; and herein lies a fresh danger to the government. If there were to arise a bold enterprising man, who knew how to set the masses in movement, a regular peasant-war would be the result. Our government knows and understands this peril; and to prevent it, has employed various measures of persuasion, of compulsion, and of letting things be,—with small success; often the measures had a result exactly contrary to that intended.

Such are the internal perils of our country. And where shall we find the remedy, or men to apply it? It is of much more importance to answer these two questions than to determine the nature of the evil; but I do not think that any one can answer them.

I mentioned just now the books upon Russia which are continually appearing: they are mostly published at Leipzig and at Paris. At Paris, a book has just come out which, I think, will make a great noise in Russia, if not throughout Europe. For you may depend it will get into Russia, in spite of the prohibition of the customs; and the very customs-officers, who are in the pay of the booksellers of Petersburg and Moscow, will help it in. Its title is, *La Vérité sur la Russie*, by the Prince Peter Dolgorouky. Its character may be summed up in two words—very bitter, but very true. It smashes every thing; nothing but the Imperial family is treated with the slightest respect. Now when you consider the name and position of the author, does not this seem a sign of the times? Would you believe that he has dared to insert a chapter upon liberty of conscience? In this chapter he gives an account of the horrors inflicted upon the Catholics at Dziernowice,—horrors which within the last two years have been described in detail by the Catholic press of France and Belgium, and, I suppose, of England too. By this means

the most efficacious publicity is secured for the abominable history. Another very interesting chapter is that devoted to the Russian clergy. After a sufficiently explicit profession of his faith in the orthodox Church, which he calls the only true Church of Jesus Christ, he demolishes the Russian clergy, though he always declares, and with some truth, that the clerical disorders are due rather to the government than to the clergy. He proves to demonstration that the seal of the confessional is habitually broken for the interests of the political spy-system. He protests with some eagerness, and again with some justice, against the notion, so universal in Europe, that the Emperor is the head of the Russian Church. He maintains that the orthodox Church has no other head than Jesus Christ, but, at the same time, he admits that the Emperor Nicolas behaved as if he was our Lord's Vicar; this comes to pretty much the same thing as an admission that he was the Pope of the Russian Church. The conclusion of his book is, that Russia is being dragged by an incapable and rapacious bureaucracy down a fatal steep, at the bottom of which it will inevitably, and that soon, find bankruptcy and revolution. The remedy which he proposes is constitutional government. I am not quite as well convinced as the author of the efficacy of this remedy. It would assuredly soon bring about immense changes. One very important truth which the writer tells is, that Russia is unable to bring into the field, outside its frontiers, an army of 150,000 men, and that for the simple reason, that outside the frontiers the troops would have to be paid in coined money, of which there is no sufficient supply. What he says about the armies of Germany is stronger still. According to Prince Dolgorouky, the only good German army *was* that of Austria: the Prussian army is a kind of great national guard, which would not hold together three weeks; while the little kings of Germany cannot agree either with Austria or with Prussia, and would most willingly join a confederation of the Rhine. These are the points in the book with which I have been chiefly struck.

In reading it, however, my ideas have been gradually led towards the foreign policy of Russia. With respect to the West, her policy is most reserved. She will make no more advances than are absolutely necessary. Those who have injured her most deeply are now seeking, if not her alliance, at least her friendship and her support. The reconciliation with France may possibly be consolidated; for France is, on the whole, the most natural ally of Russia. A kind of union may likewise be reëstablished between her and Austria. These two powers have the same interest in bridling the Poles and the Hungarians; but many a Russian has laughed heartily at Lord John Russell's announcement to parliament that he intended to propose a kind of league of the great powers against the annexation of Savoy to France. If Russia dislikes to see France grow greater, she dislikes still more the policy of England, which acknowledges neither principles, nor the rights of nations, nor honesty in the means she takes to execute her ends. You are much deceived if you imagine the nations of Europe, and especially Russia, to be disposed to be

tools for your selfish policy. Assuredly, unless the interests of Russia are directly at stake, she will never league herself with you. Your policy may come to as ridiculous a smash as it likes, your national pride may be humbled, your influence enormously decreased ; we shall only laugh heartily, as we laughed when Austria was beaten at Solferino, though our complaints against her were infinitely less than those we have against you. Do not imagine, then, that we shall take any active part in the affairs of the West. We have enough to do with the "sick man" in the East, and in our quality of neighbours we are specially interested in the legacy which his demise will leave open to us. Formerly the great question was, who should have Constantinople ? Now the question seems to be, who shall have Egypt ? In other words, the question is, how far we can shut you out from taking any share of the spoils ? Every Russian that I talk with thinks that France, Austria, and Russia will easily come to an understanding, if they have not come to one already. England is only considered as an immense embarrassment. In the mean time, European Turkey is becoming agitated ; the Sublime Porte takes such measures as it is capable of taking ; the nationalities huddled together in its dominions are daily gaining a clearer demarcation ; the agents of the various powers have their eyes open ; expectation is rising more and more on tiptoe. When the time comes, Russia will come forth from her retirement ; she will collect all her forces, and will rather expire in the violence of her efforts than miss the opportunity of establishing her power for ages. When this question is settled, we shall see whether Russia is to be the first power of the earth or a third-rate power.

I intended to finish with a recital of the endeavours that are being every where made to bring about a reconciliation between the Catholic and orthodox Churches ; but I must reserve what I have to say for another occasion.

April 15, 1860.

W.

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#### BELGIUM.

Brussels, April 14.

SIR,—The affairs of Belgium have, I suppose, their own interest for English Catholics. We are of the same race, and we live under institutions somewhat similar, except that our government is probably more like what yours would be after the passing of some extensive measure of reform. I think that you may gather some warnings from the conduct of our Liberals.

The measure now occupying our attention is M. Frère's project for the abolition of the *octroi*, or municipal tax levied at the gates of the towns. We are all agreed upon the advantage of abolishing this interior customs-duty, but we are at loggerheads about the way of doing it. M. Frère simply abolishes them, and distributes their burden over the whole country ; but in such a way that, instead of the towns being exceptionally taxed, the country-places will be most burdened, and, indeed, besides paying for themselves, will have to

pay three millions of francs for the towns. This project is popular enough in the towns, but not so in the country-places ; but it will be carried : the towns are so important in elections, that they must be conciliated. I do not feel so angry at the injustice of this act, as at the ill effects it is sure to produce in the long-run, by attracting the rural population to the towns. All over the Continent, owing to the increase of education and of wealth, and to the destruction of several rural manufactures, there is a tendency to desert the country for the town. In several departments of France, this tendency has become a complete plague. In Belgium, it has hitherto been kept back by the greater expense of living in the towns ; but when it is as cheap to live in town as in the country, fifty years will suffice to shift our population. In several rural districts labour is already scarce, while the towns are over-stocked.

The fortification of Antwerp is progressing silently but steadily ; but few persons trust to it for the safety of Belgium. If we wish successfully to resist a French invasion, we must do like the Poles under King Casimir, or like the Spaniards fifty years ago, and rise in a mass under the influence of patriotism. This renders it all the more desirable that government should avoid giving offence to any large party, as it does by its bill for the abolition of the *octroi*, and by the tone of the Liberal ministerial journals with respect to the affairs of Italy. All these papers cry out against the Pope, the dethroned princes, and the King of Naples. This is doubly foolish ; for it both wounds our Catholic feelings, and it moreover prepares our minds to suffer in our turn an annexation to France. Again, the travels of the Duke of Brabant are far from popular. We all know that ambitious ideas are the order of the day at Laeken ; and this knowledge we embroider as we please. The motives assigned by the official journals for his travels are curious, none more so than that given by the *Gazette de Cologne*. While Europe is wondering every morning whether a *casus belli* will not break out during the day, the duke, it appears, has gone to Vienna and Constantinople to complete his studies on the subject of the trade of the East. The day before yesterday, an Orleanist journal declared, semi-officially, that his journey to Constantinople was for the purpose of arranging for the purchase of Crete. *Communiqués* of this kind make the royal family, and especially the duke, ridiculous.

In Belgium a report was accredited, and is still far from discredited, that France and Prussia had come to terms ; that France was to annex the Rhenish provinces, and Prussia the smaller German states. In this case you would come to protect Belgium. But, thanks to your policy, which is universally detested and abhorred on the Continent, your presence would be very likely to be the signal for a universal shout of *Vive la France*.

Some persons have supposed that the Emperor knew beforehand and approved of the resolution of General Lamoricière to offer his services to the Pope. It would not be contrary to the system of Louis Napoleon, who likes to keep both his front and his back door open, even to have sent the general on this mission.

But the French government, which would now appropriate the honour, really had nothing to do with the initiative. The facts are these: Mgr. de Merode came to Belgium with an autograph letter of the Pope to the general. The general was summoned to Brussels, but he never showed himself at the Hôtel Merode, but remained *perdu* at M. Cattoir's, some distance away. There Mgr. de Merode sought him out, and fulfilled his commission. The French secret police at Brussels knew nothing of the matter; the French ambassador afterwards took great pains to find out something definite to tell his government, but he could discover nothing. Part of M. Cattoir's family did not know whom they had amongst them; and no one was invited to meet the general but his old confessor at Brussels. The first recruit that the general secured was the son of M. Cattoir, an excellent young man, and a most able mathematician and surveyor, who has been long known to the general, and whom he thinks equal to the best that France could supply. Mgr. de Merode and his two companions were again in Italy before the French government got an inkling of what had happened. On this there was a council of ministers, presided over by the Emperor. The question was, whether to authorise the general to accept service in a foreign country, yes or no? Almost all expressed an opinion in favour of authorising him. How could they do otherwise? They had, indeed, up to that time refused passports to young men who wanted to enlist in the Pope's army; but to refuse permission to the general was quite another matter. They had preached to the Pope about reforms: could they refuse him the use for this purpose of one of the cleverest organisers in France? This would be to throw off the mask too completely. Then General de Lamoricière, by his marriage, has entered the ranks of the French aristocracy; and it is well known that upon occasion he would give his help to the Restoration. To interdict him would have been simply to invite the young French royalists to join his standard in Italy, and there form the nucleus of an army whose future who could predict? It was determined, therefore, that permission should be given to the general. But this permission was not asked for. The nuncio at Paris received notice of the determination of the French government. Under the circumstances, this was equivalent to a command. He telegraphed to Rome; and the Roman government requested, through the French ambassador, the Emperor's permission for the general. The Emperor hastened to grant it; and the official journals were instructed to proclaim to France that the initiative belonged to him. But he cannot make much play out of this. Thank God, the attitude of Pius IX. has changed the game. He was to play St. Peter's part: *alius te cinget, et ducet quo tu non vis*. But now it is the Pope that leads, and another is in leading-strings.

Our collection of the Peter's-pence prospers. The Bishop of Ghent, as usual, was the first to move. He has found in his diocese 400,000 subscribers of twenty-five centimes a year, and donations to the amount of 80,000 francs. We shall see whether the other Bishops have a like success. The pastoral of the Cardinal of

Malines is to be read to-morrow. The Bishop of Ghent has one considerable advantage over his colleagues ; this is, that he makes far the most use of the lay element. By the Society of St. Vincent of Paul he has almost suppressed mendicity in his diocese. This society is his right hand for every thing. He supports it every where, and will never let it be injured by the opposition of the *curés*. It has been the great instrument for the collection of the *Romescot*, to which even the beggars have subscribed.

At the same time, the Counts de Meens and de Grelle, M. Jules Malou, and other financiers, are busy about the new Roman loan. According to the first instructions from Rome, the stock was to be issued at par bearing 5 per cent interest, and the names were to be inscribed at the Bishops' palaces. But our Bishops' houses are not frequented as they are in Italy, nor are our Bishops approachable by all the world. Moreover, since the old Roman 5 per cents are only at 80, and since, therefore, the new loan is in some measure an appeal to charity, it was thought much more likely to insure its success to make it still more so. So, with the consent of Rome, the conditions have been changed. The inscriptions are made at the banks, and the issue will be at par with interest at 4 per cent. The Count de Meens puts down his name for 100,000 francs ; others are equally generous ; we reckon that Belgium will lend at least 6,000,000 francs.

M. Jules Malou has just published an *Etude sur les chemins de fer Belges*. It ought to interest and instruct your countrymen. He proves that, with very few exceptions, all the Belgian railways constructed by private companies are losing concerns, and that those constructed by English companies are the worst, and have been conducted with least foresight and sense. I will extract a few figures relating to these undertakings. The Sambre-and-Meuse line has depreciated 12,000,000 out of a capital of 28,000,000. That of West Flanders has depreciated 10,700,000 out of a capital of 15,000,000. That of Tournay, Jurbise, and Landen-Hasselt, has lost 1,700,000 out of 13,700,000. That of Charleroi-Erquelines has lost more than 3,000,000 out of 20,000,000. That of Namur and Liège out of 37,500,000 has lost more than 8,000,000. That of Mons to Manage has lost 7,700,000 out of 13,000,000 ; and the Grand-Luxembourg, the vaunted El-Dorado, has lost 19,700,000 out of 74,800,000 ; and so on. I have only given the round sums. Thus have the English sown gold broadcast in Belgium, and have only their labour for their pains. These are the worst speculations that have ever been made in our country.

I will end with a fact that does not concern Belgium, but which I have on the best authority. When the *Te Deum* was to be chanted at Bologna for the annexation of Romagna, Cardinal Viale Prelà refused to allow it, and closed the doors of the cathedral. Several priests were applied to, and all refused to have any share in the ceremony. At last they fetched a priest (said to be interdicted) from the frontiers of Tuscany, and he performed the function in one of the churches of the town.

Y. Z.

## Literary Notice.

*Palæontology; or, a Systematic Summary of Extinct Animals and their Geological Relations.* By Richard Owen, F.R.S. (Edinburgh: A. and C. Black.) Of this compendium it is sufficient to say, that whatever is written by Mr. Owen, the modern Cuvier, on his special subject, is sure to be the best in its kind. We notice the book only to quote some of the author's remarks on the antiquity of the human race, and on the successive origin of species.

On the first subject Mr. Owen, though affirming that man is geologically modern, yet makes no difficulty in allowing him the immense historical antiquity which new discoveries seem to oblige us to admit. Flint weapons, unquestionably fashioned by human hands, have been discovered in stratified gravel containing bones of the mammoth and extinct rhinoceros, stag, bear, and bison, in the valley of the Somme, near Abbeville and Amiens; in the bone-cave at Brixham, Devonshire; and in ossiferous caves in Palermo. Sir C. Lyell believes the antiquity of the Amiens flint instruments to be great indeed, if compared to the times of history or tradition. . . . It must have required a long period for the wearing down of the chalk which supplied the broken flints for the formation of so much gravel, sometimes 100 feet above the present level of the Somme; . . . and the disappearance of the elephant, rhinoceros, and other genera of quadrupeds now foreign to Europe, implies a vast lapse of ages (pp. 401-403). Ages, he says, not centuries.

With regard to the origin of species, Mr. Owen distinguishes the general proposition, "that new species are the result of *some* continuously operating second cause," from the particular proposition, that they are the result of a given hypothetical cause. The first, he says, may be entertained (as we showed that St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and the fathers, did entertain it\*) without necessitating the admission of any current hypothesis as to the second. Mr. Owen does not accept the theory of Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace, which we discussed in our last Number. "Observation of animals in a state of nature," he says, "is still required to show their amount of plasticity" (the amount of the *laxum* of the alteration of species), "or the extent to which varieties do arise. . . . Further discoveries of fossil remains are also needed to make known the antetypes" (the previous forms from which the later ones were derived) "in which varieties, analogous to the observed ones in existing species, might have occurred, *seriatim*, so as to give rise ultimately to such extreme forms as the giraffe." This application of palæontology Mr. Owen has always impressed upon his readers, and has contrasted the "more generalised structures" of extinct with the "more specialised forms" of recent animals.

"But observation of the effects of any of these hypothetical transmuting influences in changing any known species into another has not yet been recorded. And past experience of the chance aims of

\* See vol. ii. pp. 372, 373.

human fancy, unchecked and unguided by observed facts, shows how widely they have ever glanced away from the gold centre of truth."

The principles, he says, which seem to prove a continuously operative secondary creational law are, the law of irrelative or vegetative repetition; the law of unity of plan, or relations to an archetype; the phenomena of parthenogenesis; and the progressive departure from general type, as exemplified in the series of species from their first introduction to the present time.

We have made these quotations in order to confirm by the high authority of Mr. Owen the arguments which we ventured to put forward in March in reply to Mr. Darwin's theory.

## Current Events.

### HOME AFFAIRS.

#### *Home Policy.*

THE approval by the House of Commons of the Commercial Treaty with France, as a measure of trade, and as a political means of improving the relations between the two countries, was decidedly expressed before the end of February. Feb. 20, Mr. Disraeli's motion, which rebuked the government for their sin against form in combining the Budget and Treaty in one, was defeated by 293 to 230; Feb. 24, Mr. Du Cane's motion, which amounted to a substantial condemnation of the Budget founded on the Treaty, was lost by a majority of 116; and Feb. 28, a motion in favour of the protection of cork by Mr. Duncombe, though partly adopted by Mr. Gladstone, was beaten by 191 to 118. The government was supported in its commercial policy by Mr. Maguire, and other Irish members, who had habitually voted with the opposition.

*March 1.* Lord John Russell (who had introduced the first Reform Bill, March 1, 1831) brought forward his new measure of Reform. Simplicity was paramount in his scheme, and it was introduced in a speech extremely tame. The analysis of his bill is:

In England, qualification reduced to 10*l.* rental in counties, and 6*l.* in boroughs. In Scotland, freehold franchises from 10*l.* to 5*l.* No boroughs

entirely disfranchised, but those in England and Wales, which, with a population under 7000, now return more than one member, will lose the second member. Twenty-five boroughs lose one a-piece; and of the twenty-five seats thus at his disposal, Lord John Russell gives fifteen to certain populous counties; creates four new boroughs with one member each—Chelsea and Kensington, Birkenhead, Staleybridge, Burnley; and gives an additional member to Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham; also one to the University of London. The four seats of the disfranchised boroughs, Sudbury and St. Albans, go, two to Ireland—Cork County and Dublin City; and two to Scotland—Glasgow and the Scotch Universities.

Lord John Russell discarded his "fancy constituencies," and also the principle of the representation of minorities, which he had advocated in 1854, though this sacrifice was made with evident reluctance. He said:

"The House may remember that upon a former occasion I made a proposition which was not very palatable to the House, and which was certainly not popular in the country—viz. that there should be a division of votes; in other words, that where there were three members each elector should have only two votes. As

that proposition was not very popular, although I think it was a fair and just one, I shall not attempt to renew it upon the present occasion. I have observed, that where there are three members there is a growing feeling, arising from a sense of fairness and justice, that a very considerable party, though it may be the weaker, should not be altogether excluded from the representation, but that the third member should be given to it, though constituting a minority of the constituency. For a long time, chiefly because of that question of protection and free trade in which the agricultural counties felt a deep interest, those counties which now possess three members generally returned gentlemen all belonging to the same political party—the Conservative; but, on looking at the returns made to the last Parliament, I find that in five out of the seven counties which enjoy the privilege of electing three members each, two were of one party and one of the other. I regard it as a great benefit to those counties themselves, as well as to the country at large, that there should exist such a disposition not to exclude altogether a very strong minority, but to allow it to have part of the representation. I know it is said that the vote of the third member, the representative of a minority, neutralises the vote of one of the other two. That is not altogether true, because in many instances where the questions at issue are not directly party-questions, all three members may, and, we find, often do, vote together, although sitting on different sides of the House. I think, therefore, we shall not do wrong in giving three members to some of the more populous towns, as we have given three members to some of the larger counties."

He proposes, also, that the payment of assessed taxes be no longer a condition of voting, but the payment of the poor-rates is still to be required.

The three great measures of this Session, the Budget, the Commercial Treaty with France, and the Reform Bill, cannot be properly understood unless they are considered together. The Commercial Treaty and the repeal of certain customs-duties, cre-

ate a deficit, not nearly compensated by the annuities that fall in this year. Mr. Gladstone provides for this deficit, *for one year only*, by a tenpenny income-tax, which will probably have to be extended to meet the supplementary estimates for army and navy. The income-tax is an impost on the upper classes; and the object of the Reform Bill is to give the lowest classes the preponderance in elections. A raw legislature will have to manipulate a deficit; and still worse, this legislature will probably represent the classes most interested in making the income-tax a permanent impost, and in still further reducing the poor man's burdens by economy in the defences of the country. The probable result of the policy represented by the three measures would be, in the course of a few years, a permanent income-tax of a shilling in the pound, a defenceless state of the country, and perpetual war-panics.

But within the last two months the Reform Bill has been losing favour in the eyes of the people, and has been all but lost by a count-out in the House of Commons. The Treaty with France, which was to ensure cordiality with that country for years to come, produced a cordiality that lasted exactly one fortnight, when it was rudely broken up by the annexation of Savoy; and the different interests which were being sacrificed to the Treaty have made themselves heard with effect. Mr. Gladstone has fairly fled before the assault of the publicans, who have frightened him out of his wine and beer licenses, which he proposed to grant to all vendors of eatables. The wine-licenses stand, but the beer-drinking at pastry-cooks' has yielded to the invincible morality of the great public-house interest. Several cases of great hardship occur likewise with regard to the silk, hop, and paper trades, which will go far to compel Mr. Gladstone to modify his first plans.

A Committee of the London Clergy which was appointed December 5th, to consult on the "Workhouse Question," has resolved: "That the attention of the Committee be directed to the following points in the order

in which they stand—1. The registration of religions; 2. The test of religion; 3. The punishment of false registration; 4. Separate schools and teachers for Catholic children; 5. Access of priests to Catholic inmates of workhouses and schools; 6. Attendance at Mass; 7. Appointment of chaplains; 8. Payment of chaplain." The Committee is also "of opinion that the following points ought to be arrived at:

"That in all workhouses and district union and other schools supported by the poor-rates, the creed-register shall be faithfully kept, and be open to inspection at all reasonable hours.

"That until the age of fifteen the religion of the child shall be ascertained by the following tests:

"1. As to children whose parent or parents are living—

"That the test of the religion of children . . . shall be the religion or reputed religion, or the known direction, of the parents or surviving parent.

"2. In the case of orphans—

"That the order of August 1859, in respect to orphan-children in workhouses, be extended to all orphans under the operation of the poor-law.

"That false or fraudulent registration be an offence punishable by the magistrate at the motion of any rate-payer, or of the person or persons aggrieved.

"That in registering the religion of any child, the grounds on which the religion has been determined . . . shall be entered.

"That separate schools for Catholic children be provided, to which such children detained in workhouses, &c. be sent for education, and supported out of the rates of the poor. These schools to be inspected like other Catholic schools, and the appointments of masters, &c., to be out of

the jurisdiction of the Poor-Law Board; and where no such school exists, the Catholic children to be allowed to attend any Catholic school within a reasonable distance; or, in default of this, to be placed in the charge of any person, being Catholic, certified as fit by the Poor-Law Board."

The other resolutions respect freedom of access for priests to workhouses, and the petitions and addresses to Parliament and to the Poor-Law Board which the Committee proposes to present.

In the mean time an agitation against the order of the Poor-Law Board of August 1859 has been organised by a "Committee of the Metropolitan Unions;" and those who know best the force of the inertia of Boards of Guardians, and the small power of the Poor-Law Board to bring them to reason, will have the most serious doubts of our speedy success. The question is much more a social than a legislative one; the best law in the world administered by Marylebone vestrymen might be used most tyrannously against us.

The Irish Bishops have put forth a long and ably argued reply to Mr. Cardwell's answer to their request for the abolition of the National System of Education. They find that Mr. Cardwell admits three principles—the paramount importance of religious education, the necessity for Ireland of separate religious training for the children of each religious denomination, and the rights of the heads of each Church to direct the religious education of the children of their own communion. They show how each of these principles is violated by the present system, and how the logical development of them can only conduct to that which the Bishops demand.

#### FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

##### *Annexation of Central Italy to Piedmont.*

On the 15th of January Lord John Russell pointed out, in a despatch to Lord Cowley, that there was no hope

from a Congress, because "between the doctrine that it will be the duty of a Congress to restore the authority of the Pope in the Romagna, and the doctrine that no force ought to be used to impose a government

or constitution on the people of Central Italy, there can be no agreement." Hence he concluded that the crisis was favourable for a unity of policy between the English and French governments, and he thereupon made four propositions:

First, that France and Austria should agree not to interfere, for the future, by force in the internal affairs of Italy, unless called upon by the Five Great Powers.

Secondly, that the French troops should evacuate Rome.

Thirdly, that the internal government of Venetia should not be matter of European negotiation.

Fourthly, that, should the decision of the governments of Central Italy be in favour of annexation, Great Britain and France would permit Sardinia to enter those States in force.

On the 27th, Lord Cowley wrote that the Emperor agreed to the first proposition; that he was anxious to comply with the second, when the moment was opportune; to the third he agreed with an unimportant reservation; with regard to the fourth, though he personally considered it equitable that the destiny of Central Italy should be ascertained through the Assemblies, yet he could give no answer till he had set himself right with Austria in respect of the peace of Villafranca. Altogether the Emperor was inclined to accept the English propositions, "provided he could make them accord with his own situation with the court of Austria, on the one side, and with Prussia and Russia on the other." On the 30th of January Lord John Russell received an assurance from the court of Austria, "that the Imperial Cabinet had no intention of interfering by force of arms in the Italian States."

The Emperor, in communicating the English propositions to the Viennese cabinet, did not ask for its approbation, but confined himself to expressing a wish that it would abstain from any formal opposition to the execution of the plan.

Count Rechberg, in a despatch to Prince Metternich, at Paris, February 17th, courteously but firmly refused to have any thing to say to the English propositions, demanded the realisation of the conditions of Villa-

franca and Zurich, but at the same time declared that Austria would not necessarily go to war to support them. The following is his *résumé* of the situation:

"At the period of the signature of the preliminaries of Villafranca, the Emperor Napoleon hoped that the new organisation of Italy might be reconciled with the reëstablishment of the legitimate powers. That hope, in the mind of the Emperor Francis Joseph, amounted to a conviction, and induced him to consent to make a painful sacrifice, but under the condition that the legitimate authorities should be reinstated in Central Italy.

"In the interest of the restoration and consolidation of peace, he decided on renouncing his own rights; but he positively refused to consent to combinations which would have injured the rights of third parties, and particularly of princes who had calculated on his alliance. To oppose a barrier to the progress of revolution by the restoration of the dethroned sovereigns, and to assist the Emperor of the French in his project of a federative alliance, was the twofold object of the acts of Villafranca and Zurich.

"The Emperor has not changed his opinion; he still thinks, as at Villafranca, that it would be cherishing a dangerous illusion to think of founding a durable and regular order of things by a flagrant infringement of rights consecrated by centuries and by European treaties. 'France,' says M. Thouvenel, 'yields to none in her regard for the sanctity of obligations contracted.' We also entertain the same sentiment; and it is precisely on that account that we should deeply regret to see the treaty which has just been concluded between ourselves and France remain unexecuted in stipulations of considerable importance. Of course, if the restoration should not be realised, the confederation would also remain a dead letter.

"What would be the consequence? The thought of the two Emperors would remain sterile. And what are the obstacles which cause its failure? Without any intention to underestimate them, we are very far from thinking them insurmountable.

"Lastly, the Emperor thinks the solution is to be sought in the bases of Villafranca, all the stipulations of which, in a legal point of view, form but one complete whole. We could never consent to coöperate in any combinations which should not take into account the reserves made in the Treaty of Zurich in favour of the rights of the dethroned sovereigns, and should feel it morally impossible for us to sanction such combinations by our assent. This attitude is, in the eyes of the Emperor, not only a question of honour, but also the expression of a profound political conviction."

In another despatch of the same date Count Rechberg discusses the obstacles to the realisation of the treaty which the French government had found insurmountable. These were the inaction and passive attitude of the chiefs of those dynasties; the hesitation of the Sovereign of the States of the Church to grant reforms; and, lastly, the silence which Austria has obstinately kept on the subject of the generous intentions which were expressed to the Emperor Napoleon relative to the administration of Venetia. How, he asks, could the dethroned princes have acted at all? He loudly accuses the Sardinian government of the most disloyal interference, and asserts, with a certainty that has not been justified by the actual votes, that "the insurgent provinces are placed under a system of military dictatorship. Any step in favour of the legitimate sovereigns is prosecuted as a crime of high treason. Five-sixths of the population are excluded from the operation of voting; and those who have been admitted to exercise their electoral right have only voted under the pressure of the terrorism to which the dominant party has had recourse. How could the dethroned sovereigns be enabled to make their voices heard in the presence of so violent a state of things?" The Pope could not introduce his reforms at the moment when a factious assembly was pronouncing his downfall; and Austria could not give Venetia the promised constitution while Sardinian agents were keeping the province in the very vortex of revolution.

The peace of Villafranca, by the introduction of the non-intervention clause, had been the occasion of the resurrection of revolutionary activity. France, to put an end to this situation, proposed a European congress; Austria agreed; but France decided on adjourning its meeting to an indefinite period.

Finally, though the maintenance of the present uncertain state might lead to revolution and democracy, the acceptance of the English propositions would do no less.

On the receipt of these despatches France was enabled to declare its views, both to the government of Sardinia and to that of England. To the second it said, in a despatch dated February 24th, that it was now at liberty to discuss the fourth proposition: "What is the aim, or, rather, what would be the result of the proposition of the Cabinet of London? To call forth a fresh expression of the wish of the Central Italians, with the assent of France and England, in such a manner that this manifestation would receive from the previous adhesion of these two Powers a force in some sort legalised and regular." The French government could not "set free its moral responsibility unless the principle of universal suffrage, which constitutes its own legitimacy, became also the foundation of the new order of things in Italy." But it has no right to demand this, and abstains from advising the Italian governments to adopt the proposition, not only on this ground, but also because these governments would not lend themselves, except with a sort of repugnance, to a fresh manifestation which they consider to be useless, and of a nature to throw suspicion on the value and sincerity of preceding manifestations.

The despatch goes on to call attention to the different positions in which the French and English governments are respectively placed in regard to the Italian question:

"The course of events, during the past year, has thrown us into the necessity of sustaining the weight of a war. England, on the contrary, has been able, without harm to her interests, to remain in an attitude of expectation. If a European crisis should arise, or an Italian war break

out, England would always be free to withdraw at once into the post of simple observation. For France this course would be less easy; and she has the right, without opposing the wishes of Central Italy, or dictating to the Italians a solution suited only to her convenience, to take into her previous consideration, much more than England has any need to do, the elements of internal order and of external peace contained in the different solutions which may be offered for the great problem which holds at the present day all minds in suspense."

France has some claim to give advice to Sardinia, and to correct the illusions of that State concerning the aid which it counts upon receiving from France, but which will not be given unless it takes the advice of the French government.

On the same day M. Thouvenel addressed a despatch to M. de Talleyrand, the French minister at Turin, explaining the views of France. Her object was: (1) to prevent complications that might lead Italy to anarchy, and so compromise the results of the war; and (2) to procure the sanction of Europe to the solution, and so to place it, as soon as possible, under the protection of international law.

Two courses, then, are open to the Sardinian government,—either to adopt a combination such as the French Emperor suggests, or to take the consequences of the refusal.

1. The combination maturely considered by the French government was as follows:

"(1.) Complete annexation of the Duchies of Parma and Modena to Sardinia.

"(2.) Temporal administration of the Legations of the Romagna, of Ferrara, and of Bologna, under the form of a *vicariat* (lieutenancy), exercised by his Sardinian Majesty, in the name of the Holy See.

"(3.) Reestablishment of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in its political and territorial independence (*autonomie*)."

This scheme was recommended by many arguments: 1st. By the annexation of all these States, Sardinia would become weak through overgrowth. If Sardinia extends her territory too far, the work of assimi-

lation would present obstacles which she ought not to overlook. She would, in fact, find herself less powerful, and, especially, less mistress of her resolutions; she will be dragged along; she will no longer direct, and the impulsion which has made the strength and the success of Piedmont in these latter years will no longer emanate from Turin. Florence can only give up its independence out of hatred to the Austrian, not from love to the Piedmontese. The sentiment which brought forward in certain parts of Italy the idea of annexation, and which gave rise to the expression of that wish, is rather a manifestation directed against a great power than a well-considered attraction towards Sardinia. Such a sentiment, if not checked at the onset, could not fail to fall into errors which it would be the duty of the Turin Cabinet to oppose. The trifling annexation of Parma and Modena would not distract Sardinia too much, while the *vicariat* would be in harmony with the municipal spirit which is a secular tradition in the Romagnas, as with the natural influence which the power must exercise that has become mistress of the greater portion of the valley of the Po. Moreover, this manner of settlement would guarantee to Sardinia the position which is necessary to her in a political point of view, would satisfy the Legations in an administrative point of view, and in a Catholic point of view would constitute a mean which we hope would finally satisfy all scruples and consciences. Such a result could not be indifferent to France, as she could not in principle admit a radical dismemberment of the States of the Holy Father, without compensation; nor can it be indifferent to Sardinia. On the other hand, if Tuscany, that beautiful land so rich in historical glory, is still coveted, that aspiration (there must be no delusion in the matter) reveals on the part of those whom it carries along with it an *arrière-pensée* of a war against Austria for the conquest of Venetia, and an *arrière-pensée*, if not of revolution, at least of menace for the tranquillity of the States of the Holy See and of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. It is impossible to deceive public opinion in Italy or else-

where, and the question which it is our object to settle, would only be reopened more embittered than ever.

2. But if the Sardinian government perseveres in the policy of annexation, then the conclusion that the government of his Sardinian Majesty *would have to rely only on its own forces develops itself*, so to say, naturally, and it would be painful for me to dwell upon it. France will not at any price undertake the responsibility of such a situation. The interests of France will be the Emperor's sole guide in the matter.

The despatch concludes with claiming Savoy and Nice (saving the interests of Switzerland), as necessary for the safety of the French frontiers in the event of the Sardinian court persisting in its scheme of annexation.

*March 1.* The French Legislative Session opened with a speech of the Emperor, in which these various threads of Italian policy were cleverly combined with the English Commercial Treaty, which had just been approved of in principle by several large majorities in the English Parliament.

"The dominant idea of the treaty of Villafranca was to obtain the almost complete independence of Venetia at the price of the restoration of the Archdukes. That transaction having failed, despite my most earnest endeavours, I have expressed my regret thereat at Vienna as well as at Turin, for the situation by being prolonged threatened to lead to no issue. While it was the object of frank explanations between my government and that of Austria, it suggested to England, to Prussia, to Russia, measures the whole of which clearly prove on the part of the Great Powers their desire to obtain a reconciliation of all the interests.

"To second these dispositions it was necessary for France to present that combination, the adoption of which would have the greatest chance of being accepted by Europe. Guaranteeing Italy by my army against foreign intervention, I had the right to assign the limits of that guarantee. Therefore I did not hesitate to declare to the King of Sardinia that, while leaving him full liberty of action, I could not follow him in a policy which had the fault of appearing in

the eyes of Europe a desire to absorb all the States of Italy, and which threatened new conflagrations. I counselled him to reply favourably to the wishes of the provinces which should offer themselves to him, but to maintain the independence of Tuscany, and to respect in principle the rights of the Holy See. If this arrangement does not satisfy everybody, it has the advantage of reserving principles, of calming apprehensions, and makes Piedmont a kingdom of more than 9,000,000 souls.

"Looking to this transformation of Northern Italy, which gives to a powerful State all the passes of the Alps, it was my duty, for the security of our frontiers, to claim the French slopes of the mountains. This reassertion of a claim to a territory of small extent has nothing in it of a nature to alarm Europe and give a denial to the policy of disinterestedness which I have proclaimed more than once; for France does not wish to proceed to this aggrandizement, however small it may be, either by military occupation or by provoked insurrection, or by underhand manoeuvres, but by frankly explaining the question to the Great Powers. They will doubtless understand in their equity, as France would certainly understand it for each of them under similar circumstances, that the important territorial rearrangement which is about to take place gives us a right to a guarantee indicated by nature herself.

"I cannot pass over in silence the emotion of a portion of the Catholic world; it has given way suddenly to such inconsiderate impressions, it has given itself up to such passionate alarms. The past, which ought to be a guarantee for the future, has been so much overlooked, the services rendered so much forgotten, that I needed a very deep conviction and confidence—an absolute confidence in public common sense, to establish in the midst of the agitations endeavoured to be excited that calm which alone maintains us in a proper path.

"Facts, however, speak loudly for themselves. For the last eleven years I have sustained alone at Rome the power of the Holy Father, without having ceased a single day to revere

in him the sacred character of the chief of our religion. On another side the population of the Romagna, abandoned all at once to themselves, have experienced a natural excitement, and sought during the war to make common cause with us. Ought I to forget them in making peace, and to hand them over anew for an indefinite time to the chances of a foreign occupation? My first efforts have been to reconcile them to their Sovereign; and, not having succeeded, I have tried at least to uphold in the revolted provinces the principle of the temporal power of the Pope. My government will immediately present to you a series of measures, the object of which is to facilitate production, to increase, by affording the means of living cheaply, the prosperity of those who labour, and to multiply our commercial relations. The first step to be taken in this path was to fix the period for the suppression of those impassable barriers which, under the name of prohibitions, have shut out from our markets many productions of foreign industry and constrained other nations to adopt an annoying reciprocity with regard to us.

"But something still more difficult still impeded us. It was the little inclination for a commercial treaty with England. I have therefore taken resolutely upon myself the responsibility of this great measure. A very simple reflection proves its advantages for both countries. Neither the one nor the other assuredly would have failed within a few years to take, each in its own interest, the initiative of the measures proposed; but then, the lowering of tariffs not being simultaneous, they would have taken place on one side and on the other without immediate compensation. The Treaty has done nothing more, then, than to anticipate the period of salutary modifications, and to give to indispensable reforms the character of reciprocal concessions, destined to strengthen the alliance of two great peoples. In order that this Treaty may produce its best effects, I invoke your most energetic coöperation for the adoption of the laws which will facilitate its practical adoption."

The effect of this clever union of

measures was doubtless to annul the force of the English protest against the annexation of Savoy and Nice. For a moment, the Emperor consented to appear in the eyes of France as a humble suitor to England, and as accepting at her hands a treaty and a policy that offended equally the clergy, the army, and the manufacturers, in order that he might more brilliantly defy Europe by the claim of "the natural frontiers of France." His words, "*réclamer les versants Français de montagnes,*" and "*cette revendication d'un territoire,*" gave great offence, as implying a claim, scarcely dormant, to all territories ever comprised within the limits of the first empire.

On March 6 was published Count Cavour's reply to the French propositions of Feb. 24, which had been echoed in the Emperor's speech of March 1. He says that if they had been proposed last August, the inhabitants of Central Italy would probably have adopted them with enthusiasm; but now, after their long and successful experiment of self-government, and after the publication of the English propositions, they would be almost unanimously rejected. The Pope would be no more likely to accept the vicariate of Victor Emmanuel than the Romagnoles their modified subjection to the Papal government.

"The idea of a vicariate, implying that of a direct interference of the Court of Rome in their internal administration, would encounter a resistance only to be overcome by force. Subjected to the test of popular suffrage, that proposition would hardly meet with any favour. It is, moreover, evident that the Holy Father would not accept this combination, however inspired it might be by the desire of saving his rights, and of not lowering the high position which he occupies in Italy. What has, in point of fact, hitherto prevented his Holiness from consenting, I do not say to measures calculated to limit his sovereign authority, but even to reforms which were suggested to him by all Europe, is the fear of incurring the responsibility of acts which, though in conformity with the principles in force in the greater number of civilised countries, might lead to

certain results contrary to the precepts of religious morality, of which the Sovereign Pontiff justly considers himself the supreme guardian. A very recent fact corroborates this assertion. When France desired to put an end to the occupation of Rome, she requested the Holy See to form a national army, like the other European Powers. The Roman government replied, that the Holy Father could not admit of the conscription, because it was repugnant to his conscience to force a great number of his subjects into a celibacy even temporary. The institution of a vicariate would not prevail over these scruples. The Holy Father, regarding himself as indirectly responsible for the acts of his vicar, would certainly not allow him the liberty of action necessary to permit the proposed plan to have any useful result."

Count Cavour proposes, instead of a vicariate, the Sardinian sovereignty in the Romagna, coupled with various engagements of the King to the Pope—namely, the obligation of acknowledging the Pope's independent sovereignty, of defending his independence by force of arms, and of paying a fixed contribution towards the expenses of the Roman court.

The question of annexation, therefore, will be put to the vote of the various populations (according to the demand of France, in M. Thouvenel's despatch to the French minister at London), and, in spite of all risks, King Victor Emmanuel and the Sardinian Cabinet will accept their decision. Tuscany would form an element of strength instead of weakness, when annexed to Sardinia, and would strengthen the liberal-conservative party of order by her manners and her traditions. A new elected prince would be still more offensive to Russia and Austria than King Victor Emmanuel himself, and the isolated State would be in the greatest peril, its feebleness make it the focus that would attract the discontented from all parts, and it would soon become a dangerous centre of revolution.

In accordance with these principles a decree had already been made (March 1), convoking the people of the various States to vote by universal suffrage and the ballot on

the alternative—annexation to Sardinia, or a separate kingdom. The vote was taken March 12. Its results were, in the Romagna :

For annexation to Piedmont	200,659
For a separate kingdom	244
Cancelled	283

And in Tuscany :

Total number inscribed on the lists	386,445
For annexation	366,571
For a separate kingdom	14,925
Cancelled	4,949

For the whole Æmilian provinces :

Total number of electors inscribed on the lists	526,258
Number who voted	427,512
For annexation to Piedmont	426,006
For a separate kingdom	756
Cancelled	750

As soon as the result was known (March 14), it was announced that

"The Sardinian government has consented to the demand of France to effect the cession of Savoy and Nice by a special treaty, to be concluded between France and Piedmont.

"The treaty will be followed by a vote of the municipalities, and the two contracting parties will afterwards communicate to the European Powers the nature of and motives for this territorial arrangement between them.

"By this arrangement Sardinia cedes to France Savoy up to Mont Cenis, and Nice up to Villefranche inclusive. Thus all the passes of the Alps will be possessed by France, which likewise obtains the districts of Chablais and Faucigny."

*Sunday, March 18.* Signor Farini placed the returns of the voting in the Æmilian provinces in the King's hands. He replied :

"This manifestation of the national will is so universal and so spontaneous, that it confirms to Europe, at a different time and under altered conditions, the vote already expressed by the National Assemblies of Æmilia. This manifestation completes the proofs of the order, perseverance, patriotism, and wisdom by which those people have merited universal sympathy and esteem. I accept their solemn vote, and henceforth will be proud to call them my people. In uniting to my ancient provinces not only the States of Modena and Parma,

but also the Romagna, which has already separated itself from the Papal government, I do not intend to fail in my deep devotion to the Chief of the Church. I am ready to defend the independence necessary to the supreme minister of religion, the Pope, to contribute to the splendour of his court, and to pay homage to his sovereignty.

"Our parliament in receiving the representative of Central Italy will ensure prosperity, liberty, and independence to the new kingdom."

And the next day the decree of annexation was published in the *Piedmontese Gazette*.

March 24. The Austrian government issued a protest against the annexation of Central Italy to Sardinia. The protest is based on the rights of the house of Austria to the succession of Tuscany and Modena, and the reversion of Parma and Piacenza. In each of these cases to recognise the annexation would be to sacrifice the rights of the empire, which have been confirmed by treaties to which Sardinia was a party.

In a circular note accompanying the protest, Austria intimates that in confining herself at present to a protest, she is actuated only by the wish of avoiding war at this juncture; by which it seems to be implied, that she considers herself at liberty to convert her protest into hostilities, should a favourable occasion be found.

Cardinal Antonelli, in a despatch to M. de Thouvenel, had already (Feb. 29) given his reasons why the Pope could never consent to this measure.

The Romagnoles, he says, were no more dissatisfied than the inhabitants of the other provinces, who did not think of revolting, neither would the Romagnoles but for the intrigues of Piedmont. The Pope was most anxious to introduce administrative reforms; but they can be no longer proposed, since the provisional government has declared that it will be only satisfied with the complete destruction of the Pope's temporal authority. To have offered them would not have been conformable to the dignity of the Sovereign Pontiff, nor suitable to achieve the object in view. On the one hand, it would have appeared as if the concessions were

made under pressure, and not voluntarily; on the other hand, there was the danger that the reforms might have been disdainfully received. In either case authority would have suffered.

The French Cabinet had proposed a separate administration, with an elective council, with no other dependence upon the Sovereign Pontiff except the nomination by him of a lay governor and the payment of a tribute.

This was equivalent to an absolute abdication, and the Pope could never consent to it. "He cannot do so, because his States are not his personal property, but belong to the Church, for whose advantage they were constituted; he cannot do so, because by solemn oaths he has promised to God to transmit them to his successors intact, as he received them; he cannot do so, because, considering that the motives for giving up the Romagna may be applicable, or may follow, in other portions of his States, such renunciation would imply, in a certain degree, the renunciation of the whole patrimony of the Church; he cannot do so, because, as common father of his twenty-one provinces, he must either procure for all the good he destines for the four provinces of the Romagna, or shield the latter from the evils which he should not like to see fall upon the others; he cannot do so, because it cannot be indifferent to him to behold the spiritual ruin of a million of his subjects, who would be abandoned to the mercy of a party which would commence by laying snares for their faith and by corrupting their morals; finally, he cannot do it, because of the scandal that would ensue to the detriment of the Italian princes *de facto* unthroned, and also to the detriment of all Christian princes, and of the whole of civilised society,—a scandal which could not fail to arise when the felony of a faction is seen crowned with such success."

M. de Thouvenel had urged that what Pius VI. did by the Treaty of Tolentino, Pius IX. could do now. The Cardinal answers, that Pius VI. ceded parts of his States to mere material force; whereas Pius IX. is required to sanction the principle of revolution, which might as legiti-

mately be applied to any other portion of his States as to the Romagna. "Thus Pius VI., by ceding to material force, might reasonably hope to save the rest of his States; while the reigning Sovereign Pontiff, ceding to a pretended principle, would virtually abdicate the sovereignty of all his States, and would authorise a spoliation against every principle of justice and of reason."

The French government had declared that it was impossible that the Roman States should be any longer maintained by foreign intervention; Cardinal Antonelli replies: "But if it is true, and it is impossible to doubt it, that the revolt of the four Legations was made and is maintained by the means of a party which owes its power to foreign help, and to hopes of still greater assistance, I do not see why a rebellion made by iniquitous foreign aid should not also be suppressed by legitimate foreign aid. Again, can it be said that aid given by Catholic nations to their common father, and in the interests of the whole Christian universe, can be styled foreign assistance?"

*April 1. The opening of the Piedmontese Chambers.*—The King, in his speech, first spoke of gratitude to France, and of the sacrifice of Savoy and Nice which it required. This disgraceful sale of the oldest portion of his dominions was glossed over with the declaration that he would "not suffer any violation or diminution of the rights or freedom of his people." Then he protested his allegiance to the Catholic faith, and to the Pope. Nevertheless, he accepted the revolted provinces. "The Æmilian provinces," he said, "have received an organisation similar to that of my ancient States. In Tuscany a special provisional arrangement was found necessary. We shall found our constitution on political, military, and financial unity, as well as on the uniformity of civil and criminal legislation; while by the progressive administrative liberty of the provinces and communes, we shall renew in the Italian people that splendid and vigorous life which under other phases of civilisation was the result of municipal self-government,—a self-government inconsistent at the present day with the constitu-

tion of strong States, and the tendency of the nation." Then he invited all parties to unite for the furtherance of the greatness of the country, "which can no longer be the Italy of the Romans, nor yet the Italy of the middle ages; which must no longer be the open battle-field for foreign ambition, but must, at last, be the Italy of the Italians."

The Pope, however, did not take the same view of the fidelity of the King of Sardinia as that monarch himself did. On the 29th of March he published an Apostolic Letter, by which the punishment of major excommunication is inflicted on the invaders and usurpers of some of the pontifical provinces.

The Catholic Church, he says, after having once attained its perfect social form, ought to be free from subjection to any civil power; this freedom is guaranteed by conditions varying with circumstances. After the fall of the Roman empire, the guarantee assumed the form of independent temporal power. Thus the Pope was assured of the political liberty requisite to exercise his spiritual jurisdiction throughout the world without any impediments, and the Catholic world was delivered from all reasons for suspecting that his religious functions were biassed by political motives. In this way the temporal power, though secular in appearance, has really a spiritual character, in consequence of its holy destination, and the close ties with which it is connected with all Christian affairs. But the spiritual character of the government has not prevented it from seeking the temporal welfare of its subjects, as the history of so many centuries proves: nevertheless, it provokes the enemies of the Church to endeavour to weaken and embarrass it.

These detestable attempts to deprive the Church of her secular power have been characterised by lying hypocrisy, by false and pernicious principles, by cunning dissimulation, and by provoking popular risings, in distinct opposition to the apostolic precept (Rom. xiii. 1, et seq.). The innovators feign esteem for the Church which they attack, and obedience to her commands which they despise. Among them are some whose duty

it was, as sons of the Church, to protect her and maintain her power. The Sardinian government is the chief offender; the injuries inflicted by it on the Church in Sardinia were lamented in an Allocution of Jan. 22, 1855; but it has hitherto despised all reclamations, and has gone on to inflict a further injury on the secular power of the Church. The first overt tokens of the attack were made at the Paris Congress in 1856, when Sardinia proposed to weaken the temporal authority of the Holy See. But in 1859, during the war against Austria, every fraudulent method was used to excite the inhabitants of the States of the Church to sedition. Emissaries were despatched, money was distributed, arms supplied, incendiary writings disseminated, even from the Sardinian embassy at Rome, which asserted its dignity in order to misuse it, and to pursue its projects under the protection of its privileges. When at last the smouldering sedition blazed out, the agitators were ready to proclaim the dictatorship of the King of Sardinia, and his commissioners undertook to govern the provinces. Protests against these acts were made in the Allocutions of June 20 and Sept. 26, 1859, and the liability of the perpetrators of them to excommunication was pronounced. The Bishops and faithful of every rank and class joined unanimously in these protests, because they comprehended the necessity of the temporal power for the maintenance of the Papal government. But the Sardinian government has made light of every admonition; has by force, money, threats, terror, and other means, obtained a universal vote in its favour; and has invaded, occupied, and annexed the Papal provinces.

In this usurpation of the rights of others against all law natural and divine, the bases of all temporal power and of human society have been undermined. But, on one hand, it is useless to complain to those who will not listen; and on the other, the whole Catholic world looks for the employment of the proper ecclesiastical censures against the guilty, in order to give an example to others.

Then follows the sentence of excommunication: no one is named therein; but it applies to "all those

who have taken part in the sinful insurrection in our provinces, in usurping, occupying, or invading them, or in doing the deeds complained of in the Allocutions of June 20 and Sept. 26, 1859, whether themselves or their warranters, supporters, helpers, counsellors, followers, and connivers, under whatever pretence, and in whatever, even the remotest, manner;" absolution only to be granted *in articulo mortis*, but revoked on their recovery, and suspended till they have revoked and annulled publicly all that they have done, brought back every thing fully to its former state, and given complete satisfaction to the Papal government.

Then follow the usual directions for the publication and authentication of the letter.

The only other step in the progress of these events that we need record is the protest of the Papal government, dated April 18, delivered to all the European governments, against the incorporation of the Legations with Piedmont. It expresses a hope that the powers will not only refuse to recognise the annexation, but will also coöperate to put an end to this iniquitous spoliation.

#### *The Annexation of Savoy to France.*

It appears that the Sardinian government, anxious rather for the enlargement of its own provinces than for the liberties of the people for whom it fought, bargained with the Emperor Napoleon III. to concede Savoy and Nice to him, provided he assisted them in accomplishing the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy. The bargain was not only kept secret, but was explicitly denied by both governments. The Sardinian government went so far as to promise "that they would neither sell, exchange, nor surrender this territory;" and the French government had over and over again solemnly declared that it aimed at no territorial aggrandisement. In the Emperor's proclamation at Milan, he said, "it is the common enemies of Lombardy and France that try to make Europe believe that I made the war only from personal ambition, and to enlarge the French territory." "The empire," he said to his Chambers, "threatens

no man;" its aim is "to console and reassure humanity." France is the only nation that acts chivalrously, that "goes to war for an idea."

However, after the failure of the Emperor before the Quadrilateral, the bargain seemed to be evacuated; and Sardinia had an opportunity of repentance, and of refusing to sell the liberties of near a million of people who for centuries have been the mainstay of her existence and the rock of her defence. But she has made this unworthy sacrifice to obtain the French consent to the usurpation of Tuscany and the Romagna.

After this act was consummated, France immediately claimed the performance of the contract. In a despatch of March 13th, M. de Thouvenel gives the reasons for the act; he still has the hardihood to assert that "solemn acts" have furnished an irrefragable proof, that in entering on the Italian war France "had not for object any territorial aggrandisement." If the government could have foreseen that circumstances would have arisen, such as to compel them to make the demand, they would have taken all means to prevent such circumstances from arising; as, indeed, they could not have arisen, if the treaties of Villafranca and Zurich had been fulfilled. But since Sardinia has profited by the agitation in Central Italy, the case is altered. An overwhelming reason has emerged why France, from mere self-protection, must seek guarantees against her powerful neighbour.

"It is impossible to dispute the fact that the formation of a considerable State, possessing both slopes of the Alps, is an event of the highest gravity with regard to the security of our frontiers. The geographical situation of Sardinia acquires an importance which it could not have when that kingdom hardly counted 4,000,000 souls, and was, in some sort, held by a great number of conventions to be external to the Peninsula. With a development which must nearly triple its population and its material resources, the possession of all the passes of the Alps would permit it, in the case of its alliances ever making it our adversary, to open access to our territory to a foreign army, or by its own forces to disturb

the security of an important part of the empire by intercepting our principal line of military and commercial communication. To demand guarantees against an eventuality of which the occurrence, however distant we may suppose it to be, does not diminish the peril, is simply to obey the most legitimate considerations and the most ordinary courses of international polity, which never at any period has assumed gratitude and sentiment as the one basis of the relations of States."

This dread of allowing his neighbours to grow powerful is an old idea with the Emperor Napoleon. During the war of 1849, between Austria and Piedmont, the Piedmontese government seized the papers of a French secret agent, and found that his instructions were to endeavour to prevent any accession of territory on the part of Sardinia at the expense of the Austrians.

But the conduct of Sardinia was the more discreditable, in that the burden of the sacrifice did not fall solely on her, but on Switzerland also; a country which had gained nothing, and therefore had nothing to pay. The northern parts of Savoy have such strategical importance with regard to the Swiss Republic, that the Congress of Vienna in 1815 made a special provision: "That the provinces of Chablais and Faucigny shall be included in the neutrality of Switzerland; that the Sardinian troops may retire by the route of the Valais; that the armed troops of no other power shall either remain in or pass through these provinces, with the exception of such as the Helvetic Confederation may think proper to station there."

As this provision was made against France, the absorption of those provinces by France was the most flagrant breach which it was capable of suffering. Naturally enough the Swiss government protested. M. de Thouvenel replied, March 17th, that the French government was surprised that Switzerland had not more confidence in the justice of France than to protest. And he laid down with the utmost decision the following law, which changes all subjects into serfs attached to the soil, liable to be sold with it to other owners:

"In principle, sovereignty implies essentially the right of alienation. A sovereign may, whatever be the motives that actuate him, cede the whole or a part of his States; and none would be justified in opposing either measure unless there should result from it any disturbance of the balance or distribution of power in Europe. His Majesty the King of Sardinia is therefore free, according to his prerogatives, to renounce the possession of Savoy in favour of France. This first point cannot be disputed, and is not capable, in strict right, of becoming the object of any doubt, or of raising any legal difficulty."

The plain means of solving this difficulty was to annex Chablais and Faucigny to Switzerland; but this would have spoiled the value of a Naboth-portion, which Mr. Bright calls a mere barren rock, but which Napoleon III. has pronounced to be an acquisition which will not only open the great Simplon road, but will also give to France "*la liberté des Alpes, et en cas de guerre un magnifique champ de bataille pour une lutte offensive et défensive.*" Hence, March 21, a so-called deputation from Savoy was got up, which was received by the Emperor at the Tuileries, and which told him that one impulse towards France thrilled through all Savoy. But "one single anxiety has alone hitherto impeded the impulse, the fear of seeing dismembered in favour of Switzerland a nationality compact by affection and by so many links of every description."

This address enabled the Emperor to answer:

"My friendship for Switzerland made me look upon it as possible to detach in favour of the Confederation some portions of the territory of Savoy; but, in face of the repulsion shown among you at the idea of seeing a country dismembered which has known how to create for itself through centuries a glorious individuality, and thus give itself a national history, it is natural to declare that I will not constrain the wishes of the populations to the profit of others. As regards the political and commercial interests which unite certain portions of Savoy to Switzerland,

it will be easy, I think, to satisfy them by special arrangements."

And the deputation vanished, no one knows whither, as no one had known whence it came.

March 22. Lord John Russell wrote a spirited answer to M. de Thouvenel's despatch. He calls to mind the assurance given by Count Walewski, in July 1859, that the scheme for the annexation of Savoy, if it ever existed, had been entirely abandoned. He shows the absurdity of France, with 36,000,000 inhabitants, fearing invasion from Sardinia, even though in one year it had increased from a state of 4,000,000 to one of 12,000,000 inhabitants. He shows that Sardinia is not likely to become a member of a confederacy against France: first, because no such confederacy is possible, except to repel French aggression; therefore "France has it at all times in her own power to prevent the formation of any such confederacy;" and, secondly, because of late years Sardinia has been attracted towards France, and has altogether left the Austrian alliance. Then he shows that the annexation is calculated to give the greatest umbrage to the European powers, because France's "former and not very remote policy of territorial aggrandisement brought countless calamities upon Europe;" and the grounds of the claim are calculated to heighten the distrust, because, if a great military power like France is to demand the territory of a neighbour upon its own theory of what constitutes geographically its proper system of defence, it is evident that no State could be secure from the aggressions of a more powerful neighbour; that might, and not right, would henceforward be the rule to determine territorial possession; and that the integrity and independence of the smaller States of Europe would be placed in perpetual jeopardy.

The despatch concludes by showing how France cannot fulfil the engagements of Sardinia towards Switzerland for the neutralising of Northern Savoy, because these engagements "were intended as a security for Switzerland against danger coming from France;" and by deprecating a measure which would renew the distrust of Europe for the first empire.

Lord John Russell repeated and confirmed the language of the despatch in a debate in Parliament of March 26. He declared his opinion to be "that such an act as the annexation of Savoy is one that will lead a nation so warlike as the French to call upon its government, from time to time, to commit other acts of aggression (*hear, hear*); and therefore I do feel that, however we may wish to live on the most friendly terms with the French government—and certainly I do wish to live on the most friendly terms with that government (*cheers*)—we ought not to keep ourselves apart from the other nations of Europe (*loud cheers from both sides of the House*); but that, when future questions may arise—as future questions may arise—we should be ready to act with others, and to declare, always in the most moderate and friendly terms, but still firmly, that the settlement of Europe, the peace of Europe, is a matter dear to this country; and that settlement and that peace cannot be assured if it is liable to perpetual interruption (*loud cheers*), to constant fears, to doubts and rumours with respect to the annexation of this one country, or the union and connection of that other; but that the Powers of Europe, if they wish to maintain that peace, must respect each other's rights, must respect each other's limits, and, above all, restore and not disturb that commercial confidence which is the result of peace, which tends to peace, and which ultimately forms the happiness of nations" (*loud cheers*).

The former policy of the government has, however, rendered a European coalition against France, under the hegemony of England, quite out of the question; and Lord John Russell has recorded the rebuffs that he received when he first proposed it. "The Austrian government said in the first instance that the annexation of Savoy to France was not worse, at all events, than the annexation of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany to Sardinia, and that it was a question in which they had less interest. But we know besides that the Emperor of Russia has said that it was free to the King of Sardinia to give away his own province,

and that it was free for the Emperor of the French to receive it; and therefore it was impossible that a foreign sovereign could interfere."

The annexation, therefore, has been consummated, in spite of repeated protests of Switzerland, and in spite of the terror of Belgium and Prussia, and has been confirmed by a vote of the Savoyards, which shows that under the French system of managing universal suffrage, a nation of free mountaineers may be made to vote for their enslavement to the most capricious despotism in the world, with quite as much unanimity and fervour as the Central Italians can be made to vote for annexation to Sardinia, in order to free themselves from Papal and Austrian servitude. Universal suffrage enacts contradictions with equal facility; unequal to the comprehension, much less to the maintenance, of liberty, it is only fit to be the instrument of despotism and revolution.

March 24, the following treaty was signed at Turin.

"Art. 1. His Majesty the King of Sardinia consents to the annexation (*réunion*) of Savoy and of the *arrondissement* of Nice (*circondario di Nizza*) to France, and renounces for himself and all his descendants and successors his rights and claims to the said territories. It is agreed between their Majesties that this *réunion* shall be effected without any constraint upon the wishes of the populations, and that the governments of the Emperor of the French and of the King of Sardinia shall concert together as soon as possible on the best means of appreciating and taking note of (*constater*) the manifestations of those wishes.

"Art. 2. It is also understood that his Majesty the King of Sardinia cannot transfer the neutralised portions of Savoy except upon the conditions upon which he himself possesses them; and that it will appertain to his Majesty the Emperor of the French to come to an understanding on that subject as well with the Powers represented at the Congress of Vienna as with the Helvetic Confederation, and to give them the guarantees which result from the stipulations alluded to in the present article.

"Art. 3. A mixed commission will determine, in a spirit of equity, the frontiers of the two States, taking into account the configuration of the mountains and the necessity of defence.

"Art. 4. One or more mixed commissions will be charged to examine and to resolve, within a brief delay, the divers incidental questions to which the annexation will give rise; such as the decision of the contribution of Savoy and of the *arrondissement* of Nice to the public debt of Sardinia, and the execution of the obligations resulting from contracts entered into with the Sardinian government, which, however, engages to terminate itself the works commenced for cutting a tunnel through the Alps (Mont Cenis).

"Art. 5. The French government will take into account, as regards functionaries of the civil and military order, belonging by their birth to the province of Savoy, or to the *arrondissement* of Nice, and who will become French subjects, the rights which they have acquired by services rendered to the Sardinian government; they will especially enjoy the benefits of life-appointments in the magistrature and of the guarantees assured to the army.

"Art. 6. Sardinian subjects originally of Savoy, or of the *arrondissement* of Nice, or domiciled actually in those provinces, who would wish to maintain the Sardinian nationality, will enjoy, during the period of one year, dating from the exchange of the ratifications, and in virtue of a previous declaration made to the competent authorities, the faculty of removing their domicile to Italy, and settling there, in which case their qualifications as Sardinian citizens will remain to them.

"They will be at liberty to keep their landed property situate on the territory annexed to France."

#### *Austria and Hungary.*

April 19. The Archduke Albert retired from the post of governor of Hungary, and was provisionally succeeded by Feldzeugmeister Benedek in the civil government, as well as the military command. At the same time the five districts into which the country had been divided were abol-

ished, and the administrative unity of Hungary was restored. Francis Joseph adds:

"In accordance with these dispositions, I ordain that when the municipal laws and county administrations are in activity, propositions respecting a Diet shall be prepared, in order that the principle of self-government, by means of town, district, or county communes, and of diets and committees of the same—which principle is to be introduced into all the provinces of the empire—may also be in force in my kingdom of Hungary."

This measure is undoubtedly a great concession to the Hungarians, and must lead to considerable changes. It is a concession, inasmuch as it restores the unity of Hungary, and gives it the dignity of a political and administrative whole, and because it places at the head of the government of the country a Hungarian of great reputation. But it must not be considered a surrender of the policy of the last ten years, and there is very little probability that it will satisfy the aspirations of the Hungarians.

It has been the just aim and endeavour of the Emperor Francis Joseph to establish the utmost unity and concentration of power in an empire full of centrifugal elements. His object was to introduce a system of concentration, founded on self-government; not, as has been often said, a system of centralisation. Self-government consists in preserving in the hands of the several physical or moral persons of which the nation is composed the administration of those things of which it is not the right and the duty of the State to assume the direction. It renders men independent of the State in certain phases and relations of life. This is not what the Austrian and Hungarian opposition demands. Their notion of liberty is a physical geographical independence, by which the empire loses power, and the people obtain no freedom. They ask not for the self-government of the Hungarians severally, but of Hungary jointly.

There are three principal views respecting the function of the State. When it is in its infancy, whole

classes of society, whole districts of the country, are exempt from its authority. This is the feudal notion of government, by which the sovereign power is locally limited, not politically circumscribed. Thus each estate possessed the right of taxing itself, or even of refusing taxes. Thus Philip I. could levy neither troops nor taxes in the kingdom of Aragon. But the feudal system protected men only by exempting them from the jurisdiction of the sovereign. Those who were not so exempt, or who were subject to other authorities, had little or no political protection, and preserved only moral safeguards of their rights. Hence in those ages the enormous political influence of the Church. Hence too the fact, that in the age in which absolutism was most completely unknown, tyranny was most common. This is practically the ideal at which the conservative party in Hungary aims. They seek to restore a system by which Hungary stood to Austria in the position of Aragon to Castile, or rather of Hanover to England, and by which the predominant class of Hungarians were exempt from almost every obligation of citizenship.

The great superiority of the modern over the mediæval State consists in this, that its authority is increased by the removal of the absolute immunity of particular classes and regions, and is limited by political boundaries. It extends its power over the whole nation, but not over the whole of its existence. No individual entirely escapes from it, none is subject to it in every thing. In all those things in which men are protected by their rights, that is, in which they owe duties to some authority distinct from that of the State—in the departments especially of property and conscience, in which men are bound to their Church and to their families and posterity—in matters, therefore, of divine worship, education, distribution of wealth, the State has no controlling power. It is in this system that freedom lies.

But there is a third theory, which not only subjects all classes and all places to the civil power, but also every phase and domain of social existence; in which men belong wholly to the State, and have no power over

themselves. This is the centralising, revolutionary despotism of the State, by which all things are rendered to Cæsar. It was the system of Joseph II. and Francis I. in Austria, whilst in Hungary the feudal system subsisted with all its imperfections. Against both of these opposite and contradictory evils a reaction has been carried on by the statesmen who governed the empire from the revolution to the Italian war; and they have been constantly opposed by the partisans of extremely antiquated notions, the so-called old conservatives, and by the liberal adherents of modern ideas.

The selection of the new governor deprives the concession which has been made with respect to the territorial distribution of the appearance of weakness. Benedek came out of the late calamitous campaign, like Todleben from the Crimean war, with the greatest increase of reputation of any general engaged in it. A circumstance, of which we can vouch for the truth, expressively denotes the estimation in which he is held by the Austrian army. At Melleghano, Benedek, who commanded in chief the division of which a part was engaged, visited the outposts, and was highly displeased with the arrangements of the general in command there. He instantly sent him to the rear, and obtained his disgrace at head-quarters. This officer, whom he had treated with such galling severity, speaking afterwards in his retirement of the events of the war, declared that Benedek was the only man fit to lead the Austrians, and that if he had been their leader, every soldier in the army would have felt confident that they would drive the French out of Italy. But in addition to his great military ability, the new governor of Hungary is well known for the severity, almost the brutality, of his manners. Under Radetsky, he was head of the staff of the second army in Italy. He was so unpopular in the country, that he was removed when a policy of conciliation was introduced. The concession is therefore accompanied by a distinct intimation that the government will go no farther, and has something of defiance about it.